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Abstract 
State Policies and Public Facility Location: the 
Hospital Services of North East England? 1948-1982. 
Despite the importance of public facilities in everyday 
life~ as yet there is little agreement on how a theory of public 
facility location is to be produced. Following a review and 
evaluation of previous research~ it is argued that public 
facility location should be analysed within the context of 
a theory of society and of the state. This in turn necessitates 
an assessment of akernative theoretical propositions concerning 
the state. 
Following this~ an account is presented of major 
developments in the hospital services in the area covered by 
the Newcastle RHB (Northern RHA from 1974). This account 
discusses the nature of and reasons for the changing character 
of state intervention in the British economy since the war~ 
and traces the implications of these changes for spatial 
aspects of hospital provision. Detailed studies are presented 
of disputes on local hospital strategy. This material is 
structured thematically so as to facilitate commenting on the 
role of the state. 
A concluding chapter summarises the empirical material~ 
assesses the relative merits of various approaches to 
theorising the state, and considers the implications of this 
research for public facility location theory. 
John Moh:1n 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter will outline the aims of this thesis 
(section 1.1), provide a sketch of its structure (section 1.2), 
and consider the methods employed, the sources of evidence 
consulted and the problems encountered in the conduct of this 
research (section 1.3). 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
On an autobiographical note, the author's interest in the 
location of medical facilities dates initially from a period 
of employment spent investigating alternative spatial arrange-
ments of hospital facilities for Durham AHA. This raised a 
variety of issues, not only about hospital planning, but 
also about the adequacy of geographical research on public 
sector location issues, which seemed to offer some scope for 
future research. 
Consequently, an attempt is made (chapter 2) to provide 
a selective review of geographical research on public facility 
location. This will evaluate prev1ous work and put forward 
alternative proposals, in the light of various arguments which 
have demonstrated the limitations of the techniques of regional 
science and - by implication ~ spatial analysis within 
geography (Gregory, 1978; Lewis and Melville, 1978; Sayer, 1976). 
In proposing an alternative, the views of Dear (1978a 1979) 
on a reconstruction of facility location theory are evaluated. 
Specifically, Dear argues that a theory of the state, embedded 
within a theory of society, is essential to an understanding 
of the spatial aspects of public facility provision. 
With this in mind, chapter 3 reviews and evaluates 
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alternative theoretical propositions on the state. Pluralist 
and managerialist views are rejected as being inadequate - on 
their own - to give a satisfactory account of state policy 
formulation~ the former because of its denial of any links 
between political power and social class~ the latter on the 
grounds that it overemphasises the role of 'managers' at 
the expense of an adequate theorisation of the constraints 
under which they operate. In considering marxist perspectives, 
particular attention is paid to the work of Offe on the 
problem of policy formation, since this is crucial to an 
understanding of resource allocation on the part of the 
capitalist state. 
Following this, the empirical material focuses upon 
issues in hospital planning in North-East England from 
1948-1982, at two interrelated levels. Firstly (chapters 4-7) 
the development of policies at national level, and their 
implications for planning at the sub-regional scale, is 
examined historically, focusing on the problems of hospital 
planning within the area served by the Newcastle RHB and its 
successor authority, the Northern RHA (see Appendix 1 for 
details of NHS administrative structures) . The material has 
been selected in order to explore the validity of the 
theoretical propositions concerning the state advanced in 
chapter 3; no attempt has been made to provide a fully 
comprehensive account of spatial changes in hospital provision 
within the area studied. Rather the emphasis is on the constraints 
under which planners operate, upon the way state policies are 
formulated, and upon their selective character. These issues 
are explored further by reference to detailed studies of local 
policy conflicts over the siting of individual hospitals or 
-3-
groups of hospita~s; these studies are of developments in 
Newcastle upon Tyne~ the Sunderland area~ and eastern County 
Durham (chapters 8-10). The material for presentation in those 
chapters is outlined below; it is believed that it will 
contribute to the understanding of a variety of issues? as 
follows. 
Firstly? while historical studies exist of the development 
of the British hospital system (Abel-Smith, 1964) and of the 
1962 Hospital Plan (Allen, 1979) there exists as yet no 
detailed examination of the post-World War II hospital 
services. Furthermore, while health service policy formulation 
has received a great deal of attention at the national scale 
(for example Navarro, 1978; Doyal, 1979; Widgery, 1979; 
Eckstein, 1959) as yet there is a dearth of studies of planning 
at the regional and subregional scale. An exception (Ham, 1981) 
deals with the hospital service only in passing. With specific 
reference to spatial aspects of hospital planning, Cowan (1967) 
is an interesting descriptive account, but Mayhew (1979) simply 
attempts to extend central place theory to provide a location 
theory for hospital services; neither pay explicit attention to 
the role of the state in shapihg these patterns. In the light 
of the above, this thesis aims to facilitate an understanding 
of the changing pattern of hospital provision at the subregional 
and local scale, focusing on the procedures whereby resource 
allocation decisions are taken, and interpreting this in the 
context of theories of the state. 
A further theme, to which relatively little attention 
appears to have been paid, is that of the relationship between 
the intentions of NHS planners and the objectives of other 
agencies of the state. With the exceptions of Parston's (1980) 
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study of the development of health services for the new town of 
Milton Keynes~ and Eyles~ Smith and Woods '(1982) demonstration 
of the contradictory effects of NHS resource allocation and 
inner city policy initiatives~ few studies exist of such issues. 
Hence an attempt is made to consider the links between hospital 
planning and other spatial policies in the study area (chapter 
8)~ thereby building on previous investigations of state 
policies in North East England (Carney and Hudson~ 1974; 1976; 
1978; Hudson~ 1976; 1979; Robinson~ 1978). 
Thirdly, it is hoped to contribute to the development of a 
geography of human welfare (Smith, 1977; 1979) by examining in 
depth the processes whereby patterns of public service provision 
develop. Spatial aspects of health care provision have been 
studied at the aggregate, regional scale (e.g. Rathwell, 1980; 
Eyles, Smith and Woods, 1982), but little has been done on the 
more local scale, decision-making often being inferred from 
its outcomes (Phillips~ 1981, 169). This research may assist 
in closing this gap by investigating decision-making in 
detail. 
In summary, the aims of this thesis are fourfold: 
(1) to evaluate critically geographical work on public facility 
location problems, indicating in what direction this could 
profitably move (chapter 2); 
(2) to review and evaluate certain theoretical propositions 
concerning the state, with regard to their utility in 
assisting an interpretation of the spatial outcomes of 
social processes (chapter 3) ; 
(3) to discuss major developments 1n the acute hospital 
services of post~war Britain, focusing in particular on 
the implications of these for hospital planning in the 
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Newcastle RHB (Northern RHA from 1974 - see Append~x 1) 
(chapters 4-7); 
(4) to reconstruct in detail the decision-making processes 
whereby hospitals are located (chapters 8-10). 
With these aims in mind an outline of the thesis is now 
presented. 
1.2 Thesis outline 
Brief accounts of chapters 2 and 3, and of the issues 
discussed therein, have already been provided; here, attention 
is directed to an outline of the chapters concerned with 
issues in the subregional allocation of hospital services 
(section 1.2.l),and to a discussion of the way the material 
from the local case studies has been structured. 
1.2.1 Hospital planning 1948-1982: national policy 
and local impacts 
Since this thesis is concerned with the post-war hospital 
services of North East EnglandJ it is important to provide an 
historical background to the problems facing the NHS in 1948. 
Hence chapter 4 examines the development of the British 
hospital services prior to the setting up of the NHS, focusing 
upon the wartime negotiations on the future form of the service 
and upon the problems which faced planners in 1948. 
Chapter 5 then discusses hospital planning from 1948 to 
1962, the year in which the Hospital Plan was announced. Firstly, 
the reasons for the restraint of NHS expenditure in the first 
few years of the service are examined, and the implications of 
this for hospital development in the study area are then 
considered. The origin of the 1962 Hospital Plan is then 
accounted for in terms of two related developments. Politically, 
-6-
there was a trend towards economic planning on the part of the 
British state, while, on a technical level, there emerged 
proposals for increasing the size of individual hospital units. 
Chapter 6 addresses itself to the Hospital Plan and its 
implementation up to the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS, out-
lining the proposals of the plan and the impact of revisions 
to it, considering the constraints on its implementation, and 
examining the social implications of concentration of hospital 
services. 
Chapter 7 then analyses the implications for hospital 
planning of public expenditure restraint and/or rationalisation 
from 1974 to 1982. Two issues are discussed in depth, namely, 
hospital developments in Newcastle upon Tyne, and the revision 
of hospital policy in 1980. 
1.2.2 The local case studies 
p 
These occupy chafers 8 to 10; here,, the reasons for their 
choice ~~outlined, and a justification is provided .for the way 
the material is structured. 
The three case studies are concerned with developments in 
the hospital services of Newcastle upon Tyne, the Sunderland area, 
and the eastern part of County Durham. The first of these, the 
planning of Newcastle's hospital services, was extensively 
debated by a variety of interest groups and agencies of the state, 
both medical and non-medical. Hence the interaction of these 
groups, and the way their competing claims were resolved, is 
of particular interest; the sheer complexity of the issues 
involved is in itself sufficient justification for this case 
study. 
The other ·two examples chosen posed rather different 
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problems to those of Newcastle, because of the developments 
- in the Sunderland AHA and eastern County Durham - of the new 
towns of Washington and Peterlee respectively. These develop-
ments posed both political and technical problems for health 
service planners and it is the way such problems were resolved 
that is of interest. 
Rather than simply reconstruct the planning process in 
each case, however, it was felt that the material would be more 
profitably employed if structured thematically. This would not 
only assist in emphasising the themes common to the three 
issues, it would also facilitate commenting on the role of the 
state. The material from these three studies was therefore 
organised as follows. 
Firstly, it is argued that it is unrealistic to discuss 
hospital planning in the study area without reference to more 
general themes in intra-regional spatial policy in the post-war 
years. Hence a summary is presented of these themes (chapter 
8.1) and their relationship to hospital planning is examined 
(chapter 8.2). Thus the Washington and Peterlee cases provide 
useful illustrations of the problems posed for NHS planners by 
the development of new towns. An attempt is also made to link 
the theme of the urban redevelopment of Newcastle to the 
intentions of certain participants in a dispute on the future 
organisation of the city's hospital services. 
Chapter 9 then illustrates the way technical planning 
procedures have been applied in an attempt to resotve the 
disputes described in chapter 8; here, the focus is not only 
upon the technical adequacy of the methods employed but also 
on the use to which they are put, as well as the extent to which 
political problems may be solved by such methods. The Durham 
and Sunderland cases perhaps exemplify this best, but it is also 
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argued that - in the Newcastle case - a model or image of what 
was presented as an appropriate form of hospital provision~ was 
used to justify the proposals of one of the groups involved in 
the dispute over the planning of Newcastle's hospital services. 
Finally~ chapter 10 considers how the state responds to 
particular political demands for hospital provision (chapter 
10). In Newcastle~ this involved a variety of interest groups, 
prominent medical professionals~ planning agencies and local 
politicians;the interaction of these is of considerable interest. 
The Durham study illustrates the resolution of a dispute between 
the Northern RHA and the Durham AHA concerning the criteria on 
which hospital poLicy was to be based~ Finally~ the study o£ 
developments in Sunderland AHA exemplifies the way the state 
responds to community pressure for hospital provision. It is 
felt~ therefore~ that organising the evidence in this way 
permits more general comment to be made on both health service 
planning and on the operations of the state. 
1.3 Methods, sources and problems 
The methods employed in this study essentially involve a 
reconstruction of developments and decisions in the hospital 
services of North East England. To do this, a considerable 
variety of state papers~ planning documents, health authority 
material, press, biographical and autobiographical material was 
consulted, and the intention here is to note some problems 
associated with these; the principal sources consulted are 
recorded in Appendix 2. 
Investigation of the policies of central government relied 
on papers held at the Public Record Office (PRO); Ministry of 
Health and DHSS reports, papers and circulars; and the evidence 
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provided by Parliamentary committees investigating the 
implementation of specific policies. 
The '30-year' rule -whereby material held by the PRO is 
unavailable for public inspection for a minimum of 30 years -
is~ of course~ the most binding constraint on an investigation 
of the internal operations of central government. However~ there 
are also problems with the PRO filing system - such as 
duplication, preservation of 'unimportant' records and loss of 
significant ones; furthermore~ papers were not always filed 
chronologically (Pater, 1981, xii). Hence any research based 
on PRO services is only as good as the filing system in 
operation there; but, by contrast with the available material 
for subsequent years, PRO material is extremely valuable insofar 
as it allows a detailed investigation of the various policy 
options that were discussed at the setting up of the NHS. 
Government documents for the intervening 30 years can be 
very superficial by comparison; it is not possible to account for 
allocations of NHS capital expenditure simply by reference to the 
limited information contained - for instance - in Ministry of 
Health papers and circulars. This poses especially acute 
problems when interpreting such a crucial document as the 
Hospital Plan (Ministry of Health, 1962); it is impossible to 
reconstruct why some hospitals were to be closed and others 
developed, other than by inference from the details given in 
the final policy document (this is not, incidentally, a problem 
unique to hospitals, as Krieger's (1979) work on coalmine 
closures shows). Reports of government committees (e.g. Select 
Committees o.n Estimates; House of Commons Social Services 
Committee) may provide more information, though the evidence 
available is constrained by the members.hip of the committee 
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co::lce::-ned, since the specific investigations pursued are 
chosen by the members themselves (Ingle and Tether, 1981). 
On the positive side, the sustained questioning characteristic 
of such investigations may yield more explicit statements on 
government policy than are usually available. 
For material concerned with more local issues of hospital 
strategy, reliance was placed largely on the papers of the 
Newcastle RHB and the Northern RHA; access was also granted to 
the files of Newcastle AHA (T) for a more detailed study. The 
material consulted included planning files on major policy 
issues, correspondence with other statutory authorities (such 
as NTDCs)and annual accounts and reports, as well as (since 
1974) ~trategic and dperational plans, and background papers. 
The full Board Minutes of the RHB and RHA were not examined; 
access was available to the papers of the relevant sub-
committees of these bodies (for example, the Planning Committee 
of the RHB) and since this provided detailed information about 
the policy issues being analysed in depth, there was generally 
no need to check the Board minutes for further details. 
Survival of evidence was of course a crucial problem; for 
instance, the capital accounts of the Board of Governors of the 
United Newcastle upon Tyne teaching hospitals were unavailable, 
as well as a variety of RHB files on what appeared to be 
relevant topics. In addition~ the RHB's submission to the 
Hospital Plan could not be traced. 
Additional informabon was obtained through press, auto-
biographical, biographical and commentary sources, though such 
material has only been drawn upon when corroboration from 
documentary sources has proved impossible. Press sources are 
problematic to the extent that news is created, rather than 
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recorded with total objectivity~ and for this reason press 
quotes attributed to prominent public figures cannot necessarily 
be taken as a totally accurate record of their opinions and 
intentions. However~ since some of the key personnel to which 
reference is made are now dead~ press sources do provide an 
- admittedly imperfect - source of evidence. Autobiographical~ 
biographical and commentary material may also provide important 
insights; this is especially so in the case of the diaries of 
Richard Crossman (1976) and Barbara Castle (1980)~ which are 
very useful on the internal workings of central government for 
a period still covered by the 30-year rule. Crossman (1976 vol. 
III, 656-659) also provides a detailed account of his personal 
involvement in the resolution of the dispute over hospital 
strategy for Newcastle upon Tyne (see chapter 10) . Caution in 
interpretation must be exercised~ however, for Crossman almost 
certainly exaggerates his own role and position; this seems to 
be the case in the issue referred to. Likewise~ writing a 
biography offers the author a chance to portray his subject 1n 
a favourable light~ with the benefit of hindsight. Thus Foot 
(1973) almost certainly over emphasises the role of Aneurin 
Bevan in setting up the NHS. While Bevan's personal initiative, 
negotiating skill and political commitment were undoubtedly 
of importance, a variety of other forces and individuals were 
involved and Foot's account seems to underplay these - though 
he does throw valuable new light on the evidence of public 
documents. Finally, the value of commentary material is, to 
say the least, uneven, which is perhaps not surprising given the 
variety of political perspectives from which the NHS has been 
analysed. While such sources may provide additional evidence to 
support or illuminate points made in this thesis, the reliance 
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placed upon them is minimal. 
From the above, it should be clear that the various sources 
of evidence employed present a variety of problems. Though 
these might be overcome - at least in part. - by interviews with 
key decision-makers, reliance on this source poses two further 
problems. One of these - the problem of identification of 
key personnel (Saunders, 1979, 328-335) - is not crucial here; 
in the issues discussed it was usually possible to identify 
influential individuals from the papers to which the author had 
access. However,the modus operandi of state agencies in 
contemporary Britain is such that the formal meetings of - for 
instance - an Area Health Authority - may be of limited value 
to an understanding of decision-making. This is because the 
influence of administrators is crucial in terms of selecting 
and evaluating alternative policy options~ and so the 
examination of background papers~ and of documents concerning 
meetings of Authority members and officials, prepared by health 
authorities, is perhaps the most vi tal source o.f evidence drawn 
on here. This is not meant to imply that power is concentrated 
in administrators as a result solely of their technical 
expertise. Rather it is to suggest that detailed analysis of 
the record of events outside the formal meetings of NHS planning 
bodies is of some importance if a full account is to be given 
of the manner in which policy options are debated. In this 
sense there would be relatively little to be gained from interviews 
moreover, the value of interviews is limited by problems of 
recall and possibly, indeed, by the selective character of 
individuals' accounts of events (Ha.m, 1981, 14). Though formal 
interviews were therefore avoided, it should be noted that 
considerable time was spent in health authority offices while 
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gathering information. This gave the author an opportunity 
both to observe the on-going work of a planning department~ and 
to discuss NHS planning in some detail with those involved 
in it. 
1.4 Summary 
This introductory chapter has provided an account of the 
aims and structure of the thesis and of the sources of 
evidence used and of the problems associated with these. Since 
the basis of the thesis is an essentially interpretative approach 
- as argued in chapter 2 - it would be premature to state any 
conclusions at this point. Comments specific to each chapter 
are included at appropriate points, and the concluding chapter 
draws together the main themes of the thesis, assesses the 
extent to which its aims have been fulfilled, considers the 
problems encountered, and points to areas to which future 
research might be directed. 
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2. Human geography and public facility location: a review, 
evaluation, and some proposals. 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the aims of Teitz's (1968) sketch of a public 
facility location theory, Harvey (1973, 90) was still able to 
claim that geographical work on this subject had 'not progressed 
very much beyond the point of relatively simply model 
articulation~. More recently however, Dear (1974; 1978a; 
1979) has outlined alternative proposals for facility location 
theory. This chapter reviews and evaluates t'he proposals of 
both Teitz and Dear, commencing with a discussion of the work 
of Teitz and the research stimulated by him (section 2.2). This 
is then evaluated (section 2.3) and section 2.4 then presents 
an assessment of alternative proposals for public facility 
location theory, drawing not only on the views of Dear but also 
on a variety of commentaries on developments in human geography 
(Gregory, 1978; Harv~y, 1973; Lewis and Melville, 1978; Sayer, 
1976). 
Before proceeding, three points should be made clear. Firstly, 
the intention is not to provide a comprehensive literature review 
since detailed bibliographies (Freestone, 1977; Lea, 1973) and 
reviews (Hodgart, 1978; Lea, 1981) already exist. Rather the 
literature is used selectively, to exemplify particular problems 
of certain approaches to this topic. Secondly, considerable 
emphasis will be laid on the arguments of Teitz and Dear - the 
only authors who have explicitly attempted to develop a theory 
of facility location - and this is somewhat problematic; in 
evaluating the contribution of individuals to a discipline, 
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selective quotation could create a misleading impression 
(Lewis and Melville, 1978, 92). Thirdly, some criteria are 
evidently required against which alternative approaches to the 
development of theory may be assessed. Though a full review of 
the varied debates, in both the physical and human sciences, 
concerning the grounds on which such decisions are made would 
be beyond the scope of this thesis (see, inter alia, Kuhn, 1970;, 
Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975; Giddens, 1976; 
Johnston, 1979a; Wheeler, 1982) emphasis here is laid on two 
criteria. 
Firstly, an assessment of previous work on public facility 
location is provided which considers the technical difficulties 
of modelling facility systems, the problems inherent in 
attempting to construct a location theory for public facilities 
along the same lines as that developed for industrial location, 
and the extent to which previous research has been able to 
consider all issues relevant to its object of study. 
Secondly, while the problems identified could perhaps be 
resolved, at one level, via more sophisticated techniques, it 
is also necessary to assess the extent to which the work reviewed 
gives a satisfactory account of its object of study. For 
example, it may be that the techniques of spatial science 
discussed below provide little more than a generalised 
mathematical representation of the outcomes or appearances 
of social processes. 
In presenting this evaluation the emphasis will largely 
be on assessing previous work on its own terms. It will be 
argued that several problems exist which will not be overcome 
within existing frameworks but which, instead, require an 
alternative conception of theory. In putting forward such an 
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alternative the views of Dear (1978a 9 1979) are accepted as 
a point of departure~ though several issues requ1re 
clarification; these concern not only Dear's justification for 
his views but also certain weaknesses in his arguments. 
Discussion therefore commences by reviewing Teitz's original 
proposals and the research which has followed them. 
2.2 Public facility location: a review of research in 
human geography. 
Until the mid-1960s, research on public sector location 
problems had been limited in scope; Thompson (1965, 118) 
contends that public finance concepts had been 'largely spaceless' 
and facility location h~d received scant attention in the 
literature concerned with service provision (see, for instance, 
the bibliographies on central place theory by Berry (1967) and 
Berry and Pred (1961)). Noting the importance of public 
facilities in everyday life (Teitz, 1968, 35)Teitz attempted to 
construct an independent location theory for public facilities; 
the emergence of his proposals can be related to four factors. 
An overall context was undoubtedly provided by what Peet 
(1977, 243) terms society's demands for 'spatial efficiency 
and strategic planning' - witness, for instance, the establish-
ment of the Centre for Environmental Studies under the Labour 
Government in Britain (Crossman, 19 76 ( vol. 1 ) 233) . Secondly, 
the developing techniques of spatial operations research 
(Cooper, 1963; Kuhn and Kuenne, 1962) were allied, thirdly, to 
an (assumed)analogy between private sector location theory and 
the characteristics of public facility systems. Finally, the 
extension and refinement of computer technology facilitated the 
solution of the colossal combinatorial problems involved in the 
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spatial analysis of facility systems (see Tornquist et al~ 
1971; Scott~ 1970; 1971). It was against this background that 
Teitz attempted to sketch a theory of public facility location~ 
though he restricted himself from the start by proposing that 
this could be achieved simply by extending the substantive 
domain of regional science to include public facilities (Teitz~ 
1968, 35). Hence Dear's (1978a~ 97) observation that Teitz had 
both 'stimulated and confined' research on facility location; 
the following amplifies this by summarising Teitz's views. 
Though Teitz argued by analogy with private sector location 
theory~ he recognised two qualifications. Firstly~ the 
objective function of a facility location theory would differ from 
that of industrial location theory; whereas in the latter, 
concepts of profit and loss could be operationalised with little 
difficulty~ this was not true for the public sector. Secondly~ 
public facility provision has to be evaluated in system terms. 
In its neoclassical form, by contrast, private sector location 
theory usually focuses on the locational strategies o£ 
individual production units in response to market forces (see 
-Smith~ D., 1971, for a review). However, in the public sector~ 
the question of whether or not individual units should continue 
to operate is not simply subject to market forces. It follows 
that analyses must consider not simply static location problems 
for individual units, but rather multiple location problems in 
a dynamic framework. At best this poses serious analytical 
problems; at worst~ it may well be that the construction of a 
location theory for public facilities - along the lines of that 
developed for the private sector - is an impossible task. 
Teitz then classified public facilities, in terms of their 
outputs (public or collective-use goods; zero or short-run 
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marginal cost goods; and merit goods); their· geometric properties 
(point patterns or networks); their interactions (both with 
other facilities and with the rest of the urban system); and 
in terms of the extent to which they exhibited hierarchical 
structuring. 
Thirdly» Teitz noted that» since public faciDties were 
the responsibility of the government, the operational criteria 
whereby they were allocated could not easily be specified. 
Being unable to incorporate the political aspects of service 
provision into his proposals» Teitz conceded that 'most of the 
interesting problems still remain'; he therefore confined 
himself to an identification of the 'opposing forces of the 
economies of scale and the advantages of dispersion' (Teitz, 
1968» 42) and indeed a considerable quantity of research has 
addressed this 'equity versus efficiency' aspect of public 
facility location (Symons, 1971; McAllister, 1976, McGrew and 
Monroe, 1975; Bigman and Revelle, 1978; 1979). 
Finally, Teitz's models of how public facilities might be 
provided took as their point of departure a 'formidable' set 
of assumptions concerning demand, cost and pricing mechanisms, 
and derived likely relationships between several variables, such 
as scale and consumption, scale and cost, and scale and number 
of facilities (figure 2.1 a,b,c). Crftcially, however, Teitz 
admitted that he was 'unable to incorporate the location problem 
into a pure analytic model' - though he did offer suggestions 
as to how this might be achieved. 
In sum~ary, therefore, Teitz's principal contribution 
to facility location theory was to identify the potential 
applicability of the techniques of regional science to this 
topic. Much subsequent research has remained within this 
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framework: typically~ linear programming models~ computer 
technology and analogies with private sector location have been 
used to solve location-allocation problems. These can be 
regarded as special cases of mathematical programs; they seek 
to optimise flows - of goods or people - between supply and 
demand points, in relation to specified objective functions and 
subject to specified constraints (Beaumont~ 1979; 1980). An 
example from private sector location theory would be Weber's 
(1909) model of industrial location: taking their cue from this, 
initial analyses of facility location had sought that spatial 
arrangement of services whereby aggregate distance travelled 
was minimised (e.g. Cooper, 1963; 1967; Kuhn and Kuenne, 1962). 
More recent developments have sought to relax some of the over-
simplistic behavioural assumptions of earlier models, for instance 
by the incorporation of spatial interaction concepts (Beaumont 
1980). Such procedures have been increasingly widespread in 
their application (e.g. Godlund, 1961; Cox, 1965; Gould and 
Leinbach, 1966; Hodgart, 1978; Robertson, 1976; 1977; 1978; 
Beaumont and Sixsmith, 1982) and a considerable range of 
techniques are now available (see Leonardi, 198la, b; Leonardi 
and Mayhew, 1982; Mayhew and Leonardi, 1982). Few would 
dispute the view of Olsson (1975, 49) that such developments 
are admirable, if only for their technical virtuosity, but it 
will now be argued that problems related to and inherent in 
such work seriously restrict its contribution to the development 
of a comprehensive public facility location theory. These 
arguments are now outlined. 
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2.3 Evaluation 
Following the arguments of section 2.1, the research 
discussed above is now evaluated. Section 2.3.1 considers some 
technical problems pertinent to the modelling of facility 
systems, and notes some of the issues given limited consideration, 
or even ignored, by previous work. Section 2.3.2 then contends 
that even if the problems outlined in section 2.3.1 were soluble 
by more sophisticated techniques, there are grounds for the claim 
that the construction of a location theory for public facilities, 
similar to that developed for the private sector, is an 
unrealizeable goal. 
2.3.1 Limitations of previous research on 
facility location 
Two points are made here. The first is that previous 
research has provided a restricted account of issues related to 
its object of study. Secondly, the approach taken by various 
analysts has in itself confined the manner in which this topic 
can be discussed. 
First1y, it seems that mathematical programming 
solutions to location-allocation problems dominate the 
literature, at the expense of a consideration of the distributive 
consequences of decisions ,in the public sector. The conventional 
assumption that the analogy with Weber;s industrial location 
model was both appropriate and socially acceptable (Scott, 1970, 
96) has, in fact, produced inequitable solutions; distance-
minimizing procedures imply a concentration of facilities into 
large centres of population, thereby discriminating against 
some people or areas (Morrill, 1974, 41). One response has 
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been to analyse the supposed trad~-cff between 1 efficiency 1 
and 'equity' in service provision (e.g. McAllister~ 1976; 
McGrew and Monroe~ 1976). Efficiency is usually taken to 
imply some kind of distance-minimisation criterion, whereas 
equity is associated with a more dispersed pattern of provision 
which, though 'suboptimal' if evaluated in aggregate distance 
terms~ reduces the variability in distance travelled by users 
of facilities. Since public facilities are generally provided 
at discrete locations~ it is evidently impossible to reconcile 
completely these two objectives~ the closest approximation, 
given em acceptance.of his assumptions~ being the hypothetical 
pattern of Christaller 1 s central place theory (Morrill, 1974). 
An alternative response has therefore been to attempt to 
incorporate more sophisticated concepts of equity (Kellerman, 
1981) and accessibility (Bach, 1980; White, 1979) into modelling 
procedures. This arguably approximates more closely to real-
world conditions, but posing the problem of public facility 
provision in. technical terms, as a trade-o·ff between equity and 
efficiency~ may ignore -whether int~ntionally or not - both 
the purposes of and constraints upon state intervention (Scott 
and Roweis, 1977~ 1111; see also Lindberg et al, 1975). Indeed 
such criteria as efficiency or equity cannot be taken as 'non-
scientific presuppositions a~utwhich one can do nothing' 
(Horkheimer, 1972, 207); put another way, there is no 
justification for ascribing some kind of absolute status to 
'equity' or 'efficiency', since they are essentially relative 
concepts. 
It can be argued, therefore, that by attempting to develop 
more sophisticated modelling procedures~ analyses of public 
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facility location within the framework o£ regional science have 
considered only a limited range of issues; though the 
distributional aspects of public facility provision have been 
discussedy this has largely been in the context of analysing 
the 'equity/efficiency trade-off', and still less discussion 
is evident of the political aspects of this topic. Alternative 
approaches which attempt to bridge these gaps are themselves 
not without problems. For instancey analyses of the 
distributional impacts of public facility location, within the 
spirit of a 'welfare' geography (Smith, D., 1977; 1979) have 
encountered technical problems related to the measurement of 
such issues as accessibility (Moseley, 1979), externalities 
(Dear, Fincher and Currie, 1977), and need or demand for services 
(Davies, 1968; Runciman,l967). Though important evidence on 
distributional inequalities has been gathered (Coates and 
Rawstron,l971; Coates, Johnston and Knox, 1977; Cox, 1973; 1980; 
Smith, D. 1973; 1977; 1979), the accumulation of such evidence 
may be 'counter-revolutionary' (Harvey, 1973, 144-145) unless 
it is interpreted within a satisfactory theoretical frame~ork, 
and it has been claimed that such a framework does not exist as 
yet (Dear, 1978b). However, it will be argued below that this 
problem may be overcome by an appropriate reorientation of 
facility location theory. 
Furthermore, the political aspects of public facility 
provision have received limited consideration. This is not 
surprising in the case of analyses of this subject within the 
framework of regional science; political issues are treated as 
beyond the researcher's sphere of competence, given a conception 
of social science in which the analyst merely provides a 
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technical input to the solution of social problems. (Lewis 
and Melville, 1978). More generally, it may be that there 
exists confusion over what is 'political' about political 
geography (Taylor, 1982). Whatever the reason, consideration 
of political aspects of public service provision has been partial 
and limited. Three approaches can be identified. Firstly~ 
statistical associations have been identified between service 
distribution and 'political' variables such as voting patterns 
or the political composition of local authorities (see~for 
instance, Pinch, 1978; Johnston 1979 b, c). However, such work 
cannot permit the unambiguous identification of linkages of a 
causal character. Secondly, procedures have been developed to 
simulate locational conflict over service. provision (Austin et 
al., 1970; Mumphrey and Seley, 1973); however, such approaches 
merely attempt to pick out features common to disputes rather 
than analysing why decisions happen the way they do. Thirdly, 
the role of 'urban managers' in shaping spatial patterns has 
received much attention (see, for example, nuncan, 
1976; Gray, 1976; Leonard~ 19.80; 1982; Moon, 1981; Williams,. 
1976; 1978;. 1982). However (as will be argtied more extensively 
in chapter 3) such approaches ultimately over-emphasise the 
actions of individuals or institutions, at the expense of a 
fuller consideration of the constraints under which they operate. 
However, despite extensive debates on the role of the state, almost 
no attempts have been made to relate them to patterns of public 
facility provision (but see Eyles, Smith and Woods, 1982; 
Leonard, 1980). It therefore appears that analyses of political 
and distributive aspects of public facility provision have not 
been entirely satisfactory, especially in terms o£ accounting 
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for the spatial outcomes of public decisions. 
Furthermore, it may not be possible to develop a 
location theory for the public sector along the same lines as 
private sector location theory. Dear (1974, 47) argues that 
notwithstanding the problems associated with the neo-classical 
theory of the firm as a basis for location theory (on which see 
Massey, 1973), the concepts of such theory have simply been 
transmitted to the public sector in a 'superficial tinkering' 
with private sector location theory. Moreover, by remaining 
within the epistemological confines of regional science, research 
has toncentrated largely on more accurate representation in 
modelling procedures,which have become increasingly sophisticated 
(see Beaumont, 1979; 1980; Leonardi, 1981 a, b). The 
internal consistency and technical sophistication of such work 
is not at issue here. However, by focusing largely upon 
technical issues, such research may slide into what Carney 
(1973, 175) terms a 'point pattern positivism', which only 
contributes to a comprehensive theory of facility location to 
the extent that it permits more 'rational' or 'realistic' spatial 
planning. But this begs the question of whether, given the 
complexity of state policy making, optimisation of public 
decisions is possible. The number of factors which have to be 
taken into account by the state in formulating its policies is 
considerable (Harvey, 1973, 90; Dear, 1979 a, 59). Moreover, 
structural constraints on the operations of the capitalist state 
render its goals difficult to specify and limit the extent to 
which its intentions can be achieved (see chapter. 3; see also 
Habermas, 1976 a, b; Offe, 1974; Offe and R©nge, 1975). Inci.ee,d 
the term 'optimisation' - which is used freely in the analyses 
reviewed here - is a relative, socially-defined concept, which 
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means different things to different people in different 
historical circumstances. Spatial modelling procedure thus 
seem to be attempting the impossible: how can decisions be 
'optimised' if the meaning of optimisation changes, and if it 
is impossible to identify what goals the state is seeking to 
achieve? 
It should be clear from the above, that there remain 
several obstacles to the development of a comprehensive theory 
of public facility location. The fragmented and limited treat-
ment of the subject is one aspect of this; doubt has also been 
cast on the possibility of paralleling private sector location 
theory in a public sector context; and_ certain problems remain 
in studying distributional and political aspects of facility 
location. However, these criticisms are at a relatively low 
level, emphasising gaps in the literature or hinting at technical 
problems. The next section there.fore points to problems inherent 
in the techniques of regional science which limit its ability 
to 'explain' the phenomena to which it is applied. 
2.3.2 Some theoretical problems of regional ~cience. 
Clearly, some impo~tant deficiencies exist in geographical 
research on public facility location. Of more fundamental 
importance, however, the kind of theory advocated by Teitz -
confined within the methodology of positivist regional science -
gives only a limited account of the issues it addresses. This 
is because of its debt to functionalist sociology and neo-
classical econoE!ics, and because of an adherence to a form of 
explanation which may ultimately be self...,.defeating. From these 
arguments it will be claimed that the problems identified are not 
soluble within this theoretical framework. 
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The linkages between human geography and neoclassical 
economics have been adequately demonstrated elsewhere (Gregory 
1978~ 198lb; Massey~ 1913) and are evident~ in this context 
in fue application of concepts from private sector location theory 
to facility location problems; an obvious example would be the 
assumed parallel with Weber's (190~ theory of industrial 
location. Two problems arise. Firstly~ such a form of theory 
exhibits ~~ial fetishi~; by treating space as if it were a 
given~ abstract, and absolute category (Sayer~ 1976)~ it treats 
relations between people~ between people and places~ or between 
individuals and society, in a very limited way( see 
Carney~ Hudson, Ive and Lewis, 1976~ 25; Anderson, 1973; 197-R). 
Thus it fails to provide an adequate account of how spatial 
patterns of objects - in this case public facilities - are related 
to social relationships between the people who created them 
(Lewis, 1978, 513). Secondly~ such a theory is static, in that lt 
takes as given the character of the organisation of the society 
to which it is app1ied and within which it is produced. Thus 
analyses of facility location tend to ignore~ or treat as 
unproblematic~ the wider social context of their objec~ of study 
and the fact that this context is continually changing. Moreover, 
because of their neglect of the relationships between patterns 
of public facilities and the organisation of the society within 
which they are provided~ simply developing models of change over 
time will not resolve the problems identified here. 
These problems are compounded by the functionalism implicit 
in regional science. Since the problems of functionalist approaches 
to SJCial theory in g,eneral and regional science in particular 
have been analysed elsewhere (Giddens, 1979, 1982; Sayer, 1976)~ 
discussion focuses on two issues although the -two problems referred 
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to above also arise from such approaches. 
Firstly~ functiona1ist approaches are characterised by 
a concern for observab1e aspects of human behaviour; they 
therefore ignore the motivatibns which underlie behaviour~ and 
the constrai~ts upon it. Hence~ mod~lling spatial aspects of 
health facility systems ignores the relationships between an 
individual's health status and his/her decision to seek health 
care (Cornwell~ 1982). Likewise~ once this decision has been 
taken there exist a variety of constraints imposed by the spatial 
arrangement of medical facilities (Girt~ 1973; Hart, 1971; 
Haynes and Bentham, 1979), by gender (Coupland, 1982) and class 
(DHSS, 1980b), and by the referral patterns of medical 
practitioners (Acheson et al~ 1962; Hassan, 1974; Rigby, 1978). 
Put another way, the limited consideration given to the social 
relations between individuals and institutions may render 
trivial the insights of such research - and indeed of much 
of behavioural geography more generally (see Massey, 1973; 
Rieser, 1972). 
Secondly, an instrumentalist attitude to research 
characterises functionalist approaches.. Although -the construction 
of universalistic laws in the human sciences may be an 
unrealistic project (Giddens~ 1979, 242-245), the development 
of models which analyse society as if this were the case is 
justified - it is claimed - because models need only be 
OQ_erationally useful approximations which serve as stimulating 
analytical tools (see Batty, 1979, for such a defence of regional 
science). Such a procedure only ass~sses models in terms of 
their predictive power and goodness of fit, rather than 
questioning their inod.·e ·of cohstruc"tion (Gregory, 197 8, 41) ; 
the latter may well be self-defeating in terms of the kind of 
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issues that can be considered. As Sayer (1979a~ 859) argues: 
'in the very first step of theorising, we throw 
away the most important opportunities for understanding ... 
tal~ about residential activities and you_ can quickly 
def1ne H and maybe Hj w~ but you have def1ned out 
descriptions of the 'mechanisms and agents which produce 
hous1ng• · 
- .~ 
(emphasis added) 
Hence attention is directed to improving the goodness of 
fit of models~ without questioning whether such procedures really 
assist an understanding of social processes. Moreover, when 
leading protagonists of such views argue that 'issues of 
theory ... are all concerned with making models more realistic' 
(Wilson and Clarke, 1981, ll),the implication is clearly that 
research should seek increasingly accurate representation in 
modelling procedures, presumably in the belief that lultimately) 
all the variables pertinent to the system of interest will be 
incorporated. This may be over-optimistic, however, because 
as Gregory (1978) has argued, positivist approaches to social 
science may ultimately collapse on their own terms. Since they 
are based upon deductive logic, such methods can only draw out 
what was implicit in their definition. The logical certainty 
of the conclusion is guaranteed by using such methods lHarvey, 
1969, 37) but this will not necessarily specify the social 
processes whereby the conclusion actually happens (Sayer, 
1979a~ 860). Moreover, positivism cannot lultimately) achieve 
its aims for two reasons. 
Firstly, 1t relies on constant relationships between 
observational and theoretical categories, yet this is inadequate 
insofar as it employs stationary categories of thought to cieal 
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with a shifting. universe (Olsson~ 1974). Such a problem will 
not be resolYed by attempts to reformulate location theory 
within the framework of welfare economics (e.g. Chisholm, 1971; 
Lea, 1919) for this also implies such a constant relationship 
(Gregory, 1978, 64-65). Secondly, positivism relies on a 
deductive-nomol6gical form of explanation, of the form: 
c + 
Initial 
Conditions 
L 
Laws 
Cet~risr:> 
Par1bus 
E 
Events 
(after 
Gregory 
1978,66-67] 
Yet this does not permit the definiti:ve acceptance or 
rejection of hypotheses, since if a predicted event does not 
occur, it is impossib.le to. distingui.Sht...the failure of the 
hypothesis from the failure of all conditions external to the 
test of theory to remain constant. Thus, for example, if models 
of spatial aspects of facility systems fail to 'correspond' to 
reality, there is no way of divining the reasons for this; it 
may be due ei the.r to incorrect .mode.l specification, or to the 
influence of external factors~ but there is no way of separating 
the.se. 
This section has attempted to reinforce the arguments of 
section 2.3.1 by highlighting :various problems internal to 
regional science - particularly its functionalism and positivist 
epistemology - which linlit its explanatory power. Responses to 
such criticisms have attempted to justify the further development 
of such models on the instrumentalist grounds (e.g. Batty, 1979) 
that they provide useful planning tools. However, it should be 
evident that continuing to analyse facility location from such 
a perspec.ti ve is somewhat pr<;>b.lematic_and so an alternative 
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approach is explored below. 
2. 3. 3 ,Summary 
This section has attempted to show how and why a 
comprehensive public facility location theory has not yet been 
developed within human geography; two pr1ncipal arguments have 
been presented. Firstly~ there has been excessive emphasis 
upon developing sophisticated mathematical programming techniques 
for the analysis of facility location. In consequence~ several 
issues - such as the political and distributive aspects of 
facility location - have received limited consideration. 
Secondly (section 2.3.2) there·are grounds for the claim that the 
methods employed will not provide an adequate theory due to a 
variety of theoretical problems internal to regional science. 
The foregoing has shown that these problems will not be resolved 
within the framew0rks criticised here and therefore section 2.4 
explores the potential of Dear's (1978a~ 1979) arguments for 
a revision of public facility location theory. 
2.4 An alte~natiye: public facility loGation theory 
as a 'theory of society'. 
Here the arguments o£ Dear (1978a; 1979) are outlined and 
then evaluated~ Though Dear's proposals seem to !epresent an 
advance on the work reviewed above~ several problems remain and 
require resolution. 
Dear's point of departure is that the 'paradigm' proposed 
by Teitz has 'stimulated and confined' research on public 
facility location, prevented experiment with alternative 
analytical formats~ and (within this 'paradigm') attempts to 
incorporate concepts of equity and also political aspects of 
facility location, have beeri conceptually naive (Dear, 19J8a, 
97) 0 Such claims, whic.h rest on similar arguments to those 
o£ section 2.3.1, are taken as nnn-contentious hereo 
Dear then follows Gregory (1978) in identifying human 
geography's excessive commitment to a positivist epistemology, 
and claims that progress away from this depends on reconstruction 
of facility location theory as a 'theory of societyu, by 
adopting an historical-hermeneutic approach to social theoryo 
This would facilitate interpretation o£ why patterns of public 
facility provision had taken the form they did; this would be 
achieved by setting and interpreting location decisions in the 
context of the 1wide.r social fo.rmation' . .Dea.r also argues that 
two othe.r components a.re an integral part of a .reconstituted 
facility location theory: these involve consideration of 
location as access and location as exte.rnalityo Taken togethe.r, 
these would permit an assessment of the dir~ct and indirect 
impacts of public decisions upon human welfa.re (Dea.r, 1978, 99). 
Finally, .Dear argues that a theo.ry o£ the state, embedded 
within a theo..ry of society, is of central impo.rtance to his 
alternative (Dear, 1979, 53-54). While only a sketch of Dea.r's 
position has been presented, it can be shown that various 
p.roblems remain unresolved within it. 
Firstly, Dear's case could have been made somewhat more 
forcefully. For instance, a cri tiq.ue of certain theoretical 
problems internal to regional science, along the lines of 
Sayer (1976), would have enabled a more convincing demonstration 
that such an approach cannot provide a comprehensive public 
facility location theory. It does not follow from Dear's 
arguments that the problems he identifies are insoluble within 
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the terms of reference of regional science. For instance~ to 
argue (as he does) that concepts of equity have been 
n conceptually naive 1 does not rule .out the· possibility that more 
sophisticated concepts cotild - and should - be developed, thereby 
overcoming this problem. Moreover, a fuller consideration of 
the nature and properties of the capitalist state would have 
underlined that applying the techniques of regional science 
to public facility location problems is ultimately inadequate. 
This arises from the contradictory tasks the state must carry 
out, and from the constraints upon and limits to state inter-
vention (see chapter 3). Such arguments would have reinforced 
Dearvs (1919, 61-62) claim that equilib.rium approaches to 
theory - based upon a consensus view of society and exemplified 
by the work reviewed above - ought to be replaced by views of 
society based on cbnflict (cf. Gray, 1975; Eyles, 1914), in 
order to take account of the various constraints on the planners 
of public services. In this way., more.over, the apparent 
optimism of various authors (e.g • .Mayhew, 191.9; Beaumont, 19 80) 
that spatial reorganisation of hospital services can easily be 
accomplished - or indeed 'optimized' - can be shown to be at 
best exaggerated, and at worst, the pursuit of an illusory goal. 
Strengthening his critique in this manner would have given 
Dear firmer grounds for his reformulation; in turn, this would 
have helped avoid the eclecticism which characterises his 
proposals. In particular, these appear to place questions of 
epistemology on the same level as matters of technique. The 
three components of Dear's proposals are concerned with location 
as externality (the indirect impacts of service provision), 
location as access (direct benefits to users of facilities) ;and 
location decisions in the context of the wider social forNation 
-34~ 
(Dear~ 19.78a~ 99). Though the first two of these are 
doubtless important, Dear focuses largely upon technical aspects 
of their assessment - for instance, by employing various 
regression analyses to 9 explain 1 patterns of service 
utilisation (Dear~ 19J8a~ 101-103). Such questions are at a 
lower level of abstraction than that of the conceptualisation 
of the 1 wider social formation', insofar as they take that 
context as given; by contrast~ an understanding of location 
decisions in the wider social formation would essentially be 
historically specific. 
Moreover, despite his advocacy of an historical-hermeneutic 
approach to theory, in preference to an empirical-analytic 
approach, Dear retains a place for the latter: 'mathematical 
and statistical methods have an integral role to play' (Dear, 
1979~ 62). How- indeed whether- alternative epistemologies 
can be combined in this way, is a contentious issue; as Eyles 
and Lee (1982- in response to Johnston (1980))argue, it is not 
legitimate to see them as complementary routes towards an 
explanatory account of social phenomena. Such eclecticism could 
slide into a relativism whereby 'conservative methodologies, 
liberal idealists, ma.rxists, socialists and others can co-exist' 
(Dear, 1979, 64), linked by a common interest in a particular 
facet of society but having no grounds for moving from one frame 
of reference to another. Though this might be acceptable to 
certain philosophers of science (e.g. Feyerabend, 1975), it does 
seem (see section 2.3) that grounds exist for advocating 
al ternat.ive approaches to replace - not to complement - those 
currently dominant in the literature, and these grounds are 
somewhat firmer than those offered by ~ear. 
Partly as a result of this eclecticism, then, Dear merely 
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asserts t.he supe.rio.rity of an historical-hermeneutic approach. 
This would be validated. by the success of its interpretations; 
in contrast~ empirical-analytic approaches (typified by much 
of the work reviewed above - see section 2.2) are validated 
by successful predictions. Put another way~ a distinction 
must be made between a social science based upon verstehen 
(or understanding of human behaviou~ as opposed to erkl~ren 
(explanation of behaviour in a manner analagous to the natural 
sciences- see MacDonald and Pettit, 1981, for further details). 
Choice of an historical-hermeneutic approach could lead to the 
kind of idealism espoused by Guelke (1974), which attempts 
nothing more than a reconstruction of the behaviour of decision-
makers. While no.t disputing that considerable work is essential 
if decision~making processes are to be reconstructed in detail 
(see chapters 8-10, below), to equate such accounts with 
explanation is to remain at a purely voluntaristic level (Harvey, 
1969, 56), as long as no account is taken of the constraints under 
which decision-makers operate. How this J.s to be accomplished 
occupies much of the remainder of this chapter: a materialist 
appr_oach. will be. ad.vo<:ated, and near's views will be assessed 
in this context. 
A materialist approach is adyocated for two reasons. Firstlyj 
Marx argued that a comprehensive understanding of society cannot 
be obtained through direct experience~ since there exists a 
distinction between the appearance of phenomena and their essence. 
Science is necessary precisely because appearance and essence 
do not coincide (Mandel, 1975, 15). Secondly, so as to link the 
two, a materialist approach emphasises that society has to be 
conceived of as a totality which is subject to continuous, 
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dialectical transformation. 
The importance of such an approach to the subject matter 
of this thesis is that positivist methods for analysing facility 
location have merely tapped reality at the level of appearances~ 
focusing on technical aspects of spatial modelling procedures. 
In addition~ the fragmented nature of previous research -
focusing on~ respectively~ the political~ distributive~ and 
externality effects of facility location, but rarely linking 
them- was emphasised above (section 2.3). The adv~ntages of 
a materialist approach here are in its ability to link essence 
and appearance and, 1n so doing, to assist in integrating the 
diverse research on this topic. 
There are, howe.ver, a variety of approaches to a materialist 
view of society. These will not~ however, be examined in detail 
(see Giddens, 1982; Collier, 1978); instead three central 
features of historical ma.terialism are identified. Firstly, 
materialis.m as a conception of human praxis, sees human beings 
neither as passive. ~Qjects nor as totally free agents. Secondly, 
materialism is a theory of social change which emphasises the 
primacy of economic factors; as will he shown below, howeve:r, 
this does not have to imply that the 'economic base' determines 
the 0 superstructure' of society. Finally, materialism offers 
a theory of the centrality of class divi~ions in society. The 
value of each o£ these features will be discussed in turn. 
First of all, materialism as a conception of human praxis 
provides valuable insights into the nature of human agency and 
its relationship to social structure. This was recognised by 
Marx in his argument that 'men make their own history but they 
do so under conditions not of their own choosing' (Marx, q~oted 
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1n Collier? 1978·~ 46). Hence it is inadequate simply to trace 
decisions to key individuals and, having done so, regard this 
as a satisfactory explanation. Such accounts only succeed in 
describing what human agents have achieved; they say little or 
nothing about the conditions under which certain decisions have 
been taken (Col~r? 1978, 48). As will become evident in the 
next chapter, focusing upon individuals' perceptions and 
subsequent behaviour may lead to voluntaristic explanations. 
However? it is important not to proceed to the other extreme, 
in which no scope at all is given to the actions of individuals; 
it is for this reason that some commentators have reacted sharply 
against what they see as an ove-r-mechanistic view. of .human 
agency in certain Marxist approaches (Duncan and Ley, 1982) 
whereby his tory is reduced to a 'conceptual meccano set' (Thompson , 
1978, 359). The value of a materialist view lies precisely in 
its 'contradictory combination of determinism and voluntarism' 
(Gouldner, 1980, 224). Thus the outcomes of state policy 
formulation are neither solely the result of interactions between 
individuals, acting in unconstrained pursuit of their own goals? 
nor are they simply a consequenc;e of the inexo.rable logic of 
the 'laws of motion' of capitalism, mediated through agencies 
of the state. Consequently it is important to understand - in 
general terms - the limits to the sco.pe of possible policy 
formation by the state, as well as examining what are essentially 
contingent outcomes in order to understand why particular 
decisions take the form they do, and to understand the extent 
to which the individual decision-makers possess - and are able to 
exert - autonomy in planning. 
Secondly? while historical materialism, as a theory of 
-38-
social change,lays a:1 emphasis on the primacy of econom1c factors, 
this is not to imply that the veconomic base 0 determines events 
in the v superstructure v. Unfortunately, Dea.r v s arguments seem 
structuralist and rather economistic: 
0 the pattern (of public facility provision) is 
inextricably determined by .the contemporary socio-
economic and political context. •• there is a direct 
correlation between social policy and spatial 
outcome 9 • 
(Dear, 1918a, 107, 110- emphases added). 
Likewise)> Dear argues that a geography of the public 
sector should focus upon: 
1 the material (especially economic) basis. of society, 
and particularly the processes· whereby it determines 
th~ super$truct~re of soc1al, legal and 
adm1nistrative solutions 9 • 
(Dear, 1919, 63- emphasis added). 
Such a view sees the state as little Jnore than an 
epiphenomenon - a reflection - of the economic base of society, 
yet, as various authors have demonstrated (see the debates 
summarised in chapter 3 and in Frankel, 1979; Gold et al, 1975; 
Holloway and Picciotto, 1918; Jessop, 1971) this would be a 
greatly over-simplified and impoverished view of the capitalist 
state. Thus, despite claiming. to have sketched a theory of 
-
facility location within an historical-materialist framework 
(1919, 63), Dear retains more than a hint of arid structuralism 
in his proposals. This is not merely a semantic quibble, 
because it is not adequa.te simply to 'read off' spatial patterns 
from the vprocesses of capitalist economic development', as 
Gray (1975, 231) seems to imply. Rather, the particular spatial 
patterns taken by - for example - the hospital services of North 
East England, are essentially contingent outcomes. These 
depend - inter alia - on the results of complex negotiations 
within and between agencies of thestate, and between these and 
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social groups located outside of the formal state apparatus 
(see chapters 4-10). Though ])ear .. points towards the broader 
social context within which.p.ublic _facility location :must 
be understood, the above quotes might be taken to imply a 
theory which simply demonstrates that 1 the spatial lattice 
exhibits, in frozen and displaced £arm~ a bundle of social 
relations 1 (Gregory, 1978 ~ 120). If this were indeed the case 
there would be relatively little point in conductihg empirical 
research on spatial patterns of human acti:vity, for it would be 
possible to derive these logically from the socio-economic 
context in which they were set. Such an approach would not only 
be entirely mechanistic in character but - to return to the 
previous point - it would rule out any consideration of the 
role of indi vi.dual dec is ion .makers and their relationship to 
wider social structures (see Gregory~ 198la). It may be 
concluded. that Dear's 1 theory of society 1 is so.mewha t .me chan is tic 
in conception, and that the relationship between the state and 
the economy. requires rather.more.detailed in:vestigation- a 
task carried but below (chapter 3). 
The third aspect of an historical ~aterialist approach 
emphasised here is its stress upon class struggle and class 
divisionin socie:ty. Instead of analysing society at the level 
of appearances via such 'chaotic conceptions' as total 
population (fo:r example), and .mo:ving fro.m these tm:mrds an 
understanding of society at a mo.re abstract level 9 Marx (1973,101) 
emphasises the central importance to be attached to property 
relations and social class in analysing society. Whereas the 
approaches reviewed above (section 2.2) have provided little 
more than generalisations about public facility systems at the 
level of appearances, this thesis s.eeks to illuminate the class 
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character of the state~ its implications for policy formulation, 
and thus demonstrate how the. outcoJTI.es of state administrative 
decisions are linked to the distribution of power in society. 
The implications of this for theorising the state will be 
considered in chapter 3. 
The advantages of a materialist approach to a theory of 
public facility location are therefore threefold. By 
emphasising that human beings (e.g. NHS planners) are not totally 
free agents, such an approach directs attention to the relation-
ship between agency and structure. Planning cannot simply be 
explained by reference to the intentions of key 'managers', 
thol}gh this is not to deny the importance of attempting a 
comprehensive reconstruction of the planning_ process. Secondly, 
in considering the relationship of the state to the economy, 
it is not adequate simply to treat this mechanistically as a 
reflection o£ the economic base; as will become evident in 
chapter 3, the picture is a rather more complicated one. Thirdly, 
a class analysis of society-is essentiaL; given that a discussion 
of events in capitalist society is being presented, moreover, 
it is important to ground analysis of the state in the capital 
relation (cf. Holloway and Picciotto, 1971). It is important, 
finally, to outline briefly the way these remarks contained in 
this chapter offer an advance on the proposals presented by 
Dear. 
Firstly, as argued above, Dear's case could have been 
strengthened which would have allowed him to base his re-
formulations on firmer foundations. As they stand, his proposals 
seem to allow.him to retain a_space for the positivist approaches 
roundly - and correctly - criticised in his papers. More 
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fundamentally~ how.e:ver ~ the case for and advantages o£ a 
materialist approach require a fir.mer gr.ounding than Dear 
provided. For instance~ in relation to the three aspects of 
materialism outlined~ there is - firstly - no conception of the 
relationships of agency and structure, apart from a proposal to 
. interpret 
/location decisions in the conte..xt of the wider social formation. 
Secondly, Dear's view of the superstructure is mechanistic, in-
as much as patterns of public service provision are seen as being 
inextricably determined by the socio-economic context in which 
they are set. Finally, at no point in his theory of society 
does near specifically point towards a class analysis of society 
apart from a_proposal to '~iarify the links between public 
policy outcomes and the capitalist social formation'~ (De.ar, 
1978a, 110). Though Dear's views do provide a point of 
departure for an alternative theory of public facility location, 
this chapter has sought to indicate in which way further 
refinements are necessary. The final part of this chapter now 
reviews the foregoing evidence and argues that the proposals 
of section 2.4 offer a more fruitful approach to public facility 
location problems than the work reviewed in section 2.3 
2.5 Sunmiary 
Section 2.2 presented a selective review of previous work 
on pub.lic facility location, and this work was evaluated in 
section 2.3. It was argued that notwithstanding the high level 
of technical sophistication attained by mathematical analyses 
of public facility location, such approaches were ultimately 
unsatisfactory. This was because they could not incorporate 
into their analyses all of the multifarious elements pertinent W 
their object of study,and because they suffered from theoretical 
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problems internal-to their mode of construction. Nor had 
attempts to consider political and distributive aspects of 
facility location been entirely successful~ due both to problems 
o:E measurement and to the lack of an adequate framework within 
which to account for the issues raised. It appeared the;refore, 
that a comprehens.ive theory of public facility location had 
not been develo.ped, and that - more fundamentally - such a 
theory could not be developed in the context of regional science 
within which much previous resean:h had been conducted. Hence 
it seemed that an alternative approach to theory was required. 
In this context the proposals offered by near (1978a, 
1979) were reviewed (section 2.4). It was argued that certain 
refinemen.ts _to ~these ~.Here necessary in order to provide a 
materialist theory of society; the relBvance of these refinements 
will becnme more apparent in Chapter 3, in reviewing 
theo.retical perspectives on the state. It is proposed that the 
approach advoca.ted has at least two important advantages. 
Firstly, a more comprehens.ive app;roach to the problem 
is provided. For example, it is possible to link the pattern 
of public service provision, with its attemdant distributional 
consequences, to the political aspects of decision-making 
processe~, and to link these, in turn, to the class character 
of the state. This is also more comprehensive, it may be 
noted. in passing, than Kirby and Jones' (1982) agenda for 
public se.rvices research, which simply seeks the identification 
of links between social policy and its social and ~patial 
outcomes. Irrespective of whether social and spatial issues 
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can be separated as easily as this~ such a proposal clearly takes 
as given the nature of the determinants o£ social policy. 
Furthermore, by emphasising the.constraints under which the 
p:::.anners of public services have to operate, and the conflicting 
demands which t[leymust attempt to satisfy, the theory advocated 
breaks with consensus views of society. In contrast to those 
analysts of facility location who seem to assume that spatial 
reorganisation of service provision (e.g. Mayhew, 1979) is a 
relatively straightforward task, such an approach argues instead 
that conflicts over urban land use are such as to render the 
insights of ·ma thema.tical modelling procedures of limited value. 
Finally, the.views presented here allow an account to be given 
of spatial changes over time; this is an extremely difficult 
task within. the static conception of theory which typifies much 
regional science, but by focusing upon broader social changes 
and their i!llplications for public service provision, it ought 
to prove possible to understand how spatial patterns change 
through time. 
Secondly, if explanation in the human sciences is viewed 
as the: 
'making intelligible of observations o.r events that 
canno~. be readily interpreted within the context of 
an existing theory or frame of meaning' 
(Giddens, 1919, 25&). 
then the p.roposals advanced address several issues not considered 
in previous research. Rather than analysing society at the 
'level of appearances', for example, an attempt is made to 
link appearance - changing patterns of public facility provision 
-to the 'underlying social reality', that is, to broader 
historical changes in the British economy and society in the 
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post-wa::r years, Moreover, the complexities of public policy 
formation and planning - which have received relatively little 
attention - are capable of incorporation and interpretation 
within the framework advocated, Likewise the relationship 
between the state and the economy~ and the class character 
of the state, may be elucidated., It therefore appears that 
the reformulation of public facility location theory advocated 
here is necessary - given the unresolved problems of previous 
work - and is also progressive in terms of the comprehensive 
theory offered and the number of previously unresolved problems 
which can be addressed, Chapters 4-10 will exemplify this 
empirically, but prior to that, an evaluation is necessary 
of the extensive debates on the role of the state, since an 
adequate theory of t.he state is a crucial prerequisite of 
an understanding of public facility location, Chapter 3 
therefore presents an assessment of various theories of the 
state, 
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3. The role of the state: competir..g theoretical 
·pers p·ec.tive s 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter emphasised the limitations of previous 
work within hun1an geography on public facility location and,in 
seeking an alternative, advocated a fuller consideration of the 
role of the state. Until recently this subject has received 
scant attention from geographers (for exceptions, see Anderson, 
1978; Dear and Clark, 1978, 1981; Harvey, 1976; and various 
essays in Dear and Scott, 1981, and Burnett and Taylor, (1981D, 
and there has been limited consideration of the various 
theoretical positions on the state, though several studies of 
state intervention in regional development and planning 
(Cooke, 1980; 1982; Hudson, 19.76; 1979; Lewis, 1982) are 
correcting this imbalance. As was argued above (chapter 2), 
explanations of the distribution of public facilities have 
also avoided confronting the debates to be reviewed here. 
Attempts to develop a theory of the local state (e.g. Dear, 
1981; Kirby, 1g79; Saunders, 1979) to account for spatial 
variations iri state provision of service-s have been subject to 
criticism, not least because of the implicit functionalism and 
superficially radical rhetoric of the term 'local state'. 
More seriously, however, such work should be grounded in 
'abstraction of social relations, rather than models of 
structure and institutions'; it has been claimed that perhaps 
the most influential texts on the local state (Cockburn, 1977; 
Saunders, 1979) are deficient in this respect (Duncan and 
Goodwin, 1982, 81). 
It therefore seems that there is considerable scope for the 
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enrichment of research by geographers on such issues. One 
way to achieve this is to evaluate the variety of theoretical 
perspectives on the state; this is attempted in section 3.2, in 
which a brief introduction (section 3.2.1) outlines the 
criteria against which alternative views will be assessed. 
Pluralist and manage.rialist views are then examined (section 
3.2.2) and are judged inadequate (in themselves) for a full 
understanding of state policy formulation. The claims of 
a variety of Marxist perspectives are then considered (section 
3.2.3), and attention is directed to some important developments; 
in particular the work of Offe receives detailed consideration 
(section 3.2.4). A brief summary (section 3.2.5) is then 
fol-lowed by smne comments on problems of empirical research 
within, and explanatory problems associated with, the theoretical 
views favoured. This chapter therefore commences by reviewing 
some competing theoretical perspectives on the state. 
3. 2 The. state:· competing theoretical, p·erspectives 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section selectively reviews some of the major 
positions on the role of the state; an exhaustive account would 
be beyond the scope of this thesis (see Frankel, 1979; Held and 
Krieger, 1982; Jessop, 1977, for fuller discussions). 
Al terna ti ve positions TilliS t be evaluated in terms of their 
appropriateness to the task of theorising the role of the state 
and its relationship to the organisation of society. More 
specifically, a framework is required which will facilitate an 
understanding of decision-making within the state; only in 
this way can an adequate in.terpretation be provided of policies 
on the provision of hospital se.rvices. Put another way, if a 
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reformulated public facility location theory has to discuss 
'location decisions in the context o£ the wider social £or.m-
a,tion '(Dear? 1978a? 99; see also s.ection 2.4) then it is 
essential to establish how this wider social formation 
to be conceptualised. Two questions therefore seem to be of 
particular importance. Firstly? is there any necessary class 
bias to state policy formulation and the exercise of state 
power? If so, what form does this take and how can it be 
identified empirically? The major theoretical distinction to 
be made here is between pluralist and managerialist views -
which assert that no such bias exists - and _Marxist arguments, 
which lay a central emphasis on the class character of the 
state~ Secondly,by what logic does the state operate? What 
are the rules according to which its policies are produced? Is 
the operational rationality of the state equivalent to that 
of a private firm or does a rather different logic apply? If 
there is a class bias to the nature and operations of the state 
apparatus, how is it manifest in policy forrimlation? It is 
with these points in mind that pluralist and managerialist 
views of the state are now reviewed. 
3.2.2 Pluralist and managerialist :views of the state 
These approaches share certain limitations in terms of 
theorising about society and the state. The pluralist view 
rejects any argument that class is the main line of cleavage 
in society and hence denies any notion of class bias in the 
actions of the state. This view may be characterised as 
presenting no more than an idealised description of how society 
currently works. The manag~rialist view tends to emphasise 
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the autonomy o£ key decision-makers~ at the expense o£ a 
consideration of the constraints upon these individuals and 
upon the state. Their common failing~ then, is that they deny 
any connection between power and class. 
It has been suggested that 1 a central~ if not the 
central, tradition in Anglo-American political science has 
elaborated and defended a pluralist conception of society 1 
(Held and Krieger~ 1982, 1 - emphasis in original). Such a 
view - exemplified by the work of Dahl (1961) - defines power 
in voluntarist terms as the ability of an individual (or group) 
to act in such a manner as to control the response of another 
individual (or group). Power thus hinges on the exercise 
of control over immediate .. events. Pluralists assess the 
exercise of state power as part. o£ a refutation of the argument 
that wester.n capitalist countries are dominated by an economic 
elite or class; their case is predicated on four assumptions. 
Firstly, pluralists claim that class divisions are neither 
the sole nor the major line of cleavage within society. Other 
factors (for e](ample religion or education) are equally 
significant and., since all overlap to some extent, no one_group 
can become dOJninant. Secondly, while the existence of political 
inequalities is recognised., public pol.icy outcomes are assumed 
to represent differences in intensity o£ preferences rather 
than differences in power. Thirdly, the neutrality of the 
state between interest groups is allegedly guaranteed by the 
electoral process. If society (according to the first of the 
assumptions discussed here) is disaggregated into a number of 
minority groups, the electoral system will guarantee that no 
one group will establish control over the state. Finally, it 
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is asswned that there is no systematic bias in the e.xercise 
of state power~ as the political system is grounded in a 
consensus which belies any notion of class domination. This 
rests on the assumption that any regime based on coercion 
cannot survive~ because thB~electorate will react against the 
government in the next election. Party politics is sai~ to 
be crucial in de.fusing economic conflicts and building up such 
a consensus (MacPherson~ 19]3~ 191; see also Bevan, 1952). 
The result of holding these assumptions is that as 
Dahl (1961) attempted to demonstrate with reference to local 
politics in.Ne~Haven, power in society is disaggregated and 
non-cumulative. While some groups ~ight be disadvantaged in 
some situations, t&ey would p~ssess advantages in others. 
Although conflicts exist over appropriate allocation procedures 
for different resources, the process o£ bargaining guarantees 
equilibrium, and ensures that political outcomes are beneficial 
to the.mass of the population. The desire for power over others 
is taken to be a natural human inclination; competition between 
int.erest groups is therefore an essent.ial and inevitable 
aspect of politics. No one group will gain ascendancy over 
others, because it fs ass-umed- that considerable overlap exists 
between them and so each group , individually , is relatively 
weak. Hence the state is seen as a 'pawn up for g~abs between 
competing contenders for political power' (Saunders, 1979, 151). 
From such a perspective, policy analysis typically focuses on 
who participat.es in decision-making, who gains and loses from 
various possible outcomes and who p~evails in decision-making 
(Polsby, 1963, 4) ,.often proceeding to a consideration of the 
extent to which decision-making corresponds to some ideal-
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typical model of policy formulation (for example Allen (1979) 
and Ham (1981) apply such a methodology to NHS planning) . 
Yet such approaches risk neglecting the broader social context 
of the issues they address (Navarro, 19J6). The limitations 
of these approaches will be discussed below 1 following an 
examination of two arguments which, though ~~itical of pluralism, 
ultimately do not transcend the framework within which it is 
set. 
Firstly, pluralist views. ignore the possibility of social 
and political constraints on the. express ion of demands within 
the political system. Bachrach .. and Baratz (196.2) point towards 
this in discussing the process of 'non-decision making', whereby 
certain issues are selectively excluded from public debate. 
However, since.their analysis is conducted at the level of 
individual actions and attitudes, it ignores the broader social 
context of non-decision .making (McEachern, 1981, 12), though 
it avoids the 'one dimensional' approach to studying the exercise 
of power (Lukes, 19.74, 15), which. merely equates power with 
decision-making. 
Secondly, Lukes (19.74) intro.duces the no.tion of individual 
and group interests in decision""'making, defining power as the 
capacity of a social actor to influence. another in a manner 
contrary to the latter's interests. Yet power is not only 
exercised when the outco:me is contrary to the interests of an 
individual or group; it may also be exercised where the outcome 
is irrelevant - or even beneficial - from the point of view of 
those not exercising it (Giddens, l9J9, 89-90). Furthermore 
Lukes may not adequately connect power, interests and class, 
since he does not accept that intere.sts are related to -
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though not necessarily determined. by ,.. class. Indeed~ on 
this point~ the views of Lukes and .Dahl converge, denying the 
existence of any necessary connection between power and class 
(McEachern, 1981, 1.7) and so it is appropriate to reconsider 
the assumptions which collectively underpin the pluralist view 
and the claim that there is no class bias to the exercise of 
state power. 
The assumption that class is neither the only nor the 
major line of division in society may be justifiable in 
particular circumstances, but it is surely not the case that 
other attributes are equally important or that - if so - th~y 
are always at least as important as class. .Different classes, 
moreover, are clearly able to influence state poli~y-making 
to different degrees (see Miliband, 1969). 
Secondly, the argument that policy outcomes reflect not 
differences in power but .rather. differences in the intensity 
of preferences of particular. groups, ultimately reduces to 
the assertion that groups exer,t. influence when they have a. 
reason to do so, and the more influence they exert, the greater 
is their preference for a given policy outcome. Yet this 
ignores the possibility that a group may have an intense 
preference for a particular outcome and yet be unable to do 
anything about it . 
.,, . a·~ 1D.1T .LY, the view that th~ neutrality of the state is 
guaranteed by the electoral process is problematic in that 
it presumes that self-interest is the basis of democracy. Put 
another way, although electors and elected pursue their self-
interested goals the interests of the latter constrain them 
to act according to the preferences of the electorate. Further-
more, such a view presupposes a reasonable degree of political 
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sophist.ication on the part of the elect.orate. However~ in 
opposition to this, it has been claimed that the electorate 1 s 
position is such that they do not effectively raise or resolve 
political issues; they simply accept or reject those who are 
to rule them (Saunders, 1919, 153). 
Finally, the claim that there is no necessary connection 
between class and state power because the political system is 
grounded in a consensus which belies any notion of class 
domination ignores central issues such as the rol.e of ideology. 
For instance, groups may be able to manipulate the way policy 
options are presented and discussed in order to make their 
own interests appear to coincide with the 1 general interest' 
(Anderson, 1913). Moreover, the quest.ion of 'effective 
political demand' receives little consideration; it is 
demonstrable that particular groups.may have intense preferences 
and yet be unable to express them. 
Thus the pluralist claim that there is no class bias or 
basis to powe.r in societ:y: and .. the state is untenable, 
reflecting a more general problem of such yiews. For they take 
as their point of departure the e:m:p·irical question of what 
characterises democratic societies. The elements identified 
are then dev~loped into an: 
'idealised description of ... particular political 
systems, serving to elevate every. element of these 
S ~"s+-omc- ;,_n+.--. ,.,:; .... +,.os <>nrl +o J·ust-1"-fy 1.rh~t- t-hPv finr1 J ~'-" U.;;) ..L..L .I,.V .. V . ..L. . ..&. l,..~V ,, Y:• ~ "" ..., ..,_- ••.A...._.__ __ .._..._...,./ --·--
by ad hoc rationalisation'. 
(Raunders, 1919, 156) . 
Hence such accounts merely provide an organised largely 
uncritical, description of the existing political system. A 
critique of such views can either confront them at an e.m:pirical 
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~evel, by presenting detailed evidence ~f systematic class 
bias in the policies of the state and t.he composition of its 
personnel (e.g. Miliband, 1969.) , or seek to demonstrate the 
structural necessity for the connections bet.w.e.en the :dominant 
classes and the state (e.g. Poulantzas, 19-13); such approaches 
will be considered below. .Before that? however, it is 
appropriate to evaluate the ~~ti~g~ri~list view of the state; 
not only has this received much attention within the geographical 
literature, but it also shares common ground with the pluralist 
view. 
Managerialism's roots may be traced to Weberian sociology 
and, in particular, to Weber's arguments that firstly, there is 
no necessary connection betwe.en economic classes and political 
power, and secondly, that the mode of political domin~tion 
in modern societ~es is increasingly ~ and tiece~sa~ily -
bureaucratic. The state is allegedly based on a monopoly of 
physical coercion sus.tained by a belief in its legitimacy. 
Bureaucracy and bureaucratic procedures attain a dominant 
position in the state apparatus by virtue of their technical 
superiority over other forms of organisation; ·hence considerable 
·--
power accrues to bureaucrats by virtue of their expertise, 
information and access to secrets, an~ it is claimed that the 
bureaucracy is independent of, and neutral with re~pect to, 
class interests (Held and Krieger., 1982; Leonard, 1982). Such 
views have been influential in geography principally through 
the work of Pahl (1969; 1975), who proposed that inequalities 
in the socio-spatial system could be accounted for as a result 
of 'inevitable' spatial inequa.lities (due to the location of 
~ for instance - services at discrete points (Harvey, 1973, 
59)). ,which were mediated by the act.ivities of 'gatekeepers' or 
'managers'. For Pahl, both spatial and social constraints 
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existed o:n. access to services~ and the latter constraint: 
'ref.lectts) the distribution of power in society 
and ... (is) il.lustrated by: bureaucrat·ic rules and 
procedures (and) social gatek~~-pers who help to 
distribute and control ufban resources' 
{Pahl~ 1969~ 146) 
Explanation of inequalities in public service.,provision 
is therefore pitched largely at the level of the values and 
actions of those who manage service provision. Although several 
interesting studies of the activities of urban managers have 
been provided (Duncan, 1976; Gray, 1976; Leonard, 1980; 
Moon, 1981) at least two problems re~ain. 
Firstly, since managerialist views have inherited the 
Weberian argument that there_is. no.c.onnec.tion.between power.and 
class, they lack a theory of power and so possess no firm 
theoretical. grounds on which to base ideritifica tion of key 
decision-makers. Hence it has. been argued that managerialism 
simply focuses on descriptive data gathering, concerned with 
the activities of those who are assumed to have power (Norman, 
1975). Secondly, the notion of the increasing domination of 
the bureaucracy has led to a stress on the. intenial operations 
o_f the s.ta;te rather th.an - or at the expense of - discussion 
of external political pressures (.Leonard, 1982, 192-193). 
Hence managerialism fails to theorise the au:tonomy·of managers. 
Put simply: 
'in concentrating on studying the allocation and 
distribution of "scarce .resources" ... (managerialism) 
fails to ask why such resources a.re in short su:p·ply. 
(Gray, 1976, 33- - emphasis added) 
.VJhile.:of value in directing attention towards the degree 
of autonomy enjoyed by decision-makers within the state apparatus: 
it seems that managerialism can say little of more general 
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relevance. unless it considers the relationship betwe.en the 
actions of managers and the social context in which they are 
set. 
The approaches reviewed thus far~ then~ are of limited 
value even as starting points for examining the role of the 
state. The pluralist view presents little more than an 
idealised - and arguably inaccurate - descr~ption of society~ 
while the stress of ~anagerialist views upon individual attion~ 
and their limited consideration of constraints. on the autonomy 
of managers~ likewise restricts their value. Furthermore, 
since both approaches implicitly reject the notion that power 
and/or interests are structurally located (though not determined) 
the possibility of systematic class bias in the exercise of 
state power is ruled out. In view of these problems, an 
examination of debates on the state within Marxist circles 
ought to be fruitful; since these present a class analysis of 
society and focus on the constraints on state activities~ they 
ought to assist in overcoming the.problems identified here. 
3.2.3 Major themes in Marxist though:ton the state 
The .recent 'rediscovery' of the state as a problem in 
political economy has prompted extensive debates (summa.rised 
in, ititer alia, Frankel, 1919; Gold_et al, 1915; Held and 
Krieger, 1982; Holloway and Picciotto, 19.78; Jessop, 19.77; 
Mos.ley, 1982). In the light of the claims that public facility 
location theory should be reformulated as a 'theory of 
society' (De.ar, 19J8a; see chapter 2), the arguments presented 
above (section 3.2.2) have at best been only partially 
successful; they have merely offe.red descriptions, at an 
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empirical level~ of how .society currently works. By contrast, 
the importance of the views discussed here lies in their 
conceptualisation of society and of the relationship between 
the state and soeiety. This is carried out with varying degrees 
of success~ however, and so it is appropriate to begin by 
specifying criteria against which the adequacy of theories of 
the capitalist state may be judged. 
For Jessop (1911, 353-354) five criteria should be 
fulfilled by a Marxist theory of the capitalist state. Such 
a theory must be founded on t.he s.pecific qualities of capital ism 
as a mode. of production. Secondly, it must attribute a central 
role to class struggle in the process of capital accumulation. 
Thirdly, the relations between the political and economic 
spheres of socie:ty .must be established without reducing one 
to the other, or treating them as totally independent and 
autonomous. Fourthly, it is necessary to allow for ~istorical 
and geographical differences infu.e £or.m and functions of the 
state; there can be no universalistic theory of_the capitalist 
state 'in general', since the state takes:.:on different forms 
within specific social formations. Finally,non capitalist 
groups and/or non-class forces may influence the nature of 
the state and the e.xercise of state power. 
Though these criteria are £elt to be generally satisfactory: 
two. additional ones can be proposed. ~n the lifCnt of the argu.lllents 
of the previous section - that pluralist and .managerialist 
views. deny any connection between power and class - it is 
important to establish the class character of the capitalist 
state and the way this is .manifest in state policy formulation. 
Moreover, since the emphasis of this research is on decision-
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making by the state~ the chosen theoretica:. framework must 
be ca,pable of providing insights into the logic of state policy 
formulation~ thereby facilitating an interpretation of the 
decisions which create spatial patterns 9f public facilities. 
Perhaps the easiest entr~e into contemporary debates on the 
state is via a consideration of the contributions of Miliband 
(1969; 1970; 1973) and Poulantzas (1969; 1973; 1916). Their 
positions will be summarised and major points of criticism 
outlined. 
Miliband' s argument is referred to as instr·u:mentalism: 
that is, the state is simply a tool of the capitalist class 
and will therefore advance the interests of that class. His 
work is essentially an attempt to refute, on empirical grounds, 
the pluralist claim that the state is neutral with respect to 
different classes; to do this, Miliband demonstrates the 
extensive interpersonal connections between the ca,pi tal is t class 
and the state. Yet by arguing .purely in empirical terms, 
Miliband does not advance Marxist analyses o£ the s tat.e; indeed, 
it is not uhcha:titahle to suggest that Miliband sees the state 
as a pressure-influenced body which happens to £avour the 
capitalist class simply be<::ause that class has greater strength 
than labour (McEachern, 1981, 27). However he does deploy 
two rather more sophisticated arguments, namely that inter-
personal connections between the capitalist class and 
state personnel give rise to a shared 'world view'which 
shapes the way the state acts-(Miliband, 1969, 55-69, 107-115), 
and secondly, that the state's insertion into a social 
formation dominated by capitalism ensures its class character, 
for the parameters within which state policies may be 
formulated are set by the limits of capitalist 'reality' 
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Though Miliband does point to the class character of 
the state, he has been subj'ect to cri ticis_m on various counts. 
These include the charge of empiricism (O£Je and Ronge, 1975, 
13J) and (concomitantly) the failure to situate his work within 
an appropriate 'problematic', whereby the class chiracter of 
the state could be revealed other than on empirical grounds 
(Poulantzas, l9J6, 64; Gold et al~ 1~75, 35; Clarke, 1977, 
note 1). Furthermore, Miliband does not adequately establish 
the processes whereby the 'strategies and actions of ruling 
groups are limited by imp.ersonal, structural causes'; thus 
sta-te power is conceived of in voluntaristic terms (Gold et al., 
1975, 35) 0 
Instrumentalismhas made a valuable contribution in 
pointing to the systematic links between the capitalist class 
and the state. Ultimately,however, it reduces to little more 
than a radical managerialism, a demonstration that 'bourgeois 
theorists have got the facts wrong 1 (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1918, 5), because of the lack of a rigorous theoretical 
demonstration of the structurar n~c~5~ity Jor these links. 
Instrumentalism has usually been opposed to the structur-
alist analysis of Poulantzas (1969; 19J3; 19J6) though this is 
a rather arbitrary opposition; what is coJilllibn to bo_th Miliband 
and Poulantzas may be as significant as the differences between 
them. Poulantzas' initial response to Miliband highlighted the 
latter's neglect of the structurally-necessary links between 
.. 
the dominant classes and the state elite, and emphasised that 
Miliband had simply analysed the state in terms of the 
individual subjects who control it. By contrast, for Poulantzas: 
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'the direct participation of members of the ruling 
class is not the c.alise but the. e££e·.ct, and moreover 
a chance and conting~nt one, of this objective 
coincidence' 
(Poulantzas, 1969, 73) 
Poulantzas therefore takes as his point of departure 
the class structure of society and the contradictions inherent 
in a capitalist economy, and analyses how the state attempts 
to manage and/or displace such contradictions in helping to 
reproduce capitalist society. Since the central economic 
contradiction under capital ism is that betw.een the increasingly 
social character of production and the continuing private 
appropriation of surplus value, two political threats may be 
posed to the unity of the system: working cl·a:ss uni-ty a-nd 
capitalist class disunity. To counter these, the state's 
role i~ that of a jactor of cohesion (?oulantzas, 1973, 44-50): 
it attempts to guarantee the political organisation and}or 
unity of the dominant classes, and the political disorganisation 
of the working class (Poulantzas., 1973, 281-288). Only if the 
state is relatively autonomous from. particular capitalist 
interests can it accomplish such a task; were it the tool or 
instrument of any particular capita-list group. it would be 
incapable of doing so (Poulantzas, 1913, 256, 261-262, 282, 
284-285). Moreover, the state should not be seen as a monolithic 
bloc; it is itself an area of conflict, and the precise level 
of autonomy accorded to it depends upon the intensity of 
struggles over it and upon relations between classes. There 
are, however, several problems with such views. 
Firstly, while Poulantzas shows that a relatively autb.nomo.us 
state protects the interests of dominant classes, and that the 
state must be relatively autonomous if it is to act as a factor 
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of cohesion, he does not adequately account £or the social 
mechanisms which guara~tee that the state will act in such 
a fashion(Gold et al.~ 19]5~ 38). Secondly~ this analysis is 
functionalist and tautological~ attributing events in society to 
system needs which are accorded an explanatory status without 
their existence being accounted for (Clarke, 1917~ 21; Giddens, 
1982, 215). Thus concepts such as 'relative autonomy' are 
accorded the status of quasi-independent variables? which can 
be deployed in an explanatory account o£ virtually anj historical 
situation. (Saunders, 19]9? 18.4); hence Saunders' complaint that 
the structuralist position is impossible to falsify since it 
rules out th-e pos-sibili:t.y of counter-factual argument. Finally~ 
an insistence on the relative autcmomy of the economic and 
political spheres appears to be used as a justification for 
treating the two as separable objects of study. Hence, the 
relationships between the two may be neglected., thus side-
stepping the problems 9f relating political developments to the 
contradictions of capitalist econ01nic development, and failing 
to consider adequately such issues as the scope of and limits to 
state intervention (Holloway and Picciotto, 1918, 5-1). 
Thus instrumentalist and structuralist approaches are both 
limited in terms of their ability to account for the class 
character of the~capitalist state. Since both insist upon the 
separability of the political and the economic, neither explicitly 
confrontsthe problem of the li:qiits to state intervention, and in 
particular those constraints imposed by the necessity to guarantee 
continued accumulation (Jessop, 191-7, 361; Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1978, 1). Hence the extent to which either author's 
perspective can be emplo.yed to elucidate the class character of 
state policy is limited. An instrumentalist account is restricted 
to discussing this at the level of interpersonal connections 
' ~ ' .. )" . 
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while for adherents of Poulantzas 1 v:iews.~ th.e concept of 
relative autonomy can be.brought qn in virtually any historical 
situation to account for the comple:xities of state practice. 
In order to progress away from such ultimately restrictive 
viewpoints~ the next section will evaluate more recent 
theoretical statements~ concentrating~ in particular, on the 
work of the 'state derivationist' debate and examining the 
contribution of Offe in some depth. 
3. 2. 4 Recent advances in Marxist theories of the 
capitalist ~tate 
The ahalys·es re-viewed above exh:i.b i ted various limitations 
concerning their ability to elucidate the character of the 
capitalist state. Consequently this sect&on identifies certain 
developments in Marxist theories which can assist in this task 
and also illuminate sta.te policy-making. Drawing on attempts 
to derive the form and functions of the state from the 
characteris.tics of the capJ talist mode of pro·duction (Holloway 
and Picc.iotto, 19-77; 1978)., this section first discusses the 
contribution of cap-it-al-logic accou_nts of the state, before 
presenting the views of Habermas. and, in particular, Offe ~ in 
some detail. In contrast to Miliband and Poulantzas, fbr whom 
the class character of the state depends on factors external 
to the state itself (Jessop, 1977~ 361), the state derivationists 
have sought to elucidate the intimate relationship between the 
form and functions of the state and the characteristics of 
capitalism as a mode of production. 
One of the less sophisticated arguments within the state 
derivation debate has been the 'capital logic' position 
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(exemplified by Muller and Neususs, 19JS; and the essays by 
Altvater and Blanke et al in Holloway and Picciotto, 1918). 
The state is seen as an 'ideal collective capitalist', a 
political institution c.orresponding to the common needs of 
capital and providing that which is required for capitalist 
reproduction yet which cannot be guaranteed through co.mpeti tion 
between capitals (Altvater, 1918, 4 2; Muller and Neususs, 19.7 5, 
77), as well as being responsible for providing general 
conditions for the existence of capitalism (such as legal and 
monetary systems - Blanke et al, 1918). Though such accounts 
claim to accord primacy to class struggle in their analyses, 
this struggle i-s nonetheless ':infor_med and bounded by the 
exigencies of capital accumulation' (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1977, 92; see also Muller and Neususs, 19J5, J9). While a 
capital logic approach establishes. that the state is not a 
simple and)or undifferentiated instrument of capita·l (since, in 
acting in the common interests of cf!.pital, the state may have 
to intervene against iridivid:Ual capitals), this view ultimately 
deploys the. reductionis t arg~ent tha.t everything· that happens 
in a capit-a-lis-t- societ:y neces~arily corresponds to the needs 
of capit~l (Jessop, 1911, 364)~ 
In response to such problems, atte_mpts have been made 
to introduce an awareness of historical specificity into 
analyses of the capitalist state, emphasising how the charactex 
of the state has changed in response to the changing circumstances 
/ 
occasioned by the developmen.t of capi talis_m (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1917, 85-97; Mandel, 1915, 4J4-4J9). In addition, 
the work of Habermas (1976a, b), Hirsch (19.78) and Offe (19J4; 
1916) provides important insights into the importance of class 
struggle in shaping the capitalist state. From a different 
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poin.t of departure, theorists such as Gramsci (1971) have 
reached important conclusions concerning the class character 
of the state, and the manner in which the dominant classes 
secure and main.tain 'ideological hegemony', as media ted 
through the state. Yet such a class-theoretic approach 
ultimately fails to consider the problems of the limits to 
state intervention (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977, 82; 1~78,3), 
though it may be that the area of ideology and consciousness 
is one in which the analyses reviewed here could be s treng_thened. 
Bearing this in mind, it is now argued that the. awareness of 
class struggle provided by the theorists reviewed here is 
of central importance on four counts. 
Firstly, the 'laws of motion' of capitalism are ncit 
natural or inevitable; they are at best tendential (Mandel, 
1975, 19), and are intimately related to the balance of class 
forces between capital and labour (Hirsch, 197S, 74). In 
failing to recognise this, capital-logic accounts of the state 
(e. g. Muller and Neususs, 197.:5) are ult:ima tely ahis tori cal 
(Holloway and Picciotto, 1978, 22). Secondly, since capitalist 
social ;relations must be presen.ted as formally free, equal, 
and organised without coer_cion, rela.tions_ of force must be 
abstracted from the immediate.process of production (Hirsch, 
1978, 61~64). Thirdly, there is no necessary and automatic 
correspondence between state interYention and the needs of 
capital (contra capital-logic views.) and so crises in the 
accumulation process are of central importance in re-shaping 
the form of state intervention as well as in exposing the class 
character of the state (Offe, 1974, 45). _Fourthly, crises 
are the result of various contradictory factors which affect 
different groups in different ways; hence there are no simple 
solutions to crises. Rather the state responds to crises in 
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an a:d hoc~ trial,..,and...;error fa.shion (Habermas~ 1976a~b; Offe, 
1976) 0 
Hence important insights a:re pr.ovided into the nature 
of class struggle. Moreover, important analyses of the 
implications of the structural features of the capitalist 
state for policy formulation are provided, particularly by 
Offe (1974; 19J5a,b; 1976; but see also O'Connor, 1973; 
Habermas, l~J6a,b; Hirsch, 1978). In generai terms, the 
capitalist state must at.tempt to .maintain capitalist 
acqllllulat.ion and ensure the legitimacy of this pro.cess. The 
state can there£ore be characterised as an inpU:t'"".o:utput 
me-chanism (Dea-r a-nd C 1 ark, 19 _81 , 55 ; Hab er:Illas , 19 7 6 , b, 3.7 5) ; 
its output consists of its sovereignly executed administrative 
decisions, for which it requires ari input of .mass loyalty. 
Failure to maintain the necessary inputs or out.puts may lead 
to crises. If the state does not f~lfil thessteering i~peratives 
which it has taken mrer from the economic sys.tem, there may be 
a ration:aTity crisis, manifes.t .. in a divergence between the 
iritentio·ns and ou.tcomes. of s.tate policies, or as a perceived 
paradox in the log,:i,.c o.:f pqlicy fo:rmulation. On the other 
hand~ the state may fail to maintain the level of mass loyalty 
essential to the_pursuit. of these goals, leading to a 
legiti1Jim:._;ation crisis (Habermas, 1976a, 45-94). Both 
v 
tendencies may be compounded by the £iscal crisis of the 
state; that is, the tendency for state expenditures to exceed 
revenues (O'Connor, 1973 ) . These views have only been sketched 
here (see Jes.sop, 1977; Frankel, 1979; O'Connor, 1973; 
Habe+mas, 1976a, 45-94 for fuller discussions), but of more 
direct relevance is their deployment by Offe in his analysis 
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of the state's capacity for rational administration" 
If the state is to satisfy the competing imperati:.ves and 
demands placed upon it, Offe claims, it Jnust both simultan-
eously intervene in the economy and conceal its purpose; if 
this were not concealed, there would be a challenge to the 
normative acceptance of market rationality, thus casting doubt 
upon the class neutrality of the state" The state:is therefore 
defined by four characteristics. 
Firstly, it is excluded from. accumulation; it cannot be 
seen to compete with individual capitals, nor can it replace 
them. Secondly, it is necessary for accumulation, since it 
must take over more and more aspects o£ the economy that are 
essential to accumulation but which cannot be provided by 
private capital; in this sense the state acts as a collective 
capitalist (Offe, 1975a, 126). Thirdly, the state is depe·ndent 
upon accumulation so as to ensure the availability of revenues 
adequate to· the performance of the state's tasks (Offe and 
Ronge, 1915, 139; Hirsch, 19J8, 104). Finally, the s~ate must 
deny these functions in order to e·nsure legitimacy for its 
policies; rather the state attempts to secure assent for its 
interventions by presenting these as being in the general 
interest of all groups in society. For Offe, the extent to 
which the state can carry out these tasks is extremely 
problematic (Offe, 1975a~ 144). This brings him to tho problem 
of state policy formulation and he makes two major contributions. 
He identifies a variety of mechanisms whereby policy options 
are chosen, and he considers the logic according to which 
policy formulation takes place. 
On the former point, Offe distinguishes the operations of 
the state in liberal capitalism - where its activities are of 
-66-
an allocati:ve character - from its inte_rv:entions in late 
capi talis:m~ which he characte.r.ises as being of a producLtve 
character. The allocative mode~ in which decisions have to 
be taken concerning the use of resources already owned by the 
state~ is one in which operational goals are clear cut; they 
can be derived from manifest interests and power relations. 
However, in a productive mode of intervention~ the state is 
increasingly involved in the production of goods and services; 
since this raises a considerable number of issues regarding the 
nature and scope of such intervention, the application of 
bureaucratic procedures is inadequate (Offe, 1975a, 133; Offe 
and Range~~ l~JS) and the state selectively favours certain 
groups whose acquiescence and support are considered essential 
to the preservation of the existing social order (Held and 
Krieger, 1982). Various -selection mechanisms exist which, 
according to Offe, confir:m the class character of the state. 
to: 
Firstly, positive selection :mechani-s:ms allow the state 
'standardise and reduce to its essence a collective 
c.api talis.t interest ... even. in the face of empirical 
opposition from competin~ capitals' 
(Offe, 1974, 38). 
Thus the state has to anticipate and mitigate the effects 
of short-sighted competition between capitals. Two points 
should be noted. Firstly, positive selection mechan-isms may be 
both productive and allocative in character; currently welfare 
services in Brit~in are dominated by productive intervention 
(e.g. the NHS) though this is not to deny that allocative 
intervention (in the form of minimum safety and health standards, 
for example) is still in force. As indicated above, then, the 
scope and character of state intervention will vary historically. 
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se·c.o:n.dly, on an ideological level, there are limits 
to the scope of possible policy formulation; ideological 
selection processes may give rise to a disjunctMf!""'e between what 
the state could do. and what it a~t~ally does (Offe, 1974, 39). 
This is not to suggest that ideology operates in some blind, 
mechanistic fashion; if ideology is seen as a system of ideas 
which serves sectional interests by presenting them as being 
in the general interest (Anderson, 19J3, 5), it is reasonable 
to suggest that the processes whereby ideologies come to be 
accepted are very complex. It is per"haps in this respect that 
Offe's work is weakest (Frankel, 19J9, note 15; Jessop, 19JJ, 
366·-36J-), yet ther-e is a_t present. 'no whq})Y satisfactory 
theory of ideology' (Cen.tre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 
197J, 5); essentially what is at issue is the establishment of 
what Gransci (19Jl, 258, 261-264) terms ideological hegemony 
by the dominant classes or ppwer bloc. Given these caveats 
concerning Offe's views, ideology - as· a selection principle -
is evident in what follows in two ways. Firstly, the W?Y an 
ideology becomes accepted as legitimate .may be of decisive 
importance in terms pf sketching broad outlines of policies. 
Thus the current emphases on the ilinproductive nature of state 
expenditure in Britain have led to restraints on and attempts 
more rationally to control the use of such expenditure and this 
is evident in the exclusion from policy do.cuments of objectives 
that may conflict with what are claimed to be the needs of the 
'sy~tem' (see,for instance, the discussion of recent trends in 
hospital policy in chapter 7). Secondly the case of hospital 
planning for Newcastle upon Tyne exemplifies the use of a 
particular view of medical practice to present the arguments 
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Secondly~ the quotation from Of.fe is reminiscent of a capital-
logic view~ yet it is clearly not the case that welfare services 
are provided solely to supply the needs of capital; such 
services are also demanded by~ and are beneficial to~ labour 
(Gough~ 1979). This poses severe explanatory problems for 
historical accounts of the welfare state (s.ee Ha~ris~ 1980). 
As well as positive selection procedures~ Offe als.o 
identifies negative selection~ whereby anti-capitalist polic)!: .. 
objectives are excluded. These operate on four levels; structurel 
ideology~ process and repression. Firstly, the' strtictU:ral 
level incorporates the most general constraints on which issues 
become the subj ec;t of sta.te intervention. Offe and Ronge 
(1975• 140-142) argue that the capitalist state can fulfil its 
contradictory objectives only if it can create.conditions under 
which all economic actors can participate in commodity relation-
ships. Hence one would, in principle., anticipate resistance 
on the part of the state and the capitalist cla~ses to 
implement proposals for the provision of we:lfare services for 
use rather than exchange. The clearest example of structural 
selection in the context of this thesis would be..::the 
assumption - implicit in the wartime and postwar reforms of 
the welfare services in Britain - that the health services 
were to be organised within limits prescribed by the existing 
social order (Navarro~ 1978, 38-48; see also chapter 4 (below)). 
Attempts currently being made under the present Conservative 
government to roll back the boundaries of state intervention 
would al~o fall in this category (for instance, facilitating 
the development of private health care)' though it is clear 
that·- as the rise in unemployment indicates- its overall 
economic strategy is some way from allowing all economic actors 
to participate in exchange relationships. 
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of sectional interests as being in the interests of all 
concerned (chapters 8-10). 
The third selection procedure is that of 12rocess; the 
formal decision-ma.king mechanisms and institutions of the state 
create the possibility that some interest groups will be 
favoured at the expense of others .. Thus the class composition 
of health authorities in Britain may facilitate the reproduction 
of class inequalities in resource allocation (Crossman, 1972; 
Walters, 1980), though such procedures do not operate as 
mechanistically as Navarro (1918) ap.pears to suggest. Thus the 
case studies of local planning issues (chapters 8-10) illustrate 
that cert}t.i..n g:roups were in a stronger position to press their 
claims than others. Likewise there are grounds for arguing 
that a proposed revision of the hospital plan (the Bonham-
Carter Report - Central Health Services Council (1969)) ex-
hibited a systematic bias in its proposals towards the interests 
of consultants, emphas.ising the virtues of centralis.ation of 
medical facilities and paying limited attention to such issues 
as accessibility (see chapter 6}. Finally, Offe's fourth 
n.~:ga:tive selection principle - the use .of the :repressive 
apparatus 6£ the state - does not directly concern us here. 
Thus Offe provides valuable in£ights into the means 
whereby the class character of the state is revealed by various 
positive and negative selection procedures, whiC:h operate at 
various levels. Offe also highlights the problems of 
pluralist and managerialist accounts of the state by analysing 
the adequacy of various methods of policy formulation in terms 
of accomplishing the tasks of the capitalist state. These are 
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the logics of h1uea:-ucracy (governed by Weberian purposive 
rationality)~ pur·p:osive ·ac'i:'ion (go-verned by technical ration-
ality) ~ and a consensus. :rrio.de ·(in which the determinant of 
administrative action is conflict over in.terests and)or 
agreement on common interests)-( the following summai.ises Offe ~ 
197Sa~ 133-140). Bureaucratic rules and procedures - advocated 
by Weber on the grounds of their technical advantages (precision~ 
speed, unambiguity and so on) - are appropriate when the 
state's role is limited to allocation. This is b~cause 
decisions simply have to dispose of resources already owned by 
the state and hence deti~ion-making can follow pre-specified 
criteria. However, increased involvement of the state in 
productive activities raises a whole host of problems. Since 
productiue activities on the part of the state are, in the 
strict sense, ~~rket-replacing activities, the criteria according 
to which these are to be carried out are not subject to neutral, 
technical decision,-making procedures. Fot instance involvement 
of the state in productive activities raises questions about the 
extent and purpose of state action, the .most efficient way of 
achieving objectives and thedistributional consequences of 
state policies. State inteFvention in health is a case 1n 
point. AlToc·ative intervent-ion involves .making certain claims 
legal or setting mimimum standards (for instance, legislation 
on the length d£ the working day, or on sanitation conditions 
in houses) and bureaucracies are ideally equipped to carry out 
the supervision of such legislation. Productive intervention, 
on the other hand, may involve such activities as the con~ 
struction and management of public hospitals and so the state 
becomes directly involved in the organisation of physical 
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investment and equipment. Consequently the sc:o.pe of eve:1ts 
occurring outside the influence of the administrative apparatus 
is much greater and is beyond the control of technical, 
bureaucratic procedures. The setting up of the NHS, involving 
a considerably greater Tole for the state in tenns not only of 
productive policies but als.o in terms of producing services for 
use rather than exchange, has posed serious problems for the 
state in controlling, justifying and distributing resources, 
and the., .multifarious claims on the service could not be resolved 
simply by recourse to bureaucratic procedures. 
Alternative 16gics of policy production are that of 
purposive-rational action and that grognded in d~mocratic 
conflict and consensus. The former presupposes that the state 
has clear-cut, unequivoqal rules towards wh~ch it can move. This 
may well be true for the individual entrepreneur under conditions 
of competition (in the sense that, at the very least, one may 
assume a desire to stay in business).; but the state must 
reconcile such diverse compet.ing claims that the speci.fication 
o.f precis.e opera tiona! goals is problema tic. Even if such 
goals could be specified, there are severe constraints on the 
ability of the state to implement its declared intentions and 
attain its goals; witness the problems of implementing the 
1962 Hospital Plan (chapters 6-10 below). 
The final alternative 'logic' of policy production is 
that of allowing political conflict and consensus. to determine 
the outcome of public decisions. However, the sheer problem 
of consensus formation would render the state incapable of long-
term planning, not least because more demands and interests 
would be generated than could possibly be satisfied under 
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existing _financial and insti tut.ional cons~tra.ints (O£_fe ~ 197 Sa~ 
140). Hence policy formulation cannotadmit or consider all 
possible demands upon the state and so some form of selection 
procedure is necessary. As has been indicated above, this will 
tend to favour certain classes and interests at the expense 
of others. 
The consequences of accepting arguments are threefold. 
Firstly, they provide further grounds £or rej ect~ing pluralist 
and managerialist notions of the state. Irrespective of the 
technical competence o£ managers, and allowing £or the influence 
of subj ect.ive £actors in mana.geriai decision-.rnaking (Gray, 1976; 
Leonard, 1980), in the final ana~ysis too many events are 
beyond the control of managers. As far as pluralist vi~ws are 
concerned, the arguments advanced above ha.ve attempted to 
demonstrate that, far from all interest groups being in a 
position to articula.te their .demands., there exist systematic 
selection procedures which tend .to structure decision-making 
procedures in certain ways. 
Secondly, these proposi t.ions reinforce the arguments 
developed above (chapter 2) that the production o£ the kind of 
theory advocated for public facility location by several authors 
(for instance, Teitz, 1968) is an unrealistic project. Though 
it is, in principle,possible to specify operational gbals 
appropriate to private sector location problems, this is not 
so in the public sector, due to the number of influences and 
issues to be considered and the problem of specifying the goals 
to be achieved. 
Thirdly, it follows that the operational rationality of 
the state is somewhat difficult to s.p.ecify .. The state must 
produce policies that have to take account of a range of 
economic~ political and social .cons.iderations. For example~ in 
evaluating the closure of a hospital~ how would one assess the 
various implications~ in terms of access to services~ traffic 
flow patterns, employment opportunities and so on? Thus there 
are no clearly defined rules for policy formulation and, 
moreover~ .the state must submi.t to various const.raints on its 
scope for manoeuvre. The capitalist state cannot increase its 
planning capacity to the extent that freedom of investment 
ceases, thereby subjecting private capital to political decisions 
This is because of the need to. justify state planning to the 
electorate; hence the state cannot act simply to solve the 
problems of capital. Nor can the state simply dispense with the 
production~.o£ .::i services for use. Such se.rvices cannot be seen 
solely as a burden on private capital. (e.g. Bacon and Eltis, 
197.6) , for they provide important benefits to capital in terms 
of c.rea.ting opportunit.ies for exchange relationship.s {Gough, 
1915; 1979). In between the extremes of central planning and 
laisse.z-faire, the state's ac.tivi ties. are directed t-owards: 
'cautious crisis me~.nagemen.t and long- term crisis 
av:oidance strategy' 
IOffe~ 1916, 415). 
The state seeks to defuse potential crises by seeking 
political solutions which, though neither unassailably 1 rational' 
nor~entirely arbitrary, nevertheless have the effect of 
compromising between the views of all inte.rest groups, though 
the selection procedures discussed abo.ve will tend to skew 
the decision-making p.rocess somewhat. Purely technical 
solutions to state .decisions are inadequate, precisely because 
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of th.e n-:wnber of interest groups to be satisfied and due to 
constraints upon the state (·Frankel, 19J9~ 2.22-225). 
In the light of these comments, the detailed case studies 
of hospital planning (ch~pters 8-10) should not be seen as the 
finest empirical embodimen,t of a th.e.ory of the capitalist state 
in general, but rather as conc:r:e.te evidence which supports these 
propositions. The issues discussed below illustrate the policy 
formulation process, the way the interests of certain groups 
take precedence in planning., the e.xtent to which the views of 
all interested parties can be considered, and the way knowledge 
is produced in order to favour p~rticular interests. In thi~ 
respect Offe's work on state policy formula.tion is significant 
in that his views raise theories of the state to a level at which 
they are - at least in general terms - cap~ble of providing 
reasonable interpretatie,ns of the complexities of hospital 
planning discus.sed below. 
3.2.5 ConcTudin:g colrni1ents 
This. review has assessed the status o£ certain theoretical 
p-ropositions of the state from the point of view of their 
validi t:y as. theories of society (Dear, 1918a; see also chapter 
2, above). Two. important issues were identified, name;t·y the 
existence of any necessary class bias to state policies and the 
exercise of state power, and the character of state policy 
formulation. Pluralist and managerialist views (section 3.2.2 
above) are inadequate on both counts. By denying any connection 
between power and clas~, pluralist views provide no more than 
an idealised description of how society currently works. 
Managerialist views lack an adequate theory of the relationship 
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between the actions of managers and the social context in 
which they are operating. In addition~ as Offe graphically 
demonstrates, neither provides an adequate acco::unt of state 
policy formulation. 
In evaluating Marxist theories of the state, this review 
has moved from a subJectivist approach (Therbo.rn, 1978, 130-131), 
which merely locates who has power and describes the exercise 
of it, to an historical materialist view, seeking to understand 
the state as part of the proces.s of reproduction of capitalist 
society. It would be valid to characterise what are often 
assumed to represent Marxist analyses (e.g. Miliband, 1969) 
as theories of the state in capitalis.m,. or as subjectivist 
views; by contrast, more sophisticated writings have sought 
to derive the form and functions of the capitalist state from 
the wider structural relations of capitalist society. This 
has been. achieved with varying degrees of success. Thus 
despite the points of difference between Miliband and Poulantzas, 
both attempt to establish the class na.ture of the state by 
concentrating on the specificity o.f the .pol·i tical with respect 
to the economic sphere, thereby ignoring fundamental economic 
.. . 
constraints upon the capitalist state. Capital. logic analyses 
are, in principle, an attempt to derive the form and function 
of the state from the laws of motion and historical develop-
ment of capitalism, but they are ultimately reductionist and 
ahistorical in character. In response to such problems, Offe's 
work provides important theoretical. advances. Stressing the 
historically changing character of the capitalist state, and 
the way this is mediated through class st .. ruggle, Offe (as 
well as Hahermas) confronts attempts. by the state to respoild 
to the crises of capitalism. Moreover~ Offe's ana1ysis of the 
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selective character of state intervention, and on the logic 
of state pol icy for.mula t.ion ~ is particuiarl.y Ya.luable. These 
arguments appear to provide a means whe:rehy the problematic 
and complex articulations of state policy .may be interpreted 
not simply in the light of the idiosyncratic actions of key 
individuals or power.ful groups, but rather in relation to 
structurally located characteristics of the form and function 
of the capital is.t state. How.ever, problems remain in employing 
such .frameworks to interpret state policy formulation and the 
final section draws attention to some of these. 
3. 3 Pro.ble:ms ·of interpretat.ion an.d theorTes of the state 
This section draws attention to some of the problems in 
employing the theoretical frameworks favoured, referring 
principally to the relatiortship between theoretical categories 
and empirical evidence. This is not to deny that problems 
existed concerning the survival, availability, quality and 
reliability of this evidence but such matters have already been 
discus·sed (chapter 1). Nor will an attempt be made to confront 
two .major theoretical problems pert.aining to analyses of the 
capitalist state, namely the functionalism implicit in several 
views (Giddens, 1982,215) and· the. teTeoTogi'cal character of 
some historical accounts of the welfare state~ whereby informatioi 
is interpreted in a manner which suggest.s that the 'balance of 
class forces' was in some way inevitably right for whatever 
actually happened (Harris, 1980, 248). Several important 
interpretative proble.ms cannot be ignored. 
Firstly, some of the propositions reviewed are written at 
the level o.f the capitalist state in .general, and while this 
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begs the question of the desir.abilit:y of writing at such a 
level of abstraction, the point that the form and £-unction 
of the capitalist state will be historically specific and 
contingent on various factors should require no further 
elaboration. (Frankel~ 19]9y 200; Jessopy 1977 ~ 367) 0 
Moreover~ conducting analyses at such a level of abstraction may 
lead to ignoring the importance not only of local aspects of 
social relations and state practice (Byrney 1982), but also of 
~tipranatiotial state institutions and organisations (such as 
NATO or the EEC) o The interrelationships between the several 
levels of such a hierarchy pose an important problem for 
contemporary analyses of the capita~Ast state (Harris, 1980, 
260) . 
Secondly 9 there is the need to relate the actions of 
individual decision-makers to such abstract theoretical 
formula.tions., especially in relation to the complex debates 
on local policy issues (chapters 8-10). Local autonomy in 
decision-Jnaking undoubtedly does e.xist, and. it is in this sense 
that the actions of, and interpersonal and intergroup 
negotiations. between, key policy formulators are _w~rthy of 
close examination. It cannot be overemphasised that the 
selection procedures discussed hy Offe do not operate with 
some kind of .mechanistic inevitability; they will be .modified 
in their operation by the complexities of local politics and 
planning. However, this is not to deny the prominence of 
certain class interests in the operation of the state even at 
this local level; nor does it e.xclude the possibility that the 
policy options available at the local scale may be constrained 
by selection mechanisms o.perating at a higher level; nor can 
the possibility be ignored:>t;ha.t structural constraints on 
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the intentions of certain agencies of the sta.te .may .generate 
a discrepancy, or lack of coordination, :betwe:en th.e goals of 
these agencies, and (more generally) that social r-eformist 
intentions may become subordinate to broader economic 
imperatives. Hence, even at the local scale there is evidence 
which, in a variety of ways, poses the problem of the liniits 
to state intervention and the extent to which the state can 
achieve certain ends. The theoretical frameworks outlined 
above therefore allow interpretations to be pitched at a 
rather higher level of abstraction than that of individual 
idiosyncrasy or autonomy and hence avoid the problems of 
voluntarism which can be associated with managerialist 
iriterpretations. Objective pressures and constraints arising 
from the contradictory nature of demands placed tipon the agencies 
of the state are decisive, rather than the s.ubjective wishes 
of key individuals. Since the theoretical statements discussed 
above provide a means of explicitly de~ling with such 
constraints, there seems to be little danger in applying them 
in this context. 
A third problem concerns the extent to which class interests 
can be identified.. While Offe' s views il1lply that chosen policy 
options- in general favour capitalist interests and system-
atically exclude anti-capitalist interests, this seems to 
present classes as undifferentiated entities, yet this is 
patently not so. It is essential to recognise that sub-class 
groups exist and that these are all capable, to varying 
degrees, of articulating their objectives and influencing 
policy. In this sense, there is some force in Giddens' 
(1982, 216) claim that pluralist views have something to offer 
Marxist analyses, insofar as the latter must consider 
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explicitly the variety of interest groups lllaki:n.g claims upon 
the state (see also Harris~ 1980, 158)·. 
Fourthly, the relationship betw.een theoretical categories 
and empirical evidence may be problematic, partly because of 
the variable quality of the latter and the level of abstraction 
of the former, and partly because of the language in which 
disputes are conducted and policies articulated. The .manner 
in which ParliaJnentary debates are conducted, for instance, 
'slurs and mutes the deep antagonisms which exist in society' 
(Bevan, 1952, 21); hence Parliamentary .democracy may serve to 
defuse class conflict. It may be that ~apses and silences 
in policy. ~o_cuments and the la~guag~ in which they are written, 
may be deliberate and systematic expressions of power relation-
ships in society; though this is not develo.ped in great detail 
below, this issue can ultimately be linked to debates on 
language and explanation in the social sciences (on which see 
Giddens, 1919; Foucault, 1971; 19.7.3; 1915; MacDonald and Pettit, 
1981) . More specifica1ly, the empirical ident.ifica tion of the 
selection procedures referred to, poses serious problems .if 
one only has access to policy documents on an e·x post basis; 
in such a case, the researcher wduld be unable to examine 
policy issues which had been excluded from consideration. 
Reference could be made to a 'totality of abstract possibilities' 
in order to assess the selectiveness of political institutions, 
but the result would be that the negative concepts would 
become: 
'so .multifarious and non"7committal that the result is 
the. trivial s tatemen.t that e\l'.ery con·c·e .. ivable form of 
social organisation is based on exclusion rules', 
(Offe, 19.74, 45 - emphasis added). 
..-so-
Conventional political theorists. hav_e cir-cumvented this 
problem either by restricti:ng the scope of their enquiry to 
that which is empirically observabl-e, or by acknowledging 
'non-events' recognised by the system itself (e.g. Bachrach 
a_nd Bar a tz ~ 1962) . However, such non-events are in principle 
contingent and revocable (Offe, 1914, 42) so that such views 
are unable to account for the class character and selective 
nature of state policy formulation. These become apparent 
because of the competing demands placed upon the s,ta te; since 
these cannot all be conceded·, due to the structural properties 
of the state, selection procedures will operate and, as argued 
above, these will tend to favour certain groups. 
Finally, brief reference should be made to .the relationship 
between theore-tical and empirical resea.rch. Harvey's (197 3, 
128-129, 144.,.145) accusation that simply amassing information 
about social and spatial inequalit.ies :is of little intrinsic 
value, still rings true. In terms of s:eeking explanations 
of such inequalities, it is inadequa:t.e sin1ply to. amass evidence 
on decision-making without criteria. upon which to base selection 
of empirical examples. Furthermore, considerable debate on 
the sta.te has taken place at an a-bstract level with a 
'regrettable disregard for empirical research' (Navarro, 1978, 
xvii). If the state's influence on spatial patterns is to be 
adequately understood, it is important to recog'nise the 
complementary nature of theoretica1 and empirical work (Sayer, 
19J9b). It is possible to make claims about the capitalist 
state in general terms, at a theoretical level, but precise 
articulations of state policy formulation are essentially 
... ~· ' . 
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contingent matters and so must be revealedby empirical 
research. In what fOllows there£ore,_ an at.tem,pt is made to 
illuminate the relevance of these theoretical propositions at 
two related levels. Firstly (chapters 4~J) major themes in 
the development of the acute hospital services of postwar 
Britain are examined. The emphasis here is on the changing 
character of the British state and the im:plications of this 
for the NHS and for hospital planning in particular. Hence, 
follo~ing a discussion of the evolution of the British 
hospital system, a broad overview is presented of issues in 
the planning of the hospital service since the war. Attention 
is directed specifically to events in the Newcastle RHB 
(Northern RHA from 1974) and to constraints on the ability of 
the state to implement its declared intentions, particularly 
in relation to local planning issues. Chapters 8-10 then 
exemplify various points raised in chapters 4-J, by examining 
in detail three dis.putes on hospital strategy. This material 
is treate.d. thematically. Thus an attempt is made to lin,k 
developmen.ts in intrare.gional. spatial policy and hospital 
planning (chapter 8), focusing on the extent to which the 
intentions of various agencies were - o:r we:re not -
coordinated. Then (chapter 9) examples are presented of the 
use of tec~nical procedures fOr the reso~ution of local 
planning disputes; doubt is cast upon the utility ~f these in 
terms of providing solutions to. policy problems. Finally, a 
detailed discussion is presented of the resolution of the 
conflicts referred to, illustrating the considerations given 
prominence in the planning process (chapter 10). The aim is 
not to 'test' explicitJy the various views of the state 
~.sz-
evaluated ahmre ~ but it should become. clea:r that the .evidence 
further supports the discussion (above:} com:;.erning the relative 
merits of particular views. It is important to conunence with 
an account of the development of hospital planning in Britain 
prior to 1948~ in order to understand the nature of both 
the problems to be resolved and t.he proposals for their 
resolution; this account is now presented in chapter 4. 
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4. The .evolution of the Bri ti.sh hosuital ser.viC:es 
prior to 1948 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
(section 4.2) presents a brief account of the development of 
the hospital services in Britain prior to World War 2, 
focusing particularly on the gradual extension of state inter-
vention in hospital provision. The bulk o.f the chapter 
(section 4.3) then examines proposals for the post-w~r 
hospital system and the conflicts over these; of particular 
interest here Rre debates on whether or not full state control 
of hospital se.rvices was necessary and}or desirable, and 
discussions on the arrangements for post-war hospital planning. 
Finally (section 4.4) the condition of the hospital stock 
inherited by the NHS is discussed so as .to illuminate the 
difficulties to be resolved. 
4. 2 His.torical background: s t·a te inte.rven:tion a:n·d hospital 
provision pefore World War 2. 
Two forms of hospital provision existed in Britain 
before World War 2: the voluntary and municipal hospitals. 
The former depended for financial support largely on 
private philanthropy, the motivations for which ranged 
from genuine charity to a desire for the social prestige 
derived from patronage of a hospital (Widgery, 1979, 3; 
Abel-Smith, 1964,65). With the emergence, in the early 19th 
century, of what Foucault (1973, xix) has described as a 
'new empiricism' in medical practice, there had developed 
pressures on voluntary hospitals to keep up with medical 
,'---I 
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practi.ce and research.. H~n.ce the. vo-luntary hospitals con':'" 
centrated largely on the tre~tment of the acute sick and~ 
given the social barriers on entry to the medical profession~ 
the prarnin.ence of certain sectors of the health services was 
already being established (Abel-Smith~ 1964, 16-31). 
The second form of hospital provision was the municipal 
hospitals. State intervention in hospital provision dates 
back to the workhouse infirmaries incorporated in the 1834 
Poor Laws. Given the 'less eligibility' pr~nciple on which 
these had been established (Doyal, 1979, 1.43; Widgery, 1979, 
5), conditions in such facilities were generally poor and 
they were built cheaply, often on isolated and unhealthy 
site.s (Allen., 1979, 10). Nor was there a direct duty on 
the state to provide hospitals: Poor Law legislation was 
discretionary rather than mandatory, and so there was no 
guarantee of hospital provision in any particular area. 
However, there eme.rged pressures for increased state 
intervention in health matters in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries; several public health acts attempted to cope 
with the rapid spread of infectious diseases. Furthermore, 
the implications of the urban environment of 19th century 
Britain for the health of the working population were 
graphically demonstrated in the poor physical condition-of 
Boer War recruits (Doyal, 1979, 161-163). Such pressures, 
coupled with working class demands for reform (Navarro, 1978, 
9-10), led to the social insurance legislation of the pre-
World War 1 Liberal_ government. However, the major demands 
for reforms of the hospital service we.re to be articulated 
by defenders of the voluntary hospitals. Dependent on 
philanthropy, their development had been uncoordinated and 
unplanned: location was determined nei.ther by cooperation 
betwe.en voluntary hospitals, nor by a policy coordinated with 
municipal facilities (Allen, 1919, 11) and the consequences 
had been graphically revealed by a government inquiry (House 
of Lords, 1890-1892; see also Ro.yal Commission on the Poor 
Laws, 1909). After World Wa.r 1, the increased militanQy 
of the population led to demands (int'er alia}£or a comprehensive 
state health service (Navarro, 1978, 16-17; Doyal, 1979, 175), 
though these demands were subse.quent1y diluted and defused. 
In particular, the government's initial proposals for the 
health sector (the Dawson Report - Consultative Council on 
Medical and Allied Services, 1920) me.rely favoured cooperation 
- rather than integration - of voluntary and municipal 
hospitals. Even these proposals were not implemented following 
the defeat of what Navarro te.rmed the 'progressive wave' in 
British society in the 192.6 General Strike (Navarro, 1978, 19; 
see also Coates, 19J5, 21-25). 
If working class pressures for reform had thus been 
de.fused, there wa.s never.theless substantial pressure from the 
vol.un.tary hospitals for increased state financial support. 
Th.e financial situation of these hospitals worsened con-
side.rably in wartime; from 1913 to 1920, their income had 
risen by 67% as against cost increases of 138% and 321 (out 
of 565) voluntary hospitals in England and Wales had deficiencies 
on normal income (Pater, 1981, 12; see also Pinker, 1966, 149-
155), for a detailed analysis of the financial position of 
voluntary hospitals). In response, a block grant of £500,000 
was allocated to the voluntary hospitals following the report 
of the Gave Commi t.tee (Minis try of Health, 19 21) , though this 
was to be a limitedand temporary .measure for fear of under-
mining public contributions to and support for the voluntary 
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system. Such resistance to greater state involvement 1...ras also 
evident in the rejection of the. Onslow Co:mmittee' s (Ministry 
of Health, 1928) call for a government grant towards the 
provision of additional hospital beds, and in attacks on 
Neville Chamberlain for recommending that a mechanism be 
set up for coordinating.the a.ctivities of voluntary and 
municipal hospitals (see Pater, 1981, 14-15). Though the 1929 
Local Government Act empowered local authorities to provide 
acute hospital services - an extension of their existing 
obligation to facilitate the treatment of infectious diseases -
no formal steps were taken to guarantee the cooperation of 
municipal and yoluntary systems: hence, 'the climate in many 
areas ... was not so much one of cooperation as of cold war' 
(Pater, 1981, 16). However, such cooperation was increasingly 
perceived as essential; the interwar depression had adversely 
affected both local authority rate income and public contrib-
utions to. voluntary hospitals and thus had hampered hospital 
developmen.t (see Mess, 19 2.8, 116) . Moreover, since the 
distribution of specialists was closely relat~d to the potential 
m~r~et £or priv~te practice, areas such as the North East were 
likely to lag hehind ethers in medical provision (see below, 
section 4.4). Hence the more effective planning of hospital 
services was an increasingly urgent prohlem; by 1937, even the 
voluntary hospitals were willing to accept increased state 
finance for hospital development (British Hospitals Association, 
1931) . However their views in no sense went as far as other 
contemporary documents (Department of Health for Scotland, 1936; 
Royal Commission on Tyneside Local Government, 1936) ,which 
respectively advocated centralised control of medical services, 
and regionalised local government in the interests of more 
'· ·-· 
:' 
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effective planning. 
By World War 2~ then, a consensus had emerged on the 
necessity for increased state invol-veJnent in hospital provision. 
This was a result of the convergence o£ very different political 
forces. Though there had initially beerr a somewhat negative 
response to the possibility of state intervention~ particularly 
from the voluntary hospitals, this resistance was slowly 
weakening, no doubt motivated by the parlous financial con-
dition of the voluntary hospital system. Local authority 
interests would also be better served by more centralised 
planning; since they were dependent on income from rates, such 
authorities could not always guarantee the provision of 
services. Though these groups were of course protecting their 
own interest, the government's proposals were - certainly in 
the early inter-war years - partly motivated by £ear of working 
class deJnands for reform. Thus~ though there were moves towards 
a state medical service, there remained considerable dispute 
as to the organisation o£ such a service. In the next section, 
therefore, the development o£ propos~ls £or the post-war 
hospital service is examined in detail. 
4. 3 Wartime hospital· policy 
In order to clarify the major themes in hospital policy 
prior to the setting up of the NHS, this section considers two 
main issues. Firstly, the reasons why a qualitative extension 
of state intervention became necessary are examined (section 
4.3.1) and secondly, the debates on the form of the future 
hospital service are summarised. Reliance is placed largely 
upon contemporary state papers in order to illustrate how these 
issues were addressed, debated and resolved. 
4.3.1 
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The necessity for increased state intervention :.n 
health care an:dhospitaT planning. 
In accounting for the emergence of a consensus on the 
necessity for an increase in state involvement in the provision 
of hospital facilities~ three factors are important. These 
concern the problems of the. voluntary and municipal hospital 
systems~ the success o£ the centrally-organised Emergency 
Medical Service (EMS) hospitals, and - more generally - an 
awareness that state involvement in welfare delivery would be 
essential both in terms of providing services which could not 
otherwise be guaranteed under existing social arrangements, and 
als~ in terms of Gonceding to likely working-~lass pressure 
after the war. 
No real national hospital system could be said to 
exist prior to World War 2, and three main policy objectives 
were identified. These were to make good the overall bed 
shortage; to iron out the inequalities resulting from the ill-
balanced and uncoordinated development of services; and to 
ensure the efficient use of the service. The second of these 
was perhaps the most important, and it was recognised that 
placing a duty on local authorities to provide services would 
not necessarily solve the problem, since provision would be 
dependent on rate income and local political influences (4.1). 
In addition, the voluntary hospitals were in a serious financi~l 
condition and they had not adapted to changed circumstances 
following the 1929 Local Government Act which had empowered 
local authorities to provide acute hospital services- (4.2). 
Coordination with other hospitals was rare~ and it was claimed 
that the voluntary hospitals had been complacent, ignored 
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warnings as to their future, and rested on their laurels (4.3). 
It was also probable that the Yoluntary hospitals would become 
completely impoverished after the war; they \.vould have to cope 
with increased demand from returning military casual ties, and 
considerable capital development would be essential~ to make 
good the bomb damage suffered by many urban· hospitals (4.4). 
If this source of hospital care was not to disappear, a rather 
greater degree of state support would be required. 
Secondly, the success of _.the EMS hos.pi tal scheme 
prompted consideration of the possibility that centralised 
control o£ hospital development woul.d also be des.irable in 
peacetime. The EMS scheme had been set up in 1938 and - under 
the Civil. Defence Act, 1939 - the Ministry of Health became 
responsible for treating air raid casualties. A regional 
organisation of hospital services was set up to discharge this 
responsibility and lPOO new operating theatres had been 
provided by the outbreak of war (Allen, 1979, 21); by late 
1941, an additional 80,000 beds had been made available (4.5). 
In what was to become the Newcastle RHB area, 11 EMS 
hospitals (or major extensions of existing facilities)provided 
3,719 additional beds (see section 4.4 below). These addit-
ional resources would be a 'powerful weapon' for any government 
wishing to extend state control of hospitals, since they would 
have 'something to offer' local authorities who might other-
wise merely defend their own vested interests (4.6). The 
EMS scheme was so successful that full state control was seen 
as desirable in peacetime (4.7) and it was also instrumental 
in educating those running the voluntary hospitals to accept 
a coordinated service (4.8). Hence it was both necessary and 
appropriate that a full state hospital service should be 
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considered~ though there was to be considerable dispute .over 
the form of the service. 
While the need for more coordinated planning was evident 
from the condition of the existing hospital system~ and the 
potential for such planning had been clearly demonstrated~ 
possibly the most important direct pressure on the state was 
the need to accede to working class pressure for reform. An 
extension of welfare services was therefore a matter of 'immed-
iate practical concern'(Doyal,l9J9, l7J)- a point explicitly 
recognised early in the war by senior civil servants in the 
Ministry of Health (4.9). Though the war had diverted attention 
from potentially dangerous political issues towards the national 
concern for the defeat of Germany~ this was not sufficient to 
legitimate the wartime hardships undergone by the majority of 
the population. To ensure continued political stability, there-
fore, a 'new and better Britain' had to be promised (Forsyth, 
1966, 21; Navarro, 1978, 30). It is against this background 
that the emergence of proposals for a national hospital service 
(4.10) and of the social security measures (including a 
comprehensive health service) of the Beveridge Report (Beveridge, 
1942) should be interpreted. While there were important 
pressures for social reform to which the state responded by 
promising an extension of welfare services, the changes that 
took place were to be set squarely within limits prescribed by 
the existing social order (Kincaid, 1973, 48; Navarro, 1978, 
31). Space prevents fuller consideration of the setting up of 
the NHS (see Eckstein, 1959; Navarro, 1978; Pater, 1981); 
instead, attention is now focused on the development of proposals 
for the future hospital service. 
-91-
4. 3. 2. The. eVolution of hos·pit.a1 :poJ_!_~i d~ring the war. 
This section concentrates on two: themes: the .form of 
the organisation of the hospital service~ and the extent to 
which state control was to be imposed. 
Several inter~war reports (see section 4.2) had 
advocated a regional organisation for hospital services for 
various reasons. Firstly, a regional coordinating mechanism 
was required~ to prevent overlapping of services and com-
petitive building, secure treatment at 'key' (4.11) hospitals 
for patients resident in areas which did not already possess 
such services, and to ensure liaison between hospitals and 
hospital authorities on staff appointments (4.12). Secondly, 
a regional organisation was essential if a realistic attempt 
was to be .made to provide all forms of medical care in all areas 
of the country. In some ways this was a simple matter of 
threshold populations for service provision; regional units 
were the 'proper' scale for hospital administration, since they 
'embrace all kinds of hospital facilities', whereas not all 
counties or county boroughs could form a separate unit, and 
to provide the necessary services in each county or county 
borough would be extravagant (4.13). Moreover, given the 
increased scope and specialised character of hospital care, a 
regional organisation was also required in the interests of 
economy (4.14). 
Having established the necessity for a regional or-
ganisation, what factors would determine its size and what 
would be the future pattern of services within it? Regional 
units were seen as essential, but there were likely to be 
practical probl:ems in securing a public inte.rest in the running 
of the service; furthermore, virtually any s1ze of region would 
be inappropriate from the point of view of provision of some 
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local se.rvices (4.15). However~ since wartime proposals for 
hospital pro.:vis ion generally envisaged a coordination of 
existing arrangp.ments - as opposed to greater unification 
or inte.gra tion of voluntary and municipal hospitals - then in 
the interests of administrative efficiency, it was desirable 
that as few units as possibl~ were invo.lved. Wartime plans 
therefore advocated a small number of regional units, each of 
which would preferably be based on a teaching hospital. Within 
these, a network of 'base' hospitals of 1,000 - 2,000 beds was 
envisaged, providing a range of acute surgical and consultative 
outpatient facilities. This network would be complemented by 
a series- of specialist units supplying less frequently needed 
facilities, and the cottage hospital system was worthy of 
retention in rural areas (4.16). Thus the early wartime 
proposals concurred on the need for rationalisation and proposed 
that the future hospital services would be based on the 
(somewhat crude) hierarchical system outlined above. However, 
this issue was considerably less contentious than the complicated 
negotiations concerning the extent of state control and the 
arrangements for regional planning and administration. 
Although the necessity for increased state involvement 
was generally agreed, there was considerable reluctance to 
challlenge the voluntary hospitals and the medical profession -
the two bodies seen as most entrenched in their opposition 
to such a development. Complete state control was seen almost 
as a revolutionary step; an early wartime document compared 
this to the suppression of the monasteries by Henry VIII (4.17). 
Even a majo~ extension of state involvement would provoke 
'ferocious' professional opposition; the medical profession 
were thought likely to argue that advantage had been taken of 
-93-
the war to 'betray' them and impose a. £ull state medical 
service (4.18). Consequently, early wartime proposals insisted 
that coexistence and cooperation of municipal and voluntary 
hospitals wereboth possible and desirable. The interests of 
the latter, in particular, were strongly defended; the 
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust argued forcefully for 
retention of voluntary hospitals on the grounds of the con-
tribution these could make to the reduction of government 
expenditure on hospitals (4.19). The Coalition government's 
first wartime proposals went no further than advocating co-
ordination (4.20). This was attacked by local authority 
spokesmen as being simply an attempt to prop up the voluntary 
hospital system (4.21) - a view supported by the apparent 
unwillingness of senior civil servants to challenge this system 
(4.22). 
Subsequent proposals (Ministry of Health, 1944) re-
produced the above view, arguing that the voluntary hospitals 
would cooperate with the municipal hospitals on an independent 
contractor basis. However, as Aneurin Bevan (4.23) was to 
observe, this scheme 'ran away from so many vested interests 
that in the end ... (there was) no scheme at all' (quoted in 
Foot, 1913, 130). This res~lted from the proposed structure 
of the se.rvice. Ad hoc regional bodies were proposed, appointed 
centrally by the Minister of Health, yet the voluntary hospitals 
were to be permitted to choose whether or~not they joined the 
service. This scheme failed to satis£y the ~edical profession, 
who felt that the regional body should have rather more re-
ponsibility £or planning (4.24) the local authorities, from 
whom the scheme removed a great deal of responsibility, 
(Navarro, 19] 8, 35) , and the voTU:nta.ry hospitals ,whose view 
was that since municipal hospitals were still directly 
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controlled by the regional authori tj_es ~ these. hospitals would 
be given priority in development (4.25). In these terms the 
proposals of the Coalition government were an attempt to 
rationalise the existing pattern of service provision without 
threatening the interests of those in control of the hospitals. 
However, the Labour government elected in 1~45 had_-
in principle - a clear mandate to challenge the existing control 
and ownership of the hospital service; full state ownership and 
control was~ proposed. Yet this proposal Jnet considerable 
resistance (as indeed did Labour's plans for a national health 
service- see Navarro (1978), Abe1-Smith(l964), root (1973), 
Eckstein (1959)). 
As Minister of Health, Bevan (see note 4.23) advocated 
full state ownership of hospitals for several reasons. It 
would secure unified control and facilitate planning; ensure 
public control of public expenditure; permit the organisation 
of hospital services on 'natural' areas unhandicapped by 
local authority boundaries; avoid a separation of hospital 
planning from the execution of plans; and it wa.s likely to gain 
the support of the .medical profession, 'who are; above all things, 
terrified of local authority control' (4.26). Bevan's proposals 
therefore envisaged state control of all hospital services, though 
the teaching hospitals were to be run by separate organisations 
(see Appendix 1) . Administration was to be placed in the hands 
of regional boards, though Bevan hoped that a future local 
government reorganisation would enable the closer integration 
of hospital and local government services (see Foot, 1973, 
1973, 263-264). Regional Boards would operate under 
the'general direction' of the Minister but 
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'the aim would be the max1mum degree of decentralisation in 
the administration'. Below the RHBs 1 day-to-day operation 
of the service would be entrusted. to district committees. 
Though financed by central government, the service was to 
be operated in such a way as to ensure a 'free and flexible 
degree of decentralised control'. The reasons for these 
proposals, and the opposition to them, are now considered (4.2J). 
Full state control was advocated because the voluntary 
hospital sys tern was 'an anachronislil'; it had failed to provide 
a good service and many hospitals were on the point of bank-
ruptcy (4.28). Financial support for vbluntary hospitals had 
fallen to such an extent that the state would have to guarantee 
70-90% of their income, and contributions on such a scale were 
inconceivable without an extension of state control. Further-
more, only through full state control would it be possible to 
plan the service in such a way as to eliminate inequalities in 
provision, thereby carrying out the government's pledge to 
provide a comprehensive national service (4.29). 
As to the precise form of state control, a local 
government system could not guarantee the elimination of the 
existing inequalities, due to the problems inherent in financing 
a service from the rates. In addition, larger units than 
individual local authorities were seen as essential, and the 
extent to which local authorities had provided hospitals in the 
past had varied both geographically and qualitatively. Al-
ternatives to a regional organisation - such as a new, directly 
elected authority - were administratively complex and remote 
from public control (4.30). 
These plans were vigorously opposed by local government 
spokesmen; for example, Herbert Morrison (4.31) feared damage 
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to the fabric of local government~ and was also concerned 
at the centralisation and rigidity of the proposals (4.32). 
However, Bevan countered such objections on the grounds that 
a less radical scheme would neither solve the financial and 
administrative problems of the existing system, nor would it 
eliminate inequalities in service provision. Moreover, the 
proposals were by no means as rigid as their opponents feared; 
Bevan's plans saw local RHBs and committees as: 
'agents ... of my department... (with) suhs'tantial 
executive powers, s·uhject to a· broad f~nancial 
control' 
(4.33) 
What was involved, then, was not so much an attack on 
the functions of local govermment but rather their 'proper 
rationalisation' (4.34). 
As regards the medical profession, relatively little 
opposition developed to what was termed 'the largest seizure 
of property since Henry VIII confiscated the monasteries' 
(4.35). The most plausible interpretation of this seems to 
lie in the generous concessions made to the medical profession 
at the setting up of the NHS; in particular, the separation 
of teaching hospitals from the rest of the NHS allowed it to 
retain a substantial degree of control over medical education, 
thus according it a privileged status in terms of its ability 
to define the nature of health care (4.36). The effect of this 
and of other concessions, such as generous representation on 
RHBs (Guillebaud Committee, 1956, 96-98; see also Crossman, 1972) 
and permitting private practice in NHS hospitals, was that 
while the state was responsible for financing and planning 
service delivery, what was be.ing delivered was largely in the 
control of the medical profession (see Crossman, 1972; 
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Navarro~ 1978; .Doyal~ 1979; Widgery~ 1979, for commentaries). 
Thus the NHS repre&ented an extension of state control in the 
interests of guaranteeing the provision of a service which 
could not effect.ively be provided and planned by private bodies 
or local authorities. The 1945-1951 Labour government saw 
state intervention in the economy as a means of increasing the 
efficiency of the economy as a whole~ rather than using such 
intervention to effect a shift in class power in society 
(Coates, 1975, 41-54; Hudson, 1981, 473-477; Miliband, 1913, 
272-294). This does not appear inconsistent with arguments 
which stress that the organisation of the working class, 
p.oli tically and ideologically, was insufficiently strong 
effect.ively to challenge existing social relations (Doyal, 1979, 
17~; Corrigan, 1977, 91) though there was considerable pressure 
to improve working class living conditions (e.g. via extended 
welfare services) ~ithin that framewdrk. 
To summarise, while there was substantial agreement 
on .the form to be taken by the postwar hospital service, its 
organisation and control were contentious issues. In particular, 
state control Qf hospital provision was strongly resisted at 
first, though subsequently accepted subject to concessions on 
the structure and control of the NHS. The theoretical im-
plications of this will be considered below (section 4.5) 
following a summary of the problems to be faced by postwar 
planning. 
4.4 The condition of the hospital stock in the Newcastle 
RHB area. 
Drawing upon the evidence and recommendations of the wartime 
Hospital Surveys (Ministry of Health, 1946, volumes 9 and 10), 
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this section illustrates the problems to be tackled by postwar 
planning. Some general remarks concerning the national sit-
uation are followed by evidence concerning the condition of the 
hospital stock in what was to become the Newcastle RHB. The 
Hospital Survey's preliminary ideas on postwar planning are 
also noted. 
While the voluntary hospital system was conventionally 
identified with the best traditions of medical practice in 
Britain, and in particular with high quality care available 
in teaching hospitals, in fact only 30 voluntary teaching units 
existed in total, and their standards of care were not always 
found in the rest of the voluntary sector. Moreover, the small 
size of such units (other than the teaching hospitals)-especially 
rural co.ttage hospitals and specialist units for specific 
diseases - had rendered them increasingly uneconomic and 
difficult to staff. Likewise,.the municipal hospitals had 
developed in an uncoordinated fashion; in :many large towns there 
existed competing voluntary and municipal facilties, the latter 
having been called into existence to cover gaps left by the 
voluntary system. In addition, the statutory duty imposed on 
local authorities to provide hospitals for particular categories 
of disease, had produced a tendency for the treatment of these 
types of illness to become separated from the general stream 
of medical caTe (Nuffield. Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1946). 
Finally, the EMS hospitals had provided a considerable addition 
to the acute hospital stock, though these facilities were often 
somewhat isolated in order to minimise the risks of air-raid 
damage (see Dunn, 1952, for an account of the EMS scheme). 
The problems of organisation and coordination of these 
different sources of hospital care were compounded by 
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disparities in bed pr.ovision between voluntary and municipal 
hospitals, and betwe.en geographical areas, Firstly~ there 
were differences between voluntary and municipal hospitals 1n 
terms both of hospital size (table 4.1) and :function (table 4.2). 
The former was partly a result of the different financial 
bases of voluntary and municipal hospitals, voluntary facilities 
being dependent largely on individual generosity and/or public 
subscription, By contrast~ the ~ore secure financial situation 
of local authority hospitals (vis-a-vis voluntary hospitals) 
1n the inter-war years, had permitted the financing of larger-
scale developments. This is only a partial account, however, 
because it ignores the obligation on local authorities to 
provide facilities for the care of the chronic sick and the 
isolation of those suffering from infectious disease. Such 
units were, in general, considerably larger than the specialist 
acute hospitals; hence disparities in function and size of 
voluntary and municipal hospitals were closely interlinked 
(table 4. 2) . 
Geographical ine.quali ties in service distribution were 
evident at both regional (table 4.3) and _::;uh-regional(table 4.4) 
scales. Note, in the former case, the below-average provision 
in South Wales, the East Midlands and the North East, both 
overall and for general acute services, by comparison with the 
relatively high levels of bed availability in the Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxford regions, as well as in the North 
West and Yorkshire. Considerable work remains to be done to 
a~count for these differentials. Clearly, the effect of socio-
economic conditions in different areas on contributions to 
voluntary hospitals would be crucial. Thus the Palmer Memorial 
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Table 4 .1 Size distribution o:f __ ~~~i taTs in 
England ~nd Wale~, l938~l) 
I 
I 
Type of hospital 
Number 
.lj'. of Vorun tary Municipal 
Beds 
Number Per Cent .. Nu:mber· 
30 345 33 96 
30-100 434 41 99 
100-500 256 24 159 
500 19 2 Jl 
Total 1054 .100 .4.2.5 
Source: 
Summary Statistics from the Hospital Sur.veys -
held in PRO MH 80}34 
Notes 
Per Cent 
22 
23 
38 
17 
--
100 
--
1. This is clearly only a s·arriple of hospital accommodation, 
since at the inception of the NHS over 3,000 hospitals 
were taken over. However the basis of the sample, and its 
spatial coverage, were not given. 
I 
I 
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Tab:le 4. 2 · Functions :of non-psychiatric voluntary ·a·n_d 
municipal hospitals in England and Wales (l) 
Ty_p~e of hospital 
Speciality -
To taT (.2) Voluntary . Municipal Total 
Hos .. Beds Hos- Beds Hos- Beds Availt~~e 
. .p.i.ta1s . pi taTs .pitaTs Beds 
General 
acute 711 60198 162 69135 873 129331 141721 
Special 196 16105 31 8543 227 24648 26956 
Chronic 27 1.730 377 49199 404 49929 59211 
TB 66 7330 134 14389 200 21719 27402 
Maternity 54 1819 98 2034 152 3853 4039 
Isolation 3 297 636 42 72 5 639 43022 43665 
-
Totals 1057 87479 1438 186025 2495 2 7 3502 302994 
Source: 
Statistics held In PRO MH 80/34 
Notes 
1. Data refer to 1938 apart from those for total available 
beds, which are n·et figures for an unspecified date 
towards the end Drthe war - see also note 3. 
2. Since the NHS initially involved state control of over 
3000 hospitals, these figures are evidently incomplete. 
However, the basis on which they were gathered was not 
given. 
3. These figures comprise the total beds available in 1938, 
E,lus_beds provided in EMS u:z:.it~, minu~ beds lost through 
wartime damage. The n:et gain In beCIS was therefore 
approximately 30,000.~hough the exact dqte at which 
these statistics were gathred was nof--g'i ven, from the 
dates on other papers in this file it seems reasonable 
to infer that the data refer to late 1944 or early 
1945. 
I 
I 
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T~bl~ 4.3 · · G~og~~phi~al variations i~~V~il~bility ~f 
· typ~s of b~d per 1000 pop~l~ti~n(l) 
/survey (Z) 
I 
General Chronic Maternity I TB Infec-I Area Acute Sick tious 
Dis eases 
London 3.6 1.3 0.32 0.62 1.1 
North Wes.t 4.3 1.25 0.09 0.73 0.9 
North East 3.0 1.1 0.10 0 0 7 4 1.4 
Yorkshire 3.3 1.6 0.17 0.76 1 0 2 
Eastern 2 0 5 2. 7 0.001 0 0 90 0.8 
West 3.8 1.8 0.09 0.5 0.8 
Midlands 
East 3.0 1 .1 0.1 0.3 1.0 
Midlands 
Berks~ Bucks. 4.7. 1.8 0.09 0.7 0.9 
Oxen. 
South 3.4 1.8 0.09 0.7 0.9 
Western 
South Wales 2.16 1.11 0.18 0.76 0.6 
Source: 
Statistics held in PRO MH 80/34 
Notes 
ll -
1 Total 
6 0 94 
7 0 2 7 
6.34 
7.03 
6.90 
6.99 
50 5 
6.89 
6.89 
4.81 
1. Date to which data refer was not given; however, since 
the spatial units seem to correspond to the areas 
covered by the ten volumes of the Hospital Surveys 
(Ministry of Health, 1946, volumes 1-10) it seems 
reasonable to put this at 1945-1946. 
2. These units were not defined but their titles correspond 
exactly to those of the ten volumes of the Hospital 
Surveys. 
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Table 4o4 Local. variations in: bed .availability per 
· 1000 popu1at·i·on (l) 
Area(2) General Chronic Mater- TB Infec-
Acute Sick nity tious 
Disease 
County of 6o3 1 0 2 Oo41 0. 71 1.6 
London 
Leeds Area 2 0 9 Oo5 Oo28 Oo8 1.1 
Rhondda 2o6 2.0 - - 0.7 
Valley 
Bath 4.1 2 0 4 0.38 0 0 27 1.0 
Wiltshire 2.2 1.6 0·. 22 Oo6 0.9 
--
--.--
-- . 
'-
Source: 
Stat1stics held in PRO MH 80/34 
Notes 
1. Date not given but data accompanied those summarised 
in table 4.3; it seems likely therefore~ that they 
refer to the same date. 
2. Spatial units were not defined. 
Total 
10o22 
6o58 
5o3 
8.15 
5.52 
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Hospital, in Jarrow, had (in financial terms) 'fallen on evil 
days' (Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 10) ~ 44) following 
the closure of Palmer's Shipyard in 1934. Indeed, according 
to the Hospital Surveyors: 
'no inquiry about Tyneside can disregard the 
fact that it was a distressed area between the 
wars, and this has undoubtedly affected the 
development of the hospital service'. 
~1inistry of Health, 1946 (volume 10),35) 
Within the Newcastle RHB area, particular concern was 
expressed at the relative underprovision and/or poor quality 
of hospital services in the west Cumberland, central and south-
west Durham, and south east Northumberland areas (Ministry 
of Health, 1946 (volume 9), 112-1T6; (Voill.me 10-) 5-z, 88--8-9, 
96, 98- see also figure 4.1). More detailed interpretation 
of these differentials would however, be unjustified in the 
absence of comprehensive evidence on the development of 
hospitals in specific circumstances. 
As well as these distributional inequalities, an overall 
deficiency in bed provision had been identified, and it was 
estimated that an additional 98,000 beds were required (Nuffield 
Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1946). However, the surveyors were 
by no means confident that such problems would be eliminated 
by new provision, for 'it 1s the common experience;~. that 
new provision only serves to reveal a considerable hidden need' 
(Ministry of Health, 1946, (volume 10), 12; compare Haynes and 
Bentham, 1979). On a more local scale, the historical develop-
ment of many hospitals on restricted urban sites had led to 
overcrowding and hence to difficult working conditions (Ministry 
of Health, 1946 (volume 9), 17; (volume 10), 37, 39, 41, 55, 
68, 71, 83, 91). 
Such problems were compounded by shortages of, and 
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inequalities in the distribution of, consultant staff. These 
were concentrated in Newcastle upon Tyne (table 4.5)~ because 
consultants offered their services to voluntary. hospitals on 
an up.paid basis and so these staff would only settle where there 
was sufficient private practice to guarantee them a· regular 
income. This had serious implications for the treatment of 
patients in peripheral hospitals, which was either carried out 
by GPs or delayed until an appropriately qualified consultant 
visited a private patient (Nuffield Provincial Hospitals 
Trust, 1946). Finally, in a further reference to the im-
plica t ions of socio-economic conditions in the region for 
hospital development, the Hospital Survey questioned whether 
there was enough demand for (or ability to pay for) private 
practice to support a large addition to the number of con-
sultants (Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 10),13). This point 
was raised because, at the time the Survey was conducted (i.e. 
during the war) there had been no concrete proposals for full 
state control of health services; if future developments were 
dependent on an expansion in private practice, then, it was 
unlikely that much would be achieved in the North East. 
Furthermore, the physical condition of the hospital stock 
left much to be desired; buildings were small, out of date, 
and accommodation was inconvenient and cramped (Ministry of 
(volume 10), 13). Compounded by the lack of 
coordination between voluntary and municipal hospitals, and 
by the bverdevelopment of particular specialities (4.37), such 
problems would require an immense progrannne of ca. pi tal 1n-
vestment (Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 9), 17-18). Tables 
4.6 (number of hospitals and types of available beds) and 4.7 
(size distribution of hospitals) provide summary statistics 
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Table 4.5 Distribution of consultant ~edi~al. ~taf£ in 
general and special hospitals in· the 
Newcastle RHB area, 1943. 
A ;rea I Number of I Staff 
Northumberland 8 
Newcastle upon Tyne 63 
C.B. 
TynemoiJ.th C.B. 7 
Durham 17 
Darlington C.B. 6 
Gateshead C.B. 2 
So~th _S11.~~lds C.B. 6 
Sunderland C.B. 23 
West Hartlepool C.B. 2 
Yorks (N. Riding) 0 
Middlesbrough C.B. 11 
Cumberland 4 
Carlisle 7 
Westmorland 4 
Source: 
M1n1stry of Health, 1946, volumes 9 and 10. 
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on hospital provision in the Newcastle RHB area, and the 
facilities available are mapped (figure 4.1). Local authority 
facilities~ in general$ v.rere considerably larger than the 
voluntary hospitals; municipal general hospitals (average size 
445 beds) were five times as large as their voluntary counter-
parts (average size 88 beds). The preponderance of small 
hospitals posed serious problems; many of these were obsolete 
and/or inefficient ~inistry of Health, 1946 (volume 9), 22$ 
112, 113; (volume 10), 40$ 41, 49, 51, 55, 71, 79, 92), and 
their physical condition had, in several cases, degenerat~d 
to the point where they were unsuitable for continued use 
(Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 9), 112; (volume _lQ},_ 13, 
40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 54, 70, 81, 91). Considerable rational-
isation and reorganisation of services would also be a necessary 
corollary of the uneven and uncoordinated development of acute 
hospital services in small or medium sized units (Ministry of 
Health, 1946 (volume 10), Sl-52, 61-65,72, 92). As regards 
the emergency hospitals, these had provided an additional 
3719 beds (table 4.8) either at entirely new sites (Durham, 
Hexham) by extensions to existing facilities (Bishop Auckland, 
Chester-le-Street) or taking over accommodation at mental 
institutions (Shatley Bridge, Ryhope). However these were, 
in several cases (Sedgefield, Stannington, Hemlington) 
located at some distance from major centres of population$ and 
so were not ideal from fue point of view of postwar planning 
(figure 4.1). In the light of these problems, how did the 
Hospital Surveyors see the postwar hospital service developing? 
Firstly, the development of the region's hospital 
services was to focus on the teaching hospital complex in 
Newcastle upon Tyne, 1n line with central government policy 
that each RHB should be closely linked to a teaching hospital. 
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Table 4. 6 Number of hospitals and types of beds in the 
Newcastle RHB area (1), 1943. 
Type of hospital 
Number Voluntary Municipal Total 
of 
Hospitals 64 127 191 
Type of Bed 
General 
Acute 3094 2923 6017 
Specialist 516 409 925 
Acute 
Maternity 171 364 535 
Tuberculosis 525 1925 2450 
Chronic Sick 43 1930 197 3 
Infectious - 3750 3750 
Disease 
Sick Staff 13 17 30 
Pay Beds 245 3 248 
Beds ~~)EMS 260 1300 1560 Huts 
Total 4867 12621 17488 
Source: 
M1n1stry of Health, 1946, volumes 9, 10. 
Notes 
---·-
--
I~tatistics here refer to hospitals in the area for which 
Newcastle RHB took responsibility from July 1948; they 
therefore include data for the Teaching Hospitals in 
Newcastle upon Tyne, 
2. This refers to facilities provided under the aegis of 
the Emergency Medical Service; the data is not strictly 
comparable with that of table 4.8 since it refers only to 
beds add~d to existing facilities. It does not, therefore, 
incluae Efuergency Hospitals erected on new sites. 
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Table 4.7 Distribution of hospi taTs in the Newcastle 
RHB area by size and type, 19'43 . 
Type of hospital . (1) Size 
(Beds) General Specialist Chronic Infec-
!Acute Acute tious 
Disease 
so 28 26 14 51 
51-100 7 7 5 12 
101-200 10 4 5 6 
201-300 - - - 1 
300 11 2 1 1 
·-
-
--
56 39 25 71 
~ 
Source: 
M1n1stry of Health~ 1946~ volumes 9 and 10. 
Note 
Total 
119 
31 
25 
1 
15 
191 
r:--The classification of type of hospital employed here is 
that used by the Hospital Surveyors (Ministry of Health 
1946~ volumes 9 and 10). 
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Table 4. 8 Additions to ho s·pital capacity under the 
EM'S scheme in the Newc:ast1e RHB ar·ea 
Location 
Shatley Bridge 
Northallerton 
Durham (Dryburn) 
Hex ham 
Sedgefield 
Ryhope 
Hemlington 
(Middlesbrough) 
Stannington 
Bishop Auckland 
Chester-le-Street 
Carlisle 
(Cumberland Infirmary) 
Total 
Source: 
Number 
of 
Beds 
879 
416 
390 
390 
330 
300 
260 
260 
234 
156 
104 
371~ 
Description 
Former mental colony taken 
over by the EMS 
EMS hospital 
EMS hospital 
EMS hospital 
EMS hospital 
EMS hospital 
El\is ad-dition to Sma-llpox 
Hospital 
EMS hospital 
(1) EMS addition to PAI 
EMS addition to PAI 
EMS addition to existing 
hospital 
M1n1stry of Health~ 1946 (volumes 9 and 10). 
Note 
r:--PAI - Public Assistance Institution 
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Before the war~ various proposals had. been put forward for a 
Hospital Centre in the city; several of the smaller specialist 
units in Newcastle had sought sites within the curtilage of 
the R~l (4.38). The concept of a Hospital Centre was taken 
up by the Survey; Newcastle was already: 
'the centre 6£ medicine in the North East ... it should 
take an even higher place as a medical centre than 
it has in the past'. 
(Ministry of Health~ 1946 (volume 10) ~14). 
Subsequent proposals for the development of this medical 
complex were~ however~ to provoke controversial debates in the 
1960s (see chapters 8-10 below). 
Secondly~ the Survey made recommendations which~ in arguing 
for district hospitals of 600-800 beds~ (Ministry of Health, 
1962 (volume 10)~ 14) clearly anticipated the DGH concept of 
the 1962 Hospital Plan (Ministry of Health, 1962~ 6). Two 
such facilities - the R'iji and the General Hospital - would be 
provided in Newcastle; in Sunderland~ Durham and Middlesbrough 
the district hospital service would be provided by coordination 
of existing facilities; while in such centres as Carlisle and 
Darlington one major hospital would be developed (Ministry 
of Health, 1946 (volume 9), 114-116; (volume 10), 14-15, 
96-99). Finally, the Survey recommended the retention of many 
r~val cottage hospitals and the closure of a variety of small, 
inefficient and/or obsolete units~ particularly isolation 
hospitals (Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 10), 15-16,22-28). 
The extent to which these proposals were realised,and the 
problems of postwar planning, are discussed in the following 
chapters. 
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4. 5 :§·ummary 
The aim of this chapter has been to sk~tch the historical 
background to the material to be presented below (chapters 
5710). Hence section 4.2 outlined major issues in the develop-
ment of the British hospital system~ while section 4.4 
illustrated some of the planning problems to which this had 
led. Section 4.3 is also central to this thesis insofar as it 
showedp firstlyp that concepts such as regional planning of 
hospital facilities, and antecedents of the DGH concept (see 
chapter 6) had been the subject of public debate for many 
years; and secondlyp that though there was some consensus both 
on these matters and on the need for greater state intervention 
in health service and hospital provisionp there were consider-
able disputes over the form to be taken by the postwar hospital 
service. These disputes, in turnp have to be set against the 
background of broader social changes in wartime and postwar 
Britain if an adequate account is to be presented of the form 
to be taken by the NHS. 
In terms of the theoretical implications of the foregoing, 
the changes in the nature and extent of state intervention in 
health care delivery seem to provide support for Offe's views 
on the qualitatively-changing character of the capitalist 
state. Broadly speaking this involves a change from an 
allocative mode - the state or its agents aTe involved in setting 
minimum public health standards, for instance - to a productive 
mode of intervention, in which the state intervenes more 
directly in the production of health service goods and manpower. 
However, such changes cannot simply be read off from - say -
a periodisation of stages of capitalist economic development, 
nor are they a consequence of the internal logic of the laws 
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of motion of ca~italism. Rather~ such changes are fiercely 
contested - witness the reluctance on the part of the British 
state to take full control pf hospital services - and they 
do not always and inevitably operate in the interests of 
capital and/or the capitalist class. For instance~ in setting 
up the NHS~ the state intervened against the voluntary 
hospitals but did not radically reorganise the way health care 
was produced and delivered; in this sense the NHS represented 
less of a revolutionary step than a rationalisation of existing 
arrang~ments. In this sense the development of the NHS was 
characteiised by what Offe (1974) would term a structural 
s elec '):_ion me~ha_ni s:m_~ where by significant alterations in 
social relations are excluded from the range of possible 
policy options. This is important in considering what follows, 
particularly in terms of understanding the way in which 
health service planning issues are defined and debated, and 
in terms of understanding which groups are in a position to 
influence state policy formulation. 
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Foot·notes 
4.1 Ministry of Health Memorandum on The future development 
of the hospital s·ervice, 2 4. 5. 38 - held in PRO MH 80/24. 
4.2 Ministry of Health Paper, The Voluntary Hospitals of 
G~~~t Britain, 1920-1940~ 15.5.40 -held in PRO MH 80/24. 
4.3 Memorandum on the FutuTe Development of th~ Hospital 
Sys·t~m, (n.d. - 19'38?) -held. in PRO MH 80/24. 
4.4 Ministry of Health note on: Suggestions for a Postwar 
Hospital Policy, August 1941 - held in PRO MH 77/25. 
4.5 This figure was quoted in a Ministry of Health paper 
on The Emergency Hospital Scheme as a starting point for 
future d~velopment, 2.9.41 -held 1n PRO MH 77/25. 
4.6 Ibid. 
4.7 Notes on Postwar Policy, 8.5.40- held in PRO MH 80/24. 
4.8 Notes on Hospital Poli~y, 18.11.40- held in PR_O MH 80/24. 
4.9 Noted in a Ministry of Health paper on Suggestions for 
a Postwar Hospital Policrp August 1941 - held 1n 
PRO MH 80/24. 
4.10. These proposals (announced in the House of Commons, 
9.10.41) would have imposed a duty on local authorities 
to provide hospitals and set up a regional organisation 
for hospital services. Details of the scheme are given 
in a War Cabinet memorandum LP (41) 167, 14.10.41 - copy 
held in PRO MH 77/25. 
4.11. It is clear, from a reading of Ministry of Health Bill 
Pape~s for the wartime years, that concepts of 'key' 
and 'base' hospitals were the subject of intensive 
discussion, with a view to using a system of such units 
as a basis for postwar hospital planning; see also 
note 4. 1 7. 
4.12 Noted in a memorandum on Postwar Policy - Outline 
Proposals, June 1942 - held 1n PRO MH 77/26 (see also 
section 4.2). 
4.13 Noted in a Ministry of Health paper, Suggestions for 
a Postwar Hospital Policy, August 1941; and 1n a m1nute 
on Hospital Policy and Regionalisation (n.d. - 1942?) -
botn held in PRO MH 77/25. 
4.14 Memorandum by the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust 
(1941) on A Nation~l Hospital Service - copy held in 
PRO MH 7 7/ 2 5 . 
4.15 
4.16 
4.17 
4.18 
4.19 
4.20 
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On this, a minute on Ho~pit~l Policy ~nd Regionalisation 
(n.d.-1942?) - held in PR MH 77/25 - noted that: 
'in reference to regionalisation we all. have in 
mind an organisati6n for a unit larger than a county 
or county borough, but ~ lo~~l ~e~~es~titative 
organisation and not a localised piece of the central 
government ... 
. . . ·both. a regional authority' an·d a·n 'ad hoc' 
authority inevitably have difficulty in arousirig . 
popular interest, the one by virtue.o£ its remoteness 
from the electors and the other by reason of the 
limitations of its functions. On the other hand, it 
is not likely that any single are·a of government can 
be fourid which will p:rovide the mos·t efficient unit 
for alT purposes of goVe~nment'. 
(emphases added) 
Ministry of Health note on Regionalis~tion, 18.8. 42 -
held in PRO MH 80/24. 
Ministry of Health memorandum, Pr:o·posed N~tional 
Hospital Service, 21.9. 39 - held. in PRO MH 80} 24. 
Ibid. This memorandum also noted the arguments in 
favour of an extension of state control (the success of 
the EMS scheme, financial problems of the voluntary 
hospitals, etc.) and regarded such an extension as 
inevitable. 
This point was made forcibly by the Nuffield Provincial 
Hospital Trust's (1941) Me.moranduni on the Coordination 
of Hospital Services - copy held in PRO MH 77/25 - which 
argued that: 
'Fihancial and economic conditions in the postwar 
period will make it essential that the organisation 
of hospital services should be und~rtaken on lines 
which will ensure an efficie~t and adequate service 
with the minimum additional financial liability to 
public funds .... it would (therefore) be undesirable 
to adopt· a policy which would eliminate the voluntary 
hospital system or discourage the extension of 
voluntary schemes for the provision of financial 
support for hospital services'. 
(emphases added) 
Explained thus, in a Cabinet memorandum: 
'(the) existing informal and unorganised partnership 
between local authorities and voluntary hospitals 
should continue, but put on a more regular footing so 
as to avoid the competitive building and overlapping 
that has occurred in the past'. 
Extract from War Cabinet Memorandum LP (41) 167, 
14.10.41 - copy held in PRO MH 77/25. The following 
extract from the Cabinet minutes expands on this: 
4.20 
4.21 
4.22 
4.23 
4. 24 
4.25 
4.26 
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(cont) 
'The fundamental principle ... was that of a 
partnership ... but the voluntary hospitals were 
subordinated to the local authority in this sense, 
that it was the local authority that ~as ~ade 
responsible for securing the provision of a public 
service adequate to the needs of the area. This 
would be effected by a scheme which would cover a 
wider area than that of an individual authority. For 
the first time the local authorities would have a 
duty, not merely a power, to provide hospitals'. 
(emphases added) 
Extract from the minutes of the Lord President's 
committee of the War Cabinet, LP (41) 48, 15.10.41 
- held in PRO MH 80/34. 
This view was articulated in an article entitled: 
'Voluntary or municipal hospitals: the case for 
public control, published in The Star,l2.8.41, and 
written by Charles Latham (Leader of London County 
Council) - copy held in PRO MH 80/34. 
For example a Ministry of Health memorandum, dated 
9.2.41 - held in PRO MH 80/34-argued that the voluntary 
hospital system 'has its roots so deep in the national 
life that I should not expect its immediate breakup ... ' 
This view was by no means held unanimously within the 
Ministry, but it is clear from the above (and from 
other memoranda held in the same file) that proposals 
for postwar policy were (in the early wartime years at 
any rate) concerned largely with ensuring the 
coordination of voluntary and municipal hospitals. 
Bevan was to be appointed Minister of Health in the 
1945 Labour Government; for a detailed account of his 
role in the negotiations on the form of the NHS, see 
Foot (1973, 100-215). 
This (regional organisation) was viewed by the BMA 
as being: 
'the most important instrument in securing a good 
service and the essential protectiort of the profession 
against local authority control'. 
Notes of a meeting between representatives of the BMA 
and the Minister of Health, 23.1.45 - held in PRO MH 80/34. 
This reservation was expressed in a memorandum 
(n.d.-1944?) by the British Hospitals Association on 
the 1944 White Paper on a National Health Service -
held in PRO MH 80}34. 
These proposed advantages of a nationalised hospital 
service are summarised in a Secretary's minute on 
the Hospital Service, August 1945 - held in PRO MH 80}34. 
4.27 
4.28 
4.29 
4.30 
4.31 
4.32 
4.33 
4.34 
4.35 
4.36 
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The foregoing paragraph has surr@arised the arguments 
contained in Ibid. 
PRO CAB 129/3~ CP(45)205 - The Future of the Hospital 
SerVices. 
Ibid. 
Summarised from Ibid~ in which the option of a new~ 
directly elected authority was rejected on the grounds 
that not only was it remote from public control~ but 
it would also generate an 'impossible hotch potch' 
of local government areas. 
Lord President of the Council; former leader of London 
County Council. 
PRO CAB 129/3, CP (45) 227, 12.10.45. 
PRO CAB 129/3, CP(45) 231, 16.10.45 - emphases added. 
Ibid. 
Source unknown- quote-d in-Navarro (1978~ 48). 
The teaching hospitals were claimed to be a speci~l 
case: 
'partly on the ground of their exceptional standing 
in the medical world, partly because it is a good 
thing to keep separate a field for innovation and 
independent experiment in method and organisation ... 
partly because it is undesirable to introduce a_full 
and direct state control into the Educational Field' 
PRO CAB 129}3 CP(45) 205. However, the separation of 
Teaching Hospitals (given their own separate Boards of 
Governors, responsible directly to the Minister of 
Health) from RHBs was to lead to problems of coordination 
- see Guillebaud Committee (1956, 75) and also chapter 
10 (below) . 
4.37 Ministry of Health memorandum,- Reform of the Volunt~ry 
Hospital System, n.d. - probably early 1945 - held 
in PRO MH 80} 34. 
4.38 Tyne and Wear Archives Department, deposits 672/146 
(Minutes of the Hospital Centre Committee, 1933-1945) 
and 672}151 (Board of Go.liernors of the RVI - Reorganisation 
Committee minutes). These show that at various stages 
in the 1930s, small voluntary hospitals (the Princess 
Mary Ma~ernity Hospital, Fleming Memorial Hospital) had 
all sought land within the RVI site. The principle of 
a unified Hospital Centre in Newcastle had been agreed 
by late 1942 (Hospital Centre Committee, 24.9.42 and 
9.12.42). 
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5. Postwar hosJ2i~olicy and the deVelop·ment of the 
. -- __ ,. - --=---
19§3:_:~pital Pian. 
5.1 Introduction 
Taking as its point of departure the evidence presented 
in the previous chapter concerning the problems to be re-
solved by postwar hospital planning~ this chapter will discuss 
the extent to which these problems were resolved in the early 
postwar years. Section 5.2 therefore explores the problems 
posed for the Labour government up to 1951 by the perceived 
necessity to restrain expenditure~ and section 5.3 then 
discusses the emergence of the 1962 Hospital Plan,accounting 
for this in terms of interrelated political and technical 
developments. Finally section 5.4 examines the consequences 
of these policies for hospital development in the Newcastle 
RHB. 
5.2 Public expenditure restraint and ho~ital planning: 
the Labour governJI!ent 1948-1951. 
The inception of the NHS in 1948$ and the consequent 
acceptance of state responsibility for the provision of a 
comprehensive health service, brought with it various problems 
for the Labour government. In particular the criteria upon 
' 
which the service was to be run were by no means clearP 
reflecting - in general terms - the transition from production 
of health services for exchange to production for use; one 
implication of this is that it becomes extremely difficult to 
set operational goals for state activiti~s (for a fuller account 
see Offe and Rongep 1975). The rapidly increasing cost of the 
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NHS became a controversial iss~e within a short period of time~ 
as it became evident that growing demand would necessitate the 
allocation of substantial additional resources to the NHS~ 
thus contradicting the optimistic assertions of the Beveridge 
Report (Beveridge~ 1942) that providing a free health service 
would actually reduce demand as the population became healthier. 
An increase in the resources allocated to the NHS was seen as 
potentially in conflict with broader macroeconomic strategy 
and so NHS finance began to make regular appearances on the 
Cabinet agenda. Bevan's first Cabinet memorandum on this· topic 
noted three major problems to be faced by the NHS; the 
impossibility of satisfying the demand for its f_a_ci_lit_i_~s~ the 
possibility of abuse of the service~ and its cost. Need for 
the service was enormous~ not least because of the accumulated 
backlog from the war years~ and costs could only be reduced 
if demand for services was to slacken off. Howeverp the early 
indications were that rising costs were such that the estimates 
in force at the time were too low even to maintain the existing 
level of service provision. Additional finance was required 
unless beds were to be closed; f~rther resources were essential 
if some of the 50POOO empty beds were to be re-opened; and the 
estimates would not be exceeded only if ad hoc cuts were made. 
For example the Liverpool and Manchester RHBs would both have 
had to close some lp500 beds (5.1). The political consequences 
were potentially serious: 
'it was unthinkable that a supplementary estimate should 
be avoided by cloSing down beds which were urgently 
required .•• (moreover) the imposition of a charge (for 
health service facilities) would greatly reduce the 
prestige of the NHS'. 
(50 2) 
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Though he was sympathetic to such vie1AJSD the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer had nevertheless - in his Budget speech -
committed the government to the view that supplementary estimates 
could only be considered in special circumstancesP such as 
major shifts in policy. Hence he could not accept the need 
for a supplementary estimate. The Cabinet therefore agreed 
that although services were not to be reducedp every effort 
should be made t6 Yesttict further increases in NHS costs 
(5.3). 
Howeverp these costs continued to give grounds for concern~ 
and a memorandum by Herbert Morrison in late 1949 set out the 
problemsp emphasising the severe constraints - both domestic 
and international - under which the government was operating 
(5.4). Despite the desirability of increased public expenditurep 
there was 'little margin for readjustments (in public expen-
diture policy)' if taxation was to be kept at a reasonable 
level. He therefore advocated much stricter economyp arguing 
for firmer controls on public expenditure and claiming that 
ministers should be: 
'forced .•• to consider which of several desirable 
projects they will adopt Within the limits of a specific 
sum devoted to the services for· which they a're ·re sponsi '61 e' • 
(5.5) 
In effect Morrison was proposing control of expenditure 
in cash terms rather than by volume. Though there were counter-
arguments that increases in NHS expenditure were essential -
given the condition of the capital stockp the arrears in 
capital development~ and the need to keep pace with medical 
teaching and research - so that the government should re-
linquish responsibility for health services if it could not 
accept the financial implications (5.6)p the political 
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consequences of financing such increases by granting large 
supplementary estima.tes were potentially serious. The 
government would be open to accusations that they were unable 
effectively to control public expenditure and so steps had to 
be taken to rebut such criticisms (5.7); one direct consequence 
of this was the imposition of closer scrutiny of the expenditure 
of HMCs and RHBs (5.8). A more fundamental indecision was also 
evident in the Cabinet at this time~ concerning the financing 
of the NHS. Were charges to be introduced - thus breaching 
the principle of a health service free at the time of use - or 
was finance to come entirely from direct taxatiQn? Put 
rather more baldlyp were essentially economic considerations 
to take precedence over the social reformist principles upon 
which the NHS had been introduced? Political problems would 
arise in both cases; the imposition of charges would be a 'shock 
to (the governmentvs) supporters .•. and a grave disappointment 
to Socialist opinion throughout the worldv ~ but there was an 
vequal political danger in allowing expenditure ooo to continue 
unchecked' (5.9)o In terms of policy formulation~ as Offe 
(1975bp 246) graphically puts itp 'the necessary had become 
impossible and the impossible necessary'. The political crisis 
posed by this situation was ultimately to split the Labour 
Cabinet in 195lp provoking the resignations of Bevan and Wilson 
in protest against a Cabinet decision to.limit Niffi expenditure 
financed from direct taxation in 1951-1952 to £400 million. 
The balance of the estimate of £423 million was to be made up 
by the imposition of charges for some NHS appliances (£13 million) 
and economies of £10 million on the hospital service. The 
ministerial resignations referred to (see FootP 1973p for a 
fuller account) resulted from the refusal of the Cabinet to 
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reduce defence expenditure in order to .avoid the imposition 
of charges (5ol0) o Thus, faced with rising de111and for and 
expenditure on the NHS, and at the same. time under pressure 
to expand defence co111mitments, the Labour government resolved 
the situation by imposing a limited range of NHS charges, 
reducing the estimates for the hospital service, and seeking 
strict. control of NHS expenditure o 
While it would be possible to give account of the above 
discussions in terms of personal disputes between Cabinet 
members - in particular, the well-docume.nted animosity between 
Bevan and Gaitskell (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) (see 
Foot, 1973, 291-298, 319-322) - such an account would ignore 
the constraints under which the Labour government was operating. 
Moreover, the transition to production of health services for 
use, rather than for exchange, posed serious problems in terms 
of the criteria according to which the NHS was to be run. The 
resources allocated to the NHS owed less to any conception of 
need for the service than to a variety of ad hoc political 
demands, being limited to £400 million to accommodate the 
expanding defence programme. In turn these restrictions were 
to have important implications for local planning (see section 
5.4) but before discussing these, consideration is given to 
the emergence o£ the 1962 Hospital Plan. 
5.3 The emergence of the Hospital Plan. 
This can be accounted for by reference to three important 
developments. Firstly, the Conservative government: in the 
1950s sought to rationalise NHS expenditure and run the service 
more 'efficiently'; in this context an expanded capital 
investment programme seemed to offer a means of improving the 
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'efficiency' and throughput of the hospital system. Secondly, 
the changing character of the British state in the late 1950s 
- exemplified by the adoption of long-term planning of public 
expenditure - created a climate in which major public investment 
programmes were seen as playing an important role in economic 
management. Finally~ on a technical level, various studies 
suggested that a more efficient use of fewer hospital beds was 
both desirable and possible. 
As noted above (section 5.2) rising NHS costs had given 
cause for concern since the inception of the service. While 
in opposition, the Conservaties had attacked rising NHS 
estimates as an example of socialist inefficiency and waste 
-(5.11). It was therefore not surprising that, on reiurning ~o 
office, the Conservatives set up an inquiry into the cost of 
the NHS, though no attempt was made to reprivatise the service. 
Jessop (1980) argues that this resulted from their wish to 
retain the leverage on demand management provided by a large 
welfare state. Thus, despite protests to the effect that, by 
setting up an inquiry, the Conservatives were 'seeking another 
instrument by which (they) could mutilate the service' (5.12) } 
no drastic action was taken; efforts were made to trim the 
welfare state to 'what the economy could afford' (Gamble, 1974, 
63-64; see also Pliatzky, 1982, 20-21), and health authorities 
were requested to use hospital beds more efficiently (5.13) 
The report of the Committee of Inquiry into the cost of 
the NHS (Guillebaud Committee, 1956) demonstrated that the share 
of GNP accounted for by the service had actually declined 
between 1949-1950 and 1953-1954 (table 5.1); likewise, NHS 
capital investment - expressed as a proportion of gross fixed 
capital formation ~ had also fallen (table 5.2). Moreover, 
hospital capital investment in 1952-1953 was estimated to be 
only 32% of the corresponding figure for 193g-1939 (Abel~Smith 
and Titmuss~ 1956~ 52). In this light it is not surprising 
that the Committee recommended a substantial expansion of 
hospital capital investment~ particularly sinre the Minister 
of Health - Ian MacLeod - had identified the 'thrusting needs 
of the hospital service' as perhaps the major problem for the 
NHS (5.14). The Guillebaud Committee was emphatic in its 
recommendation that an expanded capital investment programme~ 
of the order of £30 million per annum~ would generate important 
savings in current expenditure. Such savings were of particular 
importance given the tendency for health-service costs to rise 
fa-s-ter t-han in more capital-intensive sec~ors of the economy. 
This tendency had developed not only because of rising demand 
(due to demographic change and provision of a free service) but 
also because of the labour-intens.ive nature of the NHS. Since 
wages in the health service cannot, in principle, be permitted 
to lag too far behind those in other sectors of the economy -
if only because of the difficul.ties this would create in terms 
of attracting labour - then pres.sure on costs is a permanent 
feature of the NHS (Manson~ 1980). Indeed Gough (1975, 63) 
claims that the cost of service industries must rise annually 
in order to preserve existing standards of service - 1n real 
terms. Hence the importance of the Guillebaud Report's (1956,116) 
suggestion that increased capital investment could reduce 
current expenditure via more efficient provision of services 
and deployment of manpower. For example, their analyses had 
shown that capital investment of £650,000 could generat~ antiual 
savings in current expenditureof £213,000 (Abel-Smith and 
Titmuss, 1956, 136). Finally, the Guillebaud Committee argued 
Table 5.1 
~ Year 
(2) 
1948-49 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
Source: 
I 
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Gross cost of the NHS(l)~s -~ propo~tion 
of GNP in England and Wale's ~ 1948-1949 
to 1953-1954. 
GNP I Gross cost Gross cost 
of the NHS as percentage 
( £rn; ( £rn; of GNP. 
actual actual 
prices prices) 
9,349 333.2 3.57 
9,90] 376.6 3.80 
10,539 395.7 3 .] 5 
. 11,560 .. 41-1. 7 3.56 
12,48] 436.7 3.50 
13,273 453.4 3.42 
Abel-Smith and Titrnuss, 1956, 60. 
Notes 
1. 'Gross cost' refers to the cost of the service 
before deduction of charges. 
2. Annual rate; interpolated from the part of the 
year for which the NHS operated. 
-12:3-
Table 5o2 Cost of new fixed as.sets in: the. NHS ~~ 
proportion of gross. fix"ed cap_ital formation, 
England and Wales~ 194 8-1949 to· 1953-19 54 o 
llJ (2) ~ Year Gross fixed Expenditure on 
capital new fixed capital 
formation assets in the NHS 
(£m; actual (£m; actual 
12rices) prices) 
1948-49 ( 2) 1,295 10.4 
1949-50 1,419 11.8 
1950-51 1,532 11.6 
1951-52 1_, 6 8 9 12.5 
. 
1952-53 1,874 11,9 
1953-54 2,084 11.1 
Source: 
Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1956, 49. 
Notes: 
1. Gross fixed capital formation is taken as 
89% of that for Great Britain, interpolated 
into financial years. 
(2) as 
percentage 
of (1) 0 
0 0 80 
0 0 83 
Oo76 
0 0 74 
0.64 
0 0 53 
2. Annual rate: interpolated from the part of the 
year for which the NHS operated. 
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for a relaxation of some of the constraints under which health 
authorities had to operate, advocating a raising of the limit 
(in cash terms) below which capital schemes did not require 
Treasury approval from £30?000 to £100,000 (1956, 85)? and 
proposing notification of capital allocations over three years 
rather than on an annual basis? to facilitate forward planning 
(Guillebaud Committee, 1956, 120-121). 
Clearly the~?the potential contribution of an expanded 
hospital capital investment programme had been recognised. 
Subsequently, political pressures for such an expansion derived 
from various sources. Thus the medical profession voiced their 
increased anxiety at the deteriorating condition of the hospitals 
and at the apparent lack of action to rectify the situation; 
they also pointed to the relative priority accorded to education 
and housing in postwar reconstruction, and therefore pressed 
for much higher allocations to hospital development (e.g. Abel 
and Lewin, 1959, 110). The policy of the BMA - articulated at 
its annual conference in 1959 - was for an expansion of the 
hospital building programme to around £750 million, spread over 
ten years (5.1~. Furthermore, it is clear that an expansionist 
public expenditure policy was pursued by the Conservatives in 
the late 1950s (Brittan, 1969, 115-118) and this had spinoffs 
in the form of a slow expansion of hospital building. One 
feature of this was the allocation of central gov~rnment 
finance - as distinct from the normal allocations to RHBs - to 
major capital projects identified as being urgent. This allowed 
the Newcastle RHB to commence construction of the West 
Cumberland Hospital (see below, section 5.4). The hospital 
capital programme continued to expand in the late 1950s, but 
perhaps the major stimulus towards the Hospital Plan derived 
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from the reorganisation of the British state apparatus that 
occurred at that time. 
The postwar 'settlement' in Britain was characterised 
by the introduction of macro-level demand management in a 
mixed economy, and by a large-scale expansion of social 
welfare programmes. However, a variety of factors exposed the 
limitations of both forms of intervention and led to an interest 
in al terna ti ve s tra te gies for economic manage.men.t (see Jessop, 
1980, 38-40; CSE State Group, 1979, 6-7). The principal 
change was the introduction of long-term economic planning. 
following the Plowden Report (1961), based on firmer public 
expenditure control through the Public Expenditure Survey 
Committee (PESC) system, whereby expenditure was controlled in 
five-year rolling programmes. Such measures had gained 
substantial support within the Treasury and the Federation of 
British Industries, the .more so since the Treasury was anxious 
to introduce labour-saving investment, both to reduce running 
costs and release labour to facilitate fuller utilisation of 
industrial capacity (Brittan, 1969, 148-153, 155). The 
emergence of the Hospital Plan should therefore be seen against 
this background. Before the 1959 election all the major 
political parties had committed themselves to an expanded hospital 
building programme; this would generate savings in NHS current 
expenditure and fit in with :moves to·wards long-term public 
expenditure planning; and there had been significant pressures 
from the medical profession for investment in hospitals. 
The Hospital Plan therefore resulted both from the 
realisation that an expanded capital building programme could 
play a valuable part in economic planning - not least because 
completion rates of houses and schools had slackened slightly 
- and also because of the potential for saving on current 
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expenditure via plant replacement and closure of obsolete 
and inefficient units. How.e.ver? the p.recise. form to be taken 
by the Plan seems to have been settled largely at ~ t~chtiical 
level; two factors were important here. 
Firstly? various studies of the relationship between 
total population and numbers of hospital beds (summarised 
in table 5.3) suggested that hospital planning should be 
based on a somewhat smaller beds/population ratio than had 
formerly been the case. The initial intention of providing 
7.0 acute beds per 1,000 population (5.16) seemed unrealistic 
in the light of the limited resources available for capital 
development; in 1960, for instance, 3.9 beds were available 
per 1,000 population in England and Wales (Ministry of Health, 
1962, 214). In the light of the evidence of these studies 
a 'bed norm' of 3.3 beds/1,000 population was favoured, though 
this was subsequently challenged on the grounds of its 
arbitrary nature (Allen, 1979). 
Secondly, technical developments in hospital planning 
emphasised the importance of flexibility in design, economies 
of scale in service provision, and comprehensiveness of 
service (Abel and Lewin, 1959; Godber, 1958; 1959; Farrer-Brown, 
1959)J and stressed the importance of integrating the work of 
the hospitals with the rest of the health service (McKeown, 
1959; Fry, 1959). Concepts such as that of the 'area hospital' 
(Abel and Lewin, 1959, iii) were aired; such facilities were 
to serve every 'natural area' of population and this concept 
has clear affinities with the 'base hospital' proposals dis-
cussed above (chapter 4). These views received official 
acceptance in the Hospital Plan's concept of the District 
General Hospital (DGH), of 600-800 beds, serving populations 
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Table 5.3 Summary of estimates .of 'norms' for acute 
hospital prdVision. 
Estimate Date Recommend- Study ,' Source (l} 
produced of ed Norm area 
by: study (beds/1000 
pop.) 
Ministry Unknown 7.0 Unknown RHB(48)1 
of 
Health 
Nuffield 1945-46 4.5-6.4 Hospitals Ministry of 
Provincial Surveys Health, 1946. 
Hospitals (various 
Trust regions) 
Llewelyn- 2.0 Northamp- Nuffield 
Davies, R. ton, Provincial 
Norfolk. Hospitals 
Trust,l955. 
Barr, v. 1957 2.0 Reading Barr, 
1957. 
--
Elder, 1957 5.0 Unknown Elder, 
A.T. 1957. 
Forsyth,G, 1960 2.56 Barrow Forsyth and 
and Logan, Logan, 
R.F.L. 1960. 
Airth, A.D. 1962 3.6 Tees side Airth and 
and Newall, 
Newall, 1962. 
D.J. 
Notes 
1. 'Source' refers to the references in which these 
studies are discuss-ed, with the exception of RHB 
(48)1, which is a Ministry ofHealth Circular 
(on the D£velopment of Specialist Services) and 
so is nDt referenced separately in the Bibliography. 
I 
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of 100-150~000 .. 
Thus the origins of the Hospital Plan can be traced to 
the desire of the Conservative government to run the NHS in 
what they perceived to be a more efficient fashion. Specific 
political pressures for increased hospital capital investment 
stemmed from various sources? including the major political 
parties and the BMA, and an expanded building programme was 
clearly in accord with the contemporary interest in long-term 
economic planning. Finally, both the Guillebaud Report and 
a variety of technical studies had demonstrated the desirabil-
ity - in terms of reducing current expenditure - of an 
expansion in hospital building. Having thus outlined the 
context against which the discussion of local planning of 
the hospital services in the Newcastle RHB must be interpreted, 
the next section considers developments in this area from 
1948-1962. 
5.4 Hospital planning in the Ne.wcastle RHB, 
1948-1962. 
Four issues are discussed here, namely: the difficulties 
posed for local planners by financial restraint on the part 
of central government; the sub-regional distribution of 
capital expenditure; the scale of capital projects accomplished 
by the RHB; and the redistribution of medical manpower. 
Emphasis will be laid on the first of these, since it is most 
directly concerned with the process of policy-making; the 
latter three points relate to the outcomes of that process. 
Figure 5.1 shows the area served by the Newcastle RHB, with 
its constituent HMCs. 
-1:54-
N 
Kilometres t 0 10 20 
East Cumberland 
Darlington 
Figure 5.1 The Ne~vcastle Rl!B and its constituent I-IMCs 
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Limited availability of labour and scarcity of 
construction materials severely constrained hospital develop-
ment in the early postwar years. In particular, rtew 
capital development was minimal(5.17) due to the small 
amounts of materials made available to RHBs (table 5.4). The 
finance available to the Newcastle RHB for capital development 
in its first two years - about £560,000 per annum - was of a 
similar order to the prewar situation. However, this was 
'quite inadequate' in the light of the additional demand 
released by the introduction of a comprehensive health service, 
particularly since virtually no new construction (apart from 
EMS units - see chapter 4) had taken place between 1939 and 
1948 (5.18). Since no major capital development was possible, 
the RHB felt that a considerable amount of minor - and 
probably 'futile' - capital works would be necessary (5.19). 
In such circumstances, developments would be geared largely 
to prolonging the life of the existing capital stock (5.20); 
this was likely to lead to hospitals becoming 'architectural 
hotch-potches', as small-scale projects were added as and 
where possible (5.21). 
Such problems were further compounded by the budgeting 
difficulties arising from uncertainty as to future capital 
allocations, and from close central government monitoring of 
NHS expenditure (imposed as a response to the political crisis 
discussed ab.ove - section 5.2) from April 1950. Under the 
'Limit and Control of Expenditure' circular, HMCs and RHBs 
were obliged to submit monthly statements of expenditure; 
cases in which the approved estimates were likely to be ex-
ceeded would undergo Ministerial scrutiny (5.22). Moreover, 
in planning future capital developments, works which were not 
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Table 5.4 Projected allocations o£ c6ntrolled 
construction rna ter·ials to RHBs· for the 
first qtiarter of 1949 
M a t e r i a 1 
RHB Steel Cast Soft- Hard- Ply-
Iron wood wood wood 
(tons) (tons) (stan- (cu. (cu. 
dards) ft.) ft.) 
Newcastle 46 20 20 520 3,650 
Leeds 56 24 24 640 4,450 
Sheffield 63 27 27 ]20 5,050 
E.Anglia 28 12 12 320 2,250 
N.W.Metro- 63 27 27 720 5,050 
politan 
N.E. Metro- 53 22 22 600 4,200 
politan 
S.E. Metro- 56 24 24 640 4,500 
politan 
S.W. Metro- 84 36 36 960 6,700 
politan 
Oxford 23 10 10 260 1,800 
South West 50 22 22 580 4,050 
Birmingham 70 30 30 800 5,600 
Manchester 73 31 31 840 5,900 
Liver:R_ool 35 15 15 400 2,800 
Boards o£ 100 50 40 zoo 9,000 
Governors 
Con tin- 450 200 160 800 35,000 
gencies 
I RHB Total 700 300 I 300 8 1""\1"\'1""\ ,vvv I c:h nnn ..JU,VV\J 
Total 1,250 550 500 9,000 100,000 
Allocation 
Source: 
RHB (48) 54 
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essential or urgent were not to be co.nsidered: 
'the broad test is whether the developEent ... 
will ef£ectiV~ly and ~c6rt6~i~~lly ~~sist in 
meeting a really important ~eficiency'. (5.23) 
Planning for immediate needs, rather than long-term 
strategic goals, was therefore the order of the day. Even 
this was further hampered by budgeting pr.oblems; for instance, 
balances not spent in one financial year could not be carried 
forward into the hext year (5.24). Furthermore, ad hoc 
reductions in capital allocations (5.25) limited the RHB!s 
scope for strategic planning. Thus the RHB's capital allo-
cation for 1951-1952 was reduced by 25% shortly before the 
end of the 1950-1951 financial year (5.26), and the RHB 
claimed that this had effecti ve.ly halved their programme, 
when the effects of rising building costs were taken into 
account. This was because the RHB's allocation had been 
reduced from £700,000 to £480,000 of which only 85% (£405,000) 
could be spent; the latter restriction had been imposed to 
reduce the risk of overspending on capital accounts (5.27). 
Such restrictions engendered 'considerable irritation' among 
RHBs and HMCs at their lack of autonomy in planning (Guillebaud 
Committee, 1956, 104). Indeed the Newcastle RHB argued that, 
in the absence of assurances that funds would be available 
for proposed schemes, planning was an activity which: 
'raises false hopes, engenders a sense of frustration, 
and degenerates into a theoretical exercise without 
purpose or justification ... the course of the Board's 
programme ... has been from G~S~.to trough of successive 
waves of hope and disappoini~ent'. (5.28) 
The RHB was further constrained by a capital allocation 
which, on a per capita basis, was claimed to be 23% below the 
national average (5.29); the RHB consequently argued that: 
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'there can be no justification~ in a national 
hospital service, for maintaining grossly different 
standards of hospital service in different parts 
of the country'. (5.30) 
Furthermore, without producing supporting evidence 
(but see chapter 4)~ the RHB argued that hospital develop-
ment in their area had proceeded more slowly than in other 
parts of the country (5.31) and therefore pressed the 
Ministry of Health to adjust their capital allocation 
accordingly (5.32). The existence of regional disparities 
in service provision was formally recognised in 1952 (5.33) 
and indeed the Newcastle RHB's position subsequently improved 
slightly vis-a-vis other regions (table 5.5), though care 
should be taken in interpreting this table as it is based OI11Y 
on each RHB's basic allocation. Consequently it does not 
include information on schemes financed directly from central 
funds. 
As for developments within the Newcastle RHB, at least 
three responses were made to the uncertain financial situation. 
Firstly, to avoid overspending, the RHB attempted to s1ow 
down the pace of its capital programme by ceasing its practice 
of 'constantly pressing the contractors to proceed with the 
work with the utmost expedition' (5.34). Secondly, to 
facilitate some small-scale improvements to services through-
out the region~ the RHB allocated a small proportion of its 
funds to minor capital building works. Originally set at 
£2 per bed per annum, this was, however, reduced to £1 per 
bed in 1951 and was a casualty of the 25% reduction in capital 
expenditure in 1951 (5.35). Thirdly, early in 1952, the RHB 
requested its constituent HMCs to suggest hospitals which 
might be closed to ease the financial situation. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the response to this was negative; thus the 
Table 5.5 Intended basic capital allocations to RHBs, 
19Sl(l)_l962. 
... 
RHB Y e a r 
1951- 1952- 1953- 1954- 1955- 1956-
1952 1953 19 54 1955 1956 1957 
(£ '000) 
Newcastle 600 480 526 462 462 529 
Leeds 600 480 475 413 413 517 
Sheffield 800 640 721 630 630 781 
East Anglia 350 280 248 209 209 250 
N.W.Metro- 700 560 600 522 522 570 
politan 
N.E. Metro- 700 560 468 407 407 468 
politan 
S.E. Metro- 700 560 499 433 433 586 
politan 
S.W. Metro- 1000 800 787 677 677 813 
po1itan 
Oxford .300 240 235 205 205 311 
S. Western 550 440 429 373 373 488 
Birmingham 800 640 715 625 625 786 
Manchester 800 640 681 592 59 2 746 
Liverpool 400 320 325 283 283 315 
Wales ( 2) 550 440 478 419 419 525 Wessex - - - - - -
-
--- --
Source: 
M1nistry of Health circulars 
Notes: 
l.Data for 1948-1951 not available 
1957-
1958 
697 
575 
890 
282 
664 
517 
651 
1016 
385 
724 
988 
914 
360 
617 
-
2.This RHB was part of the S.W.Metropolitan RIIB until 1960 
----
19 58- 1959-
19 59 1960 
780 895 
663 877 
980 1170 
324 421 
815 1017 
604 817 
718 922 
1164 1528 
353 417 
704 859 
1081 1270 
1012 1205 
4 59 591 
662 791 
- -
1960-
1961 
1022 
972 
1331 
496 
1150 
923 
1000 
1222 
486 
975 
1459 
1361 
657 
907 
522 
1961-
1962 
1051 
1035 
1386 
524 
1258 
1005 
i 1080 
I 
I 1265 
516 
1060 
1550 
1464 
714 
927 
5 58 
l 
I-' 
lN 
\D 
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Durham HMC stressed the industrialised nature of central 
Durham and the underdevelopment o£ local hospital services, and 
therefore objected to hospital closures unless the financial 
position should become acute. Likewise, in the opinion of 
the Newcastle HMC, no useful purpose would be served by 
indicating priorities for hospital closures (5.36). 
Clearly, then, considerable problems were experienced 
in setting in motion a programme of capital development in 
the region's hospitals; the results can be illustrated by a 
consideration of the use of capital resources by the RHB, and 
by discussing the outcomes of its policies. Firstly, the 
amount of new construction achieved prior to 1962 was minimal; 
the proportion of the RHB's capital allocated to this varied 
between 1.1% and 19.7%, though not until 1957 did this rise 
above 10% in any one year (figure 5.2). In this respect the 
RHB's experience was very similar to the national situation 
(figure 5.3). Given the limited resources available, the 
RHB felt unable to concentrate development on a £ew of its 
priori ties; rather, investment was in the form o£ smalF-scale 
projects (table 5.6), though this in turn led to concern 
that the Board's programme had degenerated into a number of 
extremely small works (5.37). Moreover, there was little 
scope for replacing the EMS hospitals, for this would have 
required large investment in view of the size of those 
hospitals (5.38). 
The implications of these developments for the intra-
regional pattern of capital investment were twofold. Firstly, 
the RHB had identified several priorities for capital 
development, including three new hospitals - for West 
Table 5,6 
Value of 
1 
Scheme 
(£) 
500 
501-1000 
1001-2500 
2501-5000 
5001-10000 
10001-20000 
20000 
Source: 
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Valti~ and number of capit~l building 
or engineering schemes carried out by the 
Newcastle RHB~ T948-T950(l), 
Completed In progress 
at 31.3.50 at 31.3.50 
23 -
56 25 
46 20 
27 29 
3 25 
2 18 
1 3 
Newcastle RHB (1950) First Report, 
Note: 
-1-.--The time period referred to is from the 
inception of the NHS (5.7,48) to the end 
of the financial year 1949-1950 (31.3,50), 
il 
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Cumberland~ Peterlee and the Bedlington area - and 14 major 
extensions (figure 5.4). Yet not until 1955,following a 
Government announcement of an increase in the proportion of 
capital resources allocated to large-scale developments (5.39), 
we.re the RHB able to commence construction of the new West 
Cumberland Hospital, though the Bedlington and Peterlee 
projects never came to fruition for various reasons (5.40). 
As the building programme expanded in the late 1950s, progress 
was made on several major schemes. Major capital develop-
ments completed in the acute hospital sector between 1948 and 
late 1961 are shown in figure 5.5. 
Secondly, the distribution of expenditure be't\y:een HMCs 
is of interest. This is summarised in graphs of five-year 
moving averages of per capita expenditure by HMC, standardised 
as a proportion of the regional average ~ capita expen-
diture (figure 5.6 a-d). Moving averages were employed to 
smooth out the effect of particularly large investments in 
individual years, and the figures were standardised as a 
proportion of the regional average in order to obtain an 
indication of the relative extent to which particular HMCs 
benefited from the RHB's capital investment programme. Care 
.must be taken in interpreting these figures. For example, 
small HMCs in which a relatively minor project was being carried 
out can appear to be receiving a large allocation; witness the 
experience of Hexham HMC in the early years of the NHS. What 
is clear, however~ is the relative progress made.in some areas-
particularly West Cumberland - while others (South Shields, 
Darlington, Sunderland) lagged behind. Apart from the priority 
schemes noted above, however, little information was available 
concerning the RHB's priorities £or capital development, with 
one exception. Teesside had been identified as a future 
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I1aj or capital i nvestraen ~s in non-psychia tri.c hospitals 
in Newcastle RHB~ 1948="1962 .. 
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growth point for industry within the region for some time 
(see Pepler and Macfarlane, 1949, 157-161), and in the case 
of hospital planning some indication of its importance can be 
gleaned from the following; at a meeting of the RHB's 
Planning Committee in December 1953, it was reported that: 
'in view of the importance of the developments 
of the Teesside industries (which had been: endorsed 
by the Ministry of Town: and Country Planning, the 
Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour) ... 
(Cleveland HMC) felt that.. . the proposed deVelop-
ments at Middlesbrough should be undertaken at the 
earlies.t. date. . . major indus trial expans 10n had 
taken place in respect of chemicals and heavy 
industries, and extensive additional expansion 
was planned (5.41). 
This matter was stressed at several subsequent meetings 
of the RHB's Planning Committee (5.42) and two direct con-
sequences were:firstly, that Teesside became regarded as a 
higher priority than Peterlee (see chapter 8), and secondly, 
in anticipation of developments on Teesside, the Sedgefield 
HMC was merged with part of Cleveland HMC, it being recog-;-
nised that Sedge£ield General Hospital would become 'largely 
redundant' in the event of a new general hospital being 
built in the north Teesside area (5.43). Although Teesside 
had clearly become established as a priority of the RIIB, the 
effect of this on the intraregional pattern of investment was 
not fully apparent until the late 1960s (see figure 5.6). 
Thirdly, in terms of specific patterns of openings and 
closures of hospitals, a corollary was that the only new 
hospital to be commenced was the West Cumberland Hospital. 
New bed provision was confined largely to Cumberland and 
Teesside (figure 5.7). Hospital closures were confined 
largely to buildings whose physical condition was ~ch that 
no benefits would accrue from their retention, and to 
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2 
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Hospitals in 1971. 
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tuberculosis and isolation units (figure 5.7). Many of the 
latter were unsuitable because of their physical condition? 
but changing medical attitudes to the treatment of infectious 
disease meant that a rapid concentration of these units was 
seen as desirable; indeed, this had been anticipated by the 
Hospital Surveyors (Ministry of Health? 1946 (volume 10)? 
22-29). Tuberculosis? on the other hand? had been virtually 
eliminated a few years after World War 2? and this was 
reflected in growing concern at the under-utilisation of 
several hospitals (5.44). 
However, if little progress could be made on capital 
investment, the RHB compensated for this by a redistribution 
of medical manpower and by recruiting additional staff 
(table 5.7). In the absence of the necessary capital resources, 
of course, the RHB were virtually forced to do this; at a 
Board meeting in 1949, it was observed that: 
'it was impossible to get new buildings but 
the one thing that could be obtained was good 
doctors in the hospitals' (5.45). 
By 1957, the RHB felt that the region was well staffed 
and that its specialist establishment was 80% of what it 
ought to be (5.46). This, in turn, was accompanied by a 
considerable increase in the efficiency of the service, 
measured in terms of patient throughput (table 5.8). In total, 
the number of inpatient discharges rose from 155,550 to 
208,063 (33.7%), from 1949-1953, against an increase in the 
number of staffed beds of only 5.9%. This improvement was 
still more marked in certain HMCs (e.g. Sedgefield, Durham, 
Northallerton, S.W. Durham) where considerable increases 
occurred in the number of patients discharged per staffed 
bed. 
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Table 5.7 Distribution of n~ecial_ist a_ppointments 
by HMC within Newcastle RHB, 1948-1954. 
~ 
y e a r ~ 
I I 
HMC 1948- 1950- 1951- 1952- I 1953-
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Newcastle 14 7 5 4 1 
Gateshead 3 3 1 3 -
South 2 3 2 2 -
Shields 
S.E. 3 3 2 - -
Northumberland 
Hexham 2 4 1 1 -
Berwick - 1 1 - -
Alnwick and - - - - -
Rothbury 
Wansbeck 2 2 1 2 -
N. W .Durham 4 1 1 6 -
Sunderland 9 4 4 5 3 
Hartlepools 4 7 - 1 2 
Cleveland) 6 13 3 6 5 
Teesside ) 
Sedgefield 1 - 2 1 2 
s.w. Durham 4 1 2 1 1 
Durham 7 1 4 2 -
Darlington - - - 2 -
Northallerton 2 1 1 2 -
E.Cumberland 5 - 1 2 2 
W.Cumberland 6 - 3 1 1 
74 52 35 41 17 
Source: 
Newcastle RHB Annual Reports 
Table 5.8 Comparison of numbers of staffed ]Jeds, j.npatient 
discharges, and discharges per bed in Newcastle 
RHB for 1949 and 1953. '" 
HMC Number of Discharges 
staffed beds of inJatients 
1949 1953 % 1949 1953 % 
i ChanR;e Change 
Newcastle 1737 1724 -0.75 20868 24630 +18.0 
Gates head 821 892 +8.6 8665 11145 +28.6 
S.Shields 966 969 +0.3 9425 10469 +11.0 
S.E. North- 695 686 -1.3 8873 11561 +30.3 
umber land 
Hexham 665 738 +10 .9 5688 7050 +23.9 
Berwick 115 114 -0.09 1319 1038 -22.3 
Almvick/ 49 64 +30.6 721 1158 +60.6 
Rothbury 
Wansbeck 389 412 +5.9 3388 4366 +28.8 
N.W. Durham 739 964 +30.4 5862 10498 +79.1 
Sunderland 2113 2011 -4.9 21259 29217 +37.4 
Hartlepools 746 747 +0.1 7353 8079 +9.8 
Cleveland 466 667 +43.1 2530 4159 +64.3 
Tees side 1375 1475 +7.2 21041 28496 +35.4 
Sedge field 418 404 -3.4 3080 5111 +65.9 
S.W. Durham 617 785 +27.2 2675 5774 +115. 8 
Durham 958 941 -1.8 6006 11133 +85.3 
Darlington 479 534 +11. 4 7805 8776 +12.4 
North- 304 389 +27.9 1500 2983 +98.8 
allerton 
E. Cumberlan•u 922 900 -2.4 12005 14169 +18.0 
W.Cumber],and 370 423 +14.3 5487 8251 +50.3 
TOTAL ~4944 15839 +5.98 155550 208063 +33.7 
---------
Source: 
Newcastle Rtm Annual Reports. 
Discharges per 
staffed beds 
1949 1953 l % 
1--------
12.01 14.3 
10.55 12.49 
9.76 10.8 
12.76 16.85 
8.55 9.55 
11.4 7 9.1 
14.71 18.09 
8.71 10.60 
7.93 10.89 
10.06 14.52 
9.85 10.81 
5.43 6.23 
15.3 19.32 
7. 36 12.65 
4.33 7.35 
6.26 11.83 
16.29 16.43 
4.93 7.66 
13.02 15.74 
14. 8~- 19.50 
----
10.41 13.14 
Chan12:e 
+19.1 
+18.4 
+10.6 
+32.0 
+11. 7 
-20.66 
+23.00 
+21.7 
+37.3 
+44.4 
'I +9. 8 
+14.8 
+26.2 
+71.8 
+69.8 
+88.9 
+0.8 
+55.5 
~I +20.9 +31. 6 + 26.2 
I 
I--' 
(J1 
N 
I 
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To summarise, the conseoLucnces of the. financial 
situation in which the Newcastle RHB found itself in the 
1948-1962 period were as follows. Firstly, planning of any 
long-term development was,initially at least, virtually 
impossible,given the constraints under which the Board was 
operating. Thus, developments were confined largely to 
small-scale schemes, distributed relatively evenly between 
HMCs; moreover new construction was at a premium. Secondly, 
little could be done about the various priorities identified 
for new hospital construction until the late 1950s, by 
which time planning was taking place on a more long-term 
basis. From the mid-1950s, the Ministry of Health began 
to allocate sums of money for major capital developments -
hence the West Cumberland hospital project. Finally, and of 
some importance in terms of the quality of service provided, 
significant progress was made in the redistribution of 
medical manpower and the recruitment of additional consultant 
staff. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has concentrated on three main issues, 
namely, the attempts of both Labour (1948-1951) and 
Conservative (post-1951) governments to restrain NHS ex-
penditure (section 5.2); the factors contributing to an 
expansion of NHS capital expenditure in the late 1950s and 
the development of the Hospital Plan (section 5.3); and the 
implications of these for hospital development in the New-
castle RHB (section 5.4). In this section the themes arising 
from the foregoing evidence will be reviewed. 
At one level, it could be argued that the Labour 
government wa.s torn between considerations of equity and 
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efficiency in running the NHS: to what extent was expenditure 
to be allowed to rise to meet demand, given the imperatives 
of tight control of public expenditure in the early postwar 
years? Put rather more b~dly, however, it is clear that a 
variety of political considerations led to a breach with 
the reformist principles upon which the NHS had been intro-
duced. In particular, strict limitations of NHS expenditure 
were introduced at the same time as an expansion of defence 
expenditure, and proposals to introduce charges for certain 
services provoked a political crisis for Labour, leading to 
the resignations of Bevan and Wilson from the Cabinet. In this 
situation, as noted above, necessary decisions had become 
impossible and the impossible necessary (Offe, 1975b, 246). 
While not attempting to reprivatise the NHS, the 
Conservative government were committed to its rationalisation. 
The Guillebaud. Committee's (1956) report pointed to this by 
indicating the potential savings in current expenditure that 
would accrue from an expanded capital development programme. 
Though there ensued an expansion in NHS capital development, 
not until 1962 did the Hospital Plan make a significant attempt 
to redew_l_C?_~P the hospital stock. The emergence of this plan 
reflected the restructuring of the British state apparatus in 
response to the perceived failures of Keynesian techniques, 
one consequence of which was increased state economic planning. 
The local consequences were, firstly, that little long-
term planning of capital investment was possible 1n the early 
years of the NHS; instead, small-scale schemes were developed, 
geared to patching up the existing capital stock. Intra-
regionally the RHB was unable to respond to the priority needs 
for hospital construction until an expansion of capital 
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resources permitted a start to be made on the West Cumberland 
Hospital. However, certain other priorities - such as Peter-
lee and South-East Northumberland - remained and indeed these 
slipped down the order relative to the proposals for investment 
on Teesside. Finally, the RHB made some progress with the 
r~distribution of medical manpower, one further consequence 
of which was an increase in the efficiency of the service, in 
terms of patient throughput. 
In interpreting the foregoing, it is important to 
emphasise the changing character of the British state, the 
selective character of its interventions, and the constraints 
these imposed on the RHB's activities. In particular, the 
problems of policy formation inherent in providing services 
for use (see Offe and Ronge, 1975) were particularly acute at 
the inception of the NHS; one result of this was the 1m-
position of tight controls on expenditure, on the autonomy 
of RHBs, and on new hospital development. However, as the 
potential role of capital investment in economic planning was 
re'alised, an expanded hospital building programme became in-
creasingly feasible in political terms. The selective 
character of state intervention, and the way different political 
solutions are adopted in different historical circumstances -
serving in general, to exclude anti-capitalist interests - is 
a key point here. Finally, the process of state policy 
formulation cannot be likened to that of a private entrepreneur. 
This is graphically demonstrated by the Cabinet debates on NHS 
expenditure, and its implications for hospital provision and 
location are essentially that decisions on the resources devoted 
to hospital development are subject to a variety of socio-
political criteria. These decisions are not taken according 
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to any conception of what the NHS requires; rather, they 
depend on what solutions to economic crises are seen as 
appropriate at different points in time. 
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6. Implementing the Hospital Plan, 1962-1974. 
6.1 Introduction 
Commencing with an outline of the intentions of the 
1962 Hospital Plan (section 6.2)~ this chapter considers the 
extent to which it was implemented by the Newcastle RHB, up to 
the time of NHS reorganisation in 1974. Section 6.3 therefore 
considers policy changes at national level and their im-
plications for the development of the Newcastle RHB~hospital 
services. Given that the Hospital Plan implied considerable 
centralisation and concentration of hospital facilities, a 
further theme of interest relates to the social costs of such 
development; in addition (due to the large-scale investment 
involved ln constructing DGHs) there were to be major problems 
in terms of responding to, for instance, the needs of new 
towns. Hence section 6.4 considers such issues in more 
detail. 
6.2 The proposals of the Hospital Plan 
The 1962 Hospital Plan remains the most significant 
attempt to rationalise and plan the British hospital system. 
The concept of centralised development of large-scale 
hospitals can be traced back at least as far. as the wartime 
years (see chapter 4), and despite the effects of public ex-
penditure restraint and changing attitudes to hospital size 
(chapters 6 and 7) the DGH concept survives to the present day. 
The Plan's basic proposition was that hospitals should be 
provided in units of a minimum size of 600-800 beds, to serve 
populations of 100-lSO,OOO and its logic is perhaps best 
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captured by the following: 
'the district general hospital offers the most 
practicable method of placing the full range of 
hospital facilities at the disposal of patients 
and this consid~ration far out~~ighs the disadvantages 
of longer travel fo·r some patients and their 
visitors v • 
(Ministry of Health, 1962, 6 - emphasis added) 
In spatial terms, this clearly envisaged a considerable 
concentration of hospital services, in the interests of the 
effeciency of the hospital system as a whole. Thus, while 
the provision of a system of modern, technologically sophis-
ticated hospitals would involve higher running costs, these 
increases were to be relatively marginal and, as the Plan 
explained: 
'the real increase in running costs ... will be due 
rather to a higher standard of ~~rvi~e than to any 
increase in the number of b~ds ... ~ppbrtunities for 
economy will be created by the concentration of 
work in fewer centres and the replacement of older 
buildings by new hospitals which can be more 
economically maintained and run'. 
(Ministry of Health, 1962, 13 - emphasis added) 
Put another way, efficiency had clearly triumphed over 
equity in terms of service provision; if longer travel to 
hospitals was to be accepted, it had to be justified on 
the grounds that a better hospital service was being provided. 
The Plants aim was therefore to provide a more efficient 
service - in the sense of increasing patient throughput and 
restraining running costs - or, as one commentator has argued, 
to introduce 'capitalist rationality' into the NHS (Manson, 
1980, 42). In this sense the Plan's recommendations paralleled 
proposals being put forward to establish rate of return 
criteria for nationalised industries (House of Commons, 1961). 
The Plan's intentions were to be achieved by increasing 
capital investment to £200 million in its first quinquennium 
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(1961-1962 to 1965-1966) and to £300 mil:ion in its second 
quinquennium (1966-1967 to 19J0-19Jl). These figures, however, 
'did not represent commitments' (Ministry of Health, 1962, 13) 
and indeed they fell short of the £75 million per annum 
requested by the BMA in 1959. The Plan would involve con-
structing 90 new and 134 remodelled hospitals, 356 other 
schemes each worth over £100,000, and the closure of 709 
non-psychiatric hospitals; 41 of the latter were in the New-
castle RHB. The Plan also implied resource redistribution at 
the inter- and intra- regional scales. 
Inter-regionally, the Plan sought to redress some of the 
imbalances in service provision generated by the uncoordinated 
historical development of the hospital system. This would be 
achieved by setting 'bed norms' of 3.3 acute beds per 1000 
population (see chapter 5.3). 
Table 6.1 shows the variations that existed in availability 
of acute facilities and gives details of proposed expenditure 
by region on schemes to commence between 1961-1962 and 1970-1971. 
Considerable variation in development was envisaged, both to 
rationalise the existing capital stock (e.g. in the Liverpool 
RHB) and provide for the influxes o£ population anticipated in 
certain areas (for example in the Oxford and Wessex RHBs). 
From the tables it is clear,that in terms of bed availability, 
the Newcastle RHB was sligl1tly over-provided relative to many 
regions, and that the anticipated investment in it was comparable 
with most other RHBs. However, due to problems of data 
availability, resource allocation at the inter-regional scale 
is not considered £urther (6.1). 
While the Newcastle RHB could thus be held to be typical 
Table 6.1 Summary of actual and intended distribution of acute beds, 
and proposed capital investment resulting from the Hospital 
Plan, by region. ..... 
--"-1 
RHB Acute Beds Beds/1000 Pop. Estimated Investment per 
Total Capital Head of 1975 
Investment (1) Pop. 
(£ '000) 
-- ----
Avail- Prop- Avail- Prop-
able in osed able :in osed 
1960 (1975) 1960 (1975) 
Newcastle 11475 10770 I 3.8 3.4 43000 13.3 
Leeds 11836 10860 3.8 3.4 41900 13.1 
Sheffield 13501 14160 3.1 3.0 63000 13.3 
E.Anglia- 4581 4960 3.0 2.9 22000 13.1 
Metropolitan 58529 53340 4.2 3.6 199700 13.3 
RHBs 
Wessex 5926 6450 3.6 3.3 31700 16.3 
Oxford 5336 6410 3.3 3.3 31200 16.4 
South 10627 9930 3.7 3.3 42500 14.2 
Western 
Birmingham 15671 16130 3.3 3.1 75000 14.5 
Manchester 15908 15580 3.6 3.4 60200 13.3 
Liverpool 12388 8590 5.6 3.5 50500 21.2 
Wales 11623 9310 4.5 3.5 46800 17.4 
I England & t2h79456 168550 3.9 3.4 707500 
Wales 
_____ ____J 
--
----
Source: 
M1n1stry of Health, 1962, 214, 277. 
Notes: 
1. These figures include £61,400,000 for provincial Teaching Hospitals 
and £67,800,000 for the London Teaching Hospitals. 
2. This figure includes 2055 beds in London's Teaching Hospitals used by patients 
from outside the Metropolitan regions; these beds were not included in the 
regional figures. 
I 
I 
r-' 
Q\ 
N 
I 
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of provincial RHBs? the main planning problems within the 
region concerned not so much an overall deficiency in bed 
numbers but rather that hospitals were inconveniently located 
and composed of old or unsuitable buildings. Thus table 6.2, 
showing the age distribution of hospital accommodation within 
the region, demonstrates that in terms both of new hospital 
construction and expansion or redevelopment of existing serv1ces? 
the hospital system was partly obsolescent. Over ha:tf the 
hospitals dated from the 19th century and these would be re-
placed with a small number of DGHs providing a full range of 
specialist services (Ministry of Health, 1962, 17). Most of 
the smaller facilities would ultimately close, thus increasing 
the average size of hospitals within the RHB from 107.2 beds 
to 156.6 beds (table 6.3); likewise, 46 of the 72 hospitals 
built before 1900 were ultimately to be closed. Figures 6.1 
and 6.2 illustrate, respectively, the hospitals available in 
1960 and those to be available by 1975. 
Thus the Hospital Plan was introduced as a result of a 
combination of the technical and political developments dis-
cussed above (chapter 5), with the intention of redistributing 
NHS resources between regions and concentrating facilities at 
the intra-regional level. The extent to which the Plan was 
implemented, and the problems encountered in putting it into 
operation, are both illustrative of the state's ~bility to 
achieve its declared objectives; such issues therefore occupy 
the bulk of this chapter, and indeed the three local case 
studies all, in various ways, illustrate how health authorities 
coped with demands for departures from the Plan. 
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Table 6.2 Age of acute hospitals 1n 
the Newcastle RHB. 
Date of Number of 
Construction hospitals 
Pre-1860 14 
1S80-1879 30 
1880-1899 28 
1900-1919 42 
1920-1939 25 
Post-1939 6 
145(l) 
Source: 
RHB 64, Age of hospitals. 
Note: 
-1-.--Information not available for all 
hospitals in the Newcastle RHB. 
~ 
Table 6.3 Actual and intended size distribution 
of hospitals in the Newcastle RHB. 
Size At Proposals Long 
(no. of 31.12.60 for 1975 term 1 beds) proposals ( ) 
< 50 79 36 8 
51-100 28 23 6 
101-250 33 16 12 
251-500 16 12 9 
501-1000 4 8 11 
> 1000 - 3 3 
Total 160 98 49 
Source: 
M1nistry of Health (1962) 
Note: 
~These are strictly accurate only for the lower 
I 
=' 
size ranges; in the two largest classes the precise 
figures for the distribution of beds between hospitals 
were not always given. 
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6.3 Issues in the implementatiort of the Plan 
This section provides a broad overview of the main 
shifts an~or changes of emphasis in hospital policy following 
1962, with reference to developments in policy at national 
level and to the response to these by the Newcastle RHB. The 
outcomes of these policies are also examined~ with reference 
to the use and distribution of capital investment and the 
number and distribution of hospital closures. 
Shortly after the Plan's announcement it became clear 
that its full implementation would prove extremely difficult 
in view of the scale of public investment involved. Though 
there had been a marginal expansion of the Plan in 1963 
(6.2), the Ministry of Health was concerned that if the building 
programme proceeded without delays, it would be impossible to 
finance all cipital schemes from the resources available. Put 
another way: 
'we sometimes have to delay target starting 
dates on financial rather than planning grounds' 
(6.3) 
In the context of the relatively slow growth of the 
British economy in the two years following the 1964 election, 
the scale of such expenditure commitments proved a burden for 
the Labour government. The relationship between public 
expenditure and the growth of the economy had become an issue 
of concern within six weeks of the return of Labour to power. 
In a bid to win votes before the 1964 election the Con-
servatives had announced major increases in public expenditure 
programmes. The incoming Labour government could not reduce 
these programmes drastically for fear of losing electoral 
support; on the other hand the government could not restore 
foreign confidence in the pound without such cuts (Crossman, 
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1976 (volume I), 80,82-84; Brittan, 1969, 171-176) o In 
relation to hospital building, the government therefore took 
a middle course, calling for a review of the Plan which stressed 
that development proposals should be related very closely to 
the level of resources likely to be available (6o4)o The 
published revision of the Plan claimed that its initial aims 
had been over-optimistic and that many of the proposals were 
inadequately defined and imprecisely costed; consequently it 
was necessary to 'bring greater realism to hospital planning' 
and 'get the best possible value for the resources provided' 
(Ministry of Health, 1966, 1, 10) 0 Stricter financial control 
was an explicit aim: the programme of developments was stated 
in terms of available finance rather than as a list of approved 
physical development schemes. Hence adjustments to the 
estimated cost of schemes would h~ve to be made within the 
total sum approved for hospital development. In addition, 
Boards would not be able to allow for the effect of delays on 
their programmes (6.5). Thus, if a major development project 
was delayed, for whatever reason, the capital programme for 
subsequent years would not be expanded to allow for this. Hence 
the Newcastle RHB's concern at the effect of delays in the 
Freeman Road scheme on their long-term proposals for capital 
development (see chapter 10, below). The major features of 
the revised programme within the Newcastle RHB were that while 
the existing Plan had been preserved as far as possible the 
first priority had been given to schemes worth under £100,000 
in order to provide for essential improvements at existing 
hospitals. As regards the allocation of resources within the 
Newcastle RHB, the needs of the three industrial estuaries 
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of the region were to be given the highest priority; in 
addition~ the requirements of the rapidly-growing population 
of the Darlington area were to receive attention (6.6). 
The overall effect of the 1966 revision was a slight 
slackening in the rate of growth of NHS capital expenditure 
(figure 6.3). Further attempts to ~ationalise hospital 
expenditure were made in the form of using standard-design 
units~ but as these do not have any direct bearing on the 
spatial planning of facilities (except insofar as they had 
specific site requirements) they are not considered further 
( 6. 7) . Instead, the proposals of the Bonham-Carter report 
(Ceniral Health Services Council, 1969) are outlined; these 
influenced opinions on the scale (and hence spatial arrangement) 
of hospital services. 
The intention of this report was to achieve the more 
economical and efficient use of medical manpower and to reap 
the benefits of scale economies in hospital construction. 
The report argued that DGHs: 
'should be planned around teams of not less than 
two consultants in each speciality, with all their 
inpatients at the DGH' 
(Central Health Services Council, 1969) 
This partly reflected concern as to the future number 
of consultants likely to be available for the hospital service; 
the report had assumed that there were unlikely to be large 
increases in the number of such personnel, and therefore their 
efficient use was imperative. Such views were of considerable 
importance in the debate on the future organisation of acute 
hospital services in Newcastle (see chapters 8-10 below). 
Though the assumptions concerning consultant availability 
subsequently proved groundless (6.8) the principal recommendation 
of the report - that DGHs should serve populations of 
500 
400 
CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE 
('000 000 
pounds, 
1978 prices) 
300 
200 
100 
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Source: DHSS( 1979b) 
Figure 6.3: Qrowth of NilS capital expenditure, 1921-8-1978. 
Note: Figures refer only to expenditure in England. 
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200-300 000 - caused considerable concern. Concentration of 
medical facilities into units of 1200-1800 beds followed 
logically from the report's contention that at least two 
consultants in each specialty should be available, but the 
social implications of such developments caused some alarm. 
Though the report had support within medical circles (6.9), the 
response of the DHSS and of the RHBs was less than enthusiastic. 
The Secretary of State's introduction to the report spoke of 
the needs of patients requiring long-term care and of the future 
role of peripheral hospitals, thus - by implication - arguing 
against the wholesale adoption of the report's recommendations. 
(Central Health Services Council, 1969, iv). Likewise, the 
RHB chairmen argued thatthese proposals'ought not to be 
pursued in all situations' (6.10). Within the Newcastle RHB, 
the response was that developments in Newcastle, Sunderland and 
Teesside could be planned on the assumption that only two 
DGHs would now be necessary in each centre, rather than three 
as previously proposed (but see chapters 8-10) . The populations 
of other HMCs (Gateshead, Darlington, S.E. Northumberland, 
S. Shields, Hartlepool and North Teesside) were large enough 
to permit the planning of hospitals to serve around 200,000 
people. There remained the problem of the smaller HMCs. Both 
the Cumbrian HMCs would require DGHs because of their remoteness, 
but Wansbeck, Durham and the peripheral HMCs would have to rely 
heavily upon adjacent areas. Thus acute hospital services for 
Wansbeck would be provided from the DGH to be developed in S.E. 
Northumberland HMC. Finally, while it had never been the .RHB' s 
intention to provide full scale general hospitals in the Alnwick 
and Berwick HMCs, their proposals for 'peripheral'hospitals 
in Northallerton and Hexham caused some concern (see section 
6.4). The effects of the Bonham-Carter Report on planning were 
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therefore £elt most severely in the peripheral HMCs; the 
consequences in urban areas were rather less serious (6.11). 
However, these recommendations were never formally adopted 
by the DHSS; a meeting of RHB chairmen recommended that the 
maximum size of hospitals should be of the order of 750-1100 
beds (6.12); this seems to have been a response to the social 
implications of the implied concentration of services. Such a 
view was also echoed in a DHSS study which claimed that this 
size range was one in which hospitals functioned most efficient-
ly (DHSS, 1972). Thus only in the Hexham and Northallerton 
HMCs did the Bonham-Carter Report lead to a questioning of 
former policy; in the rest of the Newcastle RHB the effect 
was marginal (6.13). 
Following this report, no significant changes in policy 
on hospital size took place up to 1974. However, preliminary 
attempts were made to equalise resource distribution both 
between geographical areas and between sectors of the NHS, but 
as these are not of direct concern here they will not be dis-
cussed further (6.14). In any case, assessing the consequences 
of such proposals is rendered complicated not least by the 
effect on planning of the anticipated NHS reorganisation, but 
also by the 1973 public expenditure cuts. These had been 
imposed to reduce demand in the economy following rapid oil price 
rises; a reduction in GHP of 1!-2% was·proposed,to be achievecllargely 
by public expenditure cuts. A reduction of £47.8 million was 
imposed on the NHS capital building programme for England and 
Wales (House of Commons, 1974, viii), and although this was 
only a 20% reduction in the total building programme, it 
actually implied a 60% reduction in new starts, because the 
.DHSS did not wish to interfere with or rephase existing contracts. 
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Moreover, new capital development had already been subject to 
a moratorium from September 1973, and the effect of this and 
the cuts was that no new NHS schemes were started between 
that date and March 1974 (House of Commons, 1974, viii-x). 
Within the Newcastle RHB this had led to the postponement of 
seven major schemes (6.15). These reductions brought to an 
end the rapid expansion of NHS capital expenditure, which 
had reached a peak in 1972-73 (figure 6.3). 
The emphasis thus far has been on policy changes nation-
ally, with brief reference to the implications of major 
developments - such as the 1966 revision of the Plan, and the 
Bonham-Carter Report - for local planning. The problems of 
local hospital development are now considered more closely. 
While the Hospital Plan had initially been optimistic 
about the level of resources likely to be available for capital 
development, even to the extent of specifying proposals in the 
form of a list of physical development schemes, the 1966 
revision was rather more guarded in tone (see above). In these 
circumstances, while HMCs were persistent in their demands for 
additional resources, RHBs had to proceed cautiously in 
response, though the government was reminded that restraint 
of and uncertainty about capital allocations was uneconomic 
in the long-term (House of Commons, 19JO, 335-336). Thus the 
Newcastle RHB felt that deferment of schemes to which thev 
' 
were fully committed was a 'considerable embarrass.m~nt ... which 
could cause a great deal of justifiable criticism' (6.16), not 
least because the declared policy of the RHB had been to 
develop services as evenly as possible throughout the region. 
Hence relatively small cost schemes had been undertaken in the 
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early years of the Plan (table 6.4), so that reductions in 
proposed expenditure would be likely to affect several projects 
and so generate criticism from more than one source. However 
the RHB conceded that their policy was disadvantageous in 
terms of temporary provisions, changes of use of facilities, 
the small size of building contracts, long gaps between 
successive phases of building at individual hospitals, and the 
need for continued expenditure on maintenance (6.17). An 
indication of the implications of such problems can be seen 
in figure 6.4. This gives the RHB's tentative programme of 
major capital developments and shows that (given certain 
assumptions about the capital resources likely to be available 
to the RHB) the DGH programme for the region could be completed 
by the end of the century. Even this target - which was 
considerably more optimistic than those of some RHBs, who were 
unlikely to complete their DGH programme in less than 50-60 
years (6.18) - looks unrealistic in the light of subsequent 
developments. To take two examples, the commissioning of the 
Freeman Road Hospital, Newcastle, was seriously delayed by 
successive financial crises in the late 1910s (see chapters 
7 and 10), while construction of Phase 1 of the new hospital 
for South East Northumberland (at Rake Lane, North Shields) 
did not commence until late 1980 - almost three years after 
the da tc indica ted in figuTe 6. 4. One Iinal irnpJ leo. tion o£ 
the complications inherent in planning under these conditions 
was that the RHB were unable to commit themselves on the 
dates at which it might be possible to provide new facilities 
in some of the relatively deprived HMCs within the region -
for instance, Sunderland and South East Northumberland (6.19). 
Against the background of these planning problems and policy 
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Table 6. 4 Major schemes implemep_ted by Newcastle 
RHB, 1962-1968. 
Scheme li Commencing 
I Date 
Shotley Bridge General April 1964 
Hospital? Phase I 
North Tees General Hospital? August 1965 
Phase I 
Darlington Memorial October 1965 
Hospital, Phase I 
Queen Elizabeth Hospital, November 1965 
Gateshead, Phase I 
Bishop Auckland General August 1966 
Hospital? Phase I 
South Shields General October 1966 
Hospital, Phase I 
Ashington Hospital, Final September 1967 
Phase 
Source: 
Newcastle RHB, Evidence to Sub Committee B of 
the Select Committee on Estimates, 1969 - held 
in RHB 145/2/K/9. 
Value 
(£m) 
0.25 
2.00 
2.00 
0. 50 
0. 50 
0. 50 
0. 50 
HMC ( Hospita I) 
Newcastle (Freeman) ~. (?: ~ ~ ::::::::::::::::: 
.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
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changes~ it is instructive to analyse three issues~ namely: 
the growth of capital investment and the use to which it was 
put~ both locally and nationally; the intra-regional allocation 
of capital resources; and the number and distribution of 
hospital closures. 
Figure 6.3 (see above) shows that capital expenditure 
rose rapidly for the first two years of the Plan~ but its growth 
then slackened slightly in the term of office of the Labour 
government in the late 1960s; after increasing again in the 
early 1970s, the 1973 cuts represented the first setback to 
the expansion of the Plan. This period also witnessed an 
overall expansion in the proportion of NHS resources used for 
capital expenditure (figure 6~51; this reached a peak of 12% 
in 1972-1973. The reductions in the late 1960s represent not 
only restraint on the Plan's implementation, but also attempts 
to switch resources from capital to revenue accounts in order 
to improve conditions in the long-stay and mental hospitals, 
revelations about which provoked a public outcry (6.20). In 
terms of th~ use of NHS capital expenditure in 1962-1974,_between 
22.7% and 39.7% was used in new hospital construction (figure 
6.6). By contrast the corresponding proportion in the New-
castle RHB was rather lower throughout this period, with the 
exception of 1961-1962 and 1973-1974 (figure 6.7). The high 
figure for 1961-1962 was d~e almost entirely to a large ln-
vestment in the new West Cumberland Hospital in that year. 
The relatively low proportion of capital devoted to new con-
struction reflected the RHB's policy of attempting to spread 
its resources as evenly as possible, rather than concentrate 
on a few major projects(6.21). 
Notwithstanding this policy intention, it is nevertheless 
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clear that - intra-regionally - capital development was uneven, 
a result of the constraints discussed above and of the 
difficulties of agreeing on local strategies for future 
development. Considering the per capita distribution of the 
RHB's capital expenditure (refer back to figure 5.6), it is 
clear that the most favoured area in this period was Teesside. 
As noted ahove, this had become one of the RHBs top priorities 
for capital development in the 1950s, and this can plausibly 
be linked to the importance attached to industrial development 
there by various state planning agencies (see chapter 5). By 
contrast, the peripheral rural HMCs were less favoured (e.g. 
Alnwick and Rothbury, Berwick, South West Durham); investment 
was limited to minor schemes at the relatively small hospitals 
in these HMCs, since the RHB did not intend to provide full 
DGH facilities in such areas. The lowest per capita invest-
ment in this period was in South East Northumberland HMC; 
this represented something of an 'inverse care' situation, for 
despite the recognition of the Hospital Surveyors that major 
developments were necessary in this area, (Ministry of Health, 
1946 (volume 10), 96), investment in this HMC had been per-
sistently low relative to the rest of the region since 1948. 
Finally, the Plan's aims in terms of hospital closures 
proved over-optimistic. Progress of closures was uneven, 
reaching a peak of 39 ln 1968 (table 6.5) (in England; data not 
available for Wales). The Newcastle RHB was scheduled to close 
41 hospitals by 1975 but only 14 closures had been effected 
by 1974 (figure 6.8). This reflects the problems both of 
implementing the Plan and of obtaining agreement on local 
hospital strategy. 
To conclude, this section has described the major shifts 
Table 6.5 Hospital closures and change~£ use in England, ~-1962-lg69. 
Resulting 
from 1962 1963 1964 1965. 1966 . 1967 1968 
Closure New provision - 1 1 _3 .6 12 15 
Reo:rganisation 14 16 5 11 13" 9" 24 
Total 14 17 6" .. 14· . 19 . . 21 39 
Change of New provision - 3 - - 2 3 -
Use Reo:r_ganisation - 2 - 4 2 7 7 
Total - .2 '3' 4 ' 2 . ' .. 9 TO 
Closure & New provision - 1 4 3 6 14 18 change of Reorganisation 14 18 5 15 15 16 31 use · 
Total 14 19 9 18 21 30 49 
L___ 
- -
Source Newcas·:;le RHB Unpublished papers held in RHB 43. 
I 
I 
I 1969 Total 
I I 
I 13 I 52 
25 127 i 
38 179 
4 12 I 
2 :: 26 
---
6 '38 
17 II 
--
64 
2.7 ll53_1 
I . I 
44 II 217 I 
! 
1-' 
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Number of Beds 
0 40 
0 60 
0 120 
0 160 
0200 
0 Closure proposed in Plan 
Q Closure proposed and effected,1962-74 0 20 
EEJ Closure not announced in Plan Kilometres 
0 
0 
oo 0 
0 0 
\j 
Source: Ministry of Health, 1962, and Newcastle RHB Annual Accounts 
FiguTe 6.8: Actual and pToposed hospital 
closures in the Newcastle 
RltB, 1962-1974. 
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in policy which followed the announcement of the Plan; 
secondly, the problems of planning have been outlined within 
this broad context; and finally, the specific changes which 
occurred during this period have been examined. Several 
factors combined to restrict the extent to which it proved 
possible to implement the Plan. Public expenditure restraint 
was perhaps the most important factor; such restraint has 
seriously limited the ability of RHBs to make progress with the 
long-term development of their services and to respond to 
social need. Hence, by 1974, the Plan was already falling short 
of its targets. Two further problems should also be considered, 
however; these are the social implications of such a concentration 
of services, and the problems of responding to the needs of 
areas of rapid population change, particularly at the sub-
regional scale, and these are considered in the next section. 
6. 4 Social and political problems in: ho·spital :elan:ni~. 
This is a somewhat broad issue and so only two key themes 
are discussed. Firstly, the problems of achieving the requisite 
number of closures proposed by the Plan will be discussed; 
related to this, the social costs of service concentration will 
be considered. Secondly, attention is directed to the difficult-
ies of responding to localised population change. These themes 
are important illustrations of the extent to which the state 
is able to implement its declared intentions. 
While the relatively slow progress in implementing the 
Plan reflects uncertainties as to the availability of capital 
resources, this is only a partial account, because the~Plan's 
implementation wa:s also subject to agreement being reached on 
closure proposals. The DHSS felt that opposition to closures 
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would cease once the public accepted that a spatial concen-
tration of facilities was in everyone's best interests, due 
to the superior service that would be provided (6.22). In 
practice, considerable resistance developed to hospital closures. 
Under the terms of the 1946 NHS Act, the Minister of Health 
was obliged to ensure that hospital buildings were, as far as 
possible, used for the purposes for which they had been em-
ployed immediately prior to the setting up of the NHS. In 
these terms, communities evidently had a right to anticipate 
the retention of their local hospital unless this was totally 
impracticable (for instance, if the physical condition of the 
building was no longer adequate for the provision of hospital 
facilities) and the arrangements for consultation on closures 
or changes of use emphasised this Ministerial obligation (6.23). 
However, a different emphasis emerged in policy from 1968; 
RHBs were: 
'actively encourage(d) to promote closures and 
change of use of uneconomic units as an essential 
.measure to facilitate the provision of a planned 
service' (6.24). 
Yet even this, which explicitly promised Ministerial 
support for closure proposals, had been of limited practical 
value. RHB chairmen commented on the grave difficulties of 
implementing closures; even tentative proposals provoked a 
public outcry, while early consultation ensured that agitation 
was greatly prolonged. In addition, Boards complained that: 
'the support of ministers for closure 
proposals ... is ... never speedily given 
and seldom unequivocal' (6.25). 
The latter point may reflect direct political pressure 
on ministers, on the part of constituency MPs, but this cannot 
be substantiated from the available evidence (6.26). In 
response to such problems, RHBs argued that closures and 
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change of use should be dealt with 'by a running-down process' 
which would c01mnence once alternative provision was available, 
rather than in advance of the provision of new hospitals 
(6.27). Thus, faced with pressures for the retention of 
services, it may well be that RHBs refrained from the full 
implementation of the Hospital Plan. 
The social consequences of hospital closures were felt 
most acutely in rural areas. As was observed in Parliament, 
it was an 'unhappy coincidence' that the Plan was announced: 
'at the moment when the Minister of Transport 
is busy dismantling rural transport services 
by both rail and road' (6.28). 
The implied accessibility problems were causing concern 
shortly after the Plan's announcement. Thus the Newcastle 
RHB reassured various local institutions that their aim was 
not an excessive centralisation; rather, small units would be 
retained in some local centres (Alston, Penrith, Alnwick, 
Rothbury) and additional facilities would be provided in places 
not already possessing them (e.g. Millom, Kirkby Stephen) 
(6.29}. On the grounds of economies of scale, the Board were 
unwilling to consider a scattering of acute hospital facilities, 
but local hospitals would be retained for the reception and 
treatment of 'social cases' (6.30). However, following the 
publication of the Bonham-Carter Report, there developed con-
siderablc local opposition to the RHB's proposals, particularly 
in the case of Northallerton which could not support a DGH 
along the lines indicated in the Report. Consequently the RHB 
envisaged running down the existing Friarage Hospital in 
Northallerton, according it the status of a 'peripheral' 
hospital (6.31). This generated a fierce protest, orchestrated 
by several local authorities and voluntary agencies (6.32), and 
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articulated in local newspapers (6.33). As discussed above~ 
the Bonham-Carter Report 1 s recommendations were never implement-
ed fully~ but one consequence of such responses to it was a 
move towards providing community hospitals to serve rural 
areas. Pilot schemes for such facilities had already been 
experimented with by the Oxford RHB (see House of Commons, 
1910, 317-386), and they were subsequently adopted as a policy 
option in 1974. 
Thus the ability of RHBs to implement the Hospital Plan 
1n full was constrained not only by uncertain capital allo-
cations but also by the political difficulties of gaining both 
public assent and Ministerial consent to closure proposals. 
This necessitated both a firmer line on closures and also 
concessions to those areas likely to suffer most from service 
concentration. But if RHBs were constrained by several social 
and political factors in the extent to which they could 
implement hospital closures, they were also seriously hampered 
in terms of responding to the needs of areas of rapid population 
change - particularly new towns. 
There existed serious problems of integrating the growth 
of new towns with health service planning. Given the 'threshold' 
populations required for full-scale DGH development - at 
least 100-150 000 - it was unlikely that new towns would merit 
consideration for development on this scale, except where 
their target populations exceeded this figure (for instance 
Milton Keynes - see Parston, 1980). Nevertheless, NTDCs were 
persistent in their demands for hospital services appropriate 
to the needs of their population, but at least two problems 
were encountered. 
Firstly, there was the uncertaitity of population growth 
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in new towns. NTDCs made various predictions as to the 
anticipated ultimate size of their towns - that of Washington, 
for example, was 80,000 (Llewelyn-Davies et al., 1966), but 
they could not guarantee that these targets would be achieved. 
This depended partly upon overspill agreements and partly upon 
voluntary migration. 
Secondly, site availability was to prove a general problem 
for hospital planners following the announcement of the Plan, 
because of the acreage required for DGH development. A 
spokesman for one of the Metropolitan RHBs claimed that, once 
local authorities ceased to be responsible for hospital pro-
vision in 1948,'hospitals went to the bottom of the queue for 
land requirements' (House of Commons, 19]0, 338). RHBs were 
constrained by public expenditure decisions to such an extent 
that they could not guarantee when they were likely to be able 
to build a hospital; hence NTDCs were unwilling to 'sterilise' 
large areas of land. Consequently, various experimental and/ 
or hybrid schemes for health service provision were put forward; 
in particular, the new town environment offered an opportunity 
to combine health centres, for instance, with hospital out-
patient facilities (see Dillane, 1966; Draper et al. ,;1,_971; Parston, 
1980; Reid and Gooding, 1975; Sichel, 1969 a,b; 1970). Yet 
such schemes were not always successful, sometimes meeting 
medical opposition to their proposals; moreover, the complex-
ities of coordinating the intentions and practices of RHBs 
and NTDCs often rendered the development of an agreed strategy 
a drawn-out and long-term process. Clearly,therefore, there 
existed constraints on the ability of RHBs to respond td the 
perceived needs of new towns. At one level this might be seen 
as a purely technical problem, to be resolved by more sophis-
ticated sub-regional resource allocation procedures. However, 
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it seems that problems of coordinating the intentions of 
various state agencies, and of guaranteeing (for instance) land 
availability, appear to be of mare decisive influence; this 
will be illustrated by a discussion of h9spital planning for 
Peterlee and Washington (Chapter 8) . 
6.5 Concluding comments 
The aim of this chapter has been to consider issues in the 
implementation of the Hospital Plan from 1962-1974, at national 
level and within the Newcastle RHB. Two sets of factors 
influenced the extent to which the Plan was put into operation. 
Firstly, there existed a variety of constraints upon the 
volume of resources available for the Plan. At the level of 
central government this was reflected in Cabinet debates about 
the economic measures necessary to restore foreign confidence 
in the pound. In turn these led to calls for a rationalisation 
of the public sector, illustrated by the 1966 review of the Plan, 
the non-adoption of the Bonham-Carter Report, and the search 
for standard-design, hospital units. Local hospital planning 
therefore, had to proceed in what was, at best, an uncertain 
environment; this in turn constrained the ability of RHBs to 
respond to social need for hospital provision. 
Secondly, there existed socio-po!itical constraints upon 
the ability of the s tat.e to imple.ment the Plan. · These arose 
form the proposed concentration of hospital services, protests 
against which became especially marked at the time of the 
Bonham-Carter Report. Two policy changes resulted: one of 
these - an attempt to pursue a firmer closure policy - was 
intended to facilitate the Plan's full and rapid implementation, 
while the other - the community hospital concept - can be seen 
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as an attempt to draw back from and/or avoid the less palatable 
social consequences of the Plan. Though they have not been 
discussed in detail above, the implementation of the Plan has 
also been hindered by disputes over hospital strategy at the 
local scale (see Chapters 8 to 10). Finally, for various 
reasons - notably conflict over land use allocation, opposition 
on the part of medical professionals, and uncertainty over 
population growth - the ability of RHBs to develop hospital 
services appropriate to the needs of new towns was very limited. 
What are the implications of the foregoing for theorising the 
role of the state? 
Firstly, the view of state policy formulation as a strategy 
of crisis avoidance (Offe, 1976, 415) seems a particularly 
apposite characterisation of some of the policy change~ dis-
cussed here. Perhaps the best illustrations of this would be 
the 1966 revision of the Plan, and the public expenditure cuts 
in late 1973, though the apparent reluctance of the Government 
to implement in full the proposals of the Bonham-Carter Report 
may also be construed as an atte.mpt. to avoid the public ex-
penditure implications and the social consequences of such 
plans. 
Secondly, the ability of the state effectively to implement 
its declared intentions appears to be called into question by 
the foregoing evidence. The socio-political and economic 
constraints that restrict the scope of state activities both 
serve to pose the problem of the limits to state intervention, 
and to produce a divergence between the stated intentions and 
actual outcomes of state policies, revealed by delays in the 
progress of the Hospital Plan. 
Thirdly, given that there exist various demands upon the 
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state, it has been argued that policy formulation proceeds in 
a selective fashion (Offe, 19.74), favouring those groups vv-hose 
support is deemed essential to the existing social order. This 
is evident, for example, in the way the .medical profession's 
requirements became manifest in the Bonham-Carter Report; 
though never formally adopted, this Report 'influenced thinking 
on the size of hospitals in an upward direction' (DHSS, 1979b, 
83), reflecting the influence of the medical profession in 
terms.of defining the character- and, by implication, spatial 
arrangement - of hospital provision. Yet if certain groups are 
selectively favoured, it also follows that certain aspects of 
state policies receive relatively less attention. Thus the 
limited consideration given to the access implications of DGH 
development is evhlence that, when efficient management is 
deemed essential, a concern for social costs tends to be 
sacrificed. These accessibility problems therefore had to be 
justified as necessary by reference to the better quality of 
service which would be provided. The foregoing evidence there-
fore illustrates the selective character of state policy 
formulation and shows that it is most appropriately understood 
as a strategy of crisis avoidance, to which there are,however, 
various limits. The problems of hospital planning were to be 
posed rather more acutely, however, by several developments 1n 
the 1910s, and these are considered in the next chapter. 
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Footno:tes 
6.1 This topic has not been considered due to data 
problems. The Ministry of Health Anntial Accounts and 
Annual 'Reports do not contain a regional disaggregation 
of the distribution of capital investment. The 
statistics available in Regio·nal Trends only refer to 
Standard Regions before 19.74; these areas are not 
coterminous with RHBs. Though there exists DHSS data 
on the number and size distributions of hospitals in 
each RHB from 1970~ this does not permit comparison of 
closures since this data does not state (a) how many 
new hospitals had been built in each RHB and (b) how 
many closures had taken place. Hence any estimate of 
closures arrived at by subtracting the number of 
facilities available in - say - 1974 from those 
available in 1962, is likely to be inaccurate. 
6.2 This expansion occurred in April 1963; four major 
schemes were added to the Newcastle RHB's programme. 
These included major developments at Newcastle General, 
Queen Elizabeth, and South Shields General Hospitals 
(as well as modernisation of accommodation at one 
psychiatric institution)- RHB Press Release 9.4.63, 
held in RHB 145}2/H. 
6.3 Letter from the Ministry of Health to the Secretary 
of Liverpool RHB, 22.9.64 - copy held in RHB 145/D. 
6.4 HM(65)37, Review of the Hospital B.l.lilding Programme. 
6.5 Newcastle RHB, Review of the Hospital Plan and the 
Ten Year Capital Programme, October 1965 - held in 
RHB. 145/2/H. 
6.6 Ibid. 
6.7 Interest in standardisation of hospital design and 
construction can be traced at least to the Ministry 
of Health's Hospital Building Note.s, dating from 1961. 
The first attempt to introduce standard units and to 
reduce construction and site development costs was the 
development of Eastburn Hospital, in the Leeds RHB 
(see Ham, 1981, 65-67). This was the forerunner of 
various attempts to standardise hospital development, 
such as the 'Best Buy' hospitals at Bury St. Edmunds 
and Frimley (House of Commons, 1970, 23-24). 
6.8 Newcastle RHB - Policy following the Bonham-Carter 
Report (n.d. - probably early 1970) - held in RHB 43. 
6.9 Local support for the Report's recommendations was 
evident in, for example, the views of Henry Miller, an 
influential figure in the Freeman Road dispute (see 
Chapter 10), who argued for hospitals of around 2,000 
beds (Miller, 1973). 
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6.10. Newcastle RHB - Policy following the Bonham-Carter 
Report (n.d. - probably early 19.70)~held in RHB 43. 
6.11 Newcastle RHB - Functions of the District General 
Hospital: Report of the Senior Administrative Medical 
Officer and Secretary - held in RHB 145/44. 
6.12 Newcastle RHB - Policy following the Bonham-Carter 
Report (n.d. - probably early 1970) - held in RHB 43. 
6.13 Newcastle RHB - File note on modifications of hospital 
plans since Cmnd. 3000, October 1970-held in RHB 
145} 2}H. 
6.14 Despite the conditions of the mental and long-stay 
hospitals at the inception of the NHS, litt~was done 
to alleviate this problem (apart from a priority 
allocation of capital resources to mental hospitals in 
the mid 1950s) until 1969. Following a report on 
conditions at Ely Hospital, Cardiff, some efforts were 
made to reallocate resources to long-stay services. 
As for resource allocation in the ~cute sector, the 
population-based estimates of the Hospital Plan were 
supplanted by a more sophisticated assessment (which 
also considered hospital workload and the condition of 
the capital stock) from late 1969. On these developments 
see Crossman, (1976 (volume III), various entries} 
6.15 Newcastle RHB - Hospital Services Development Committee 
meeting, 4.2 . .74 - notes held in RHB 145}44. The 
affected schemes included developments at Sunderland 
General Hospital, South Shields General Hospital, 
Cumberland Infirmary, North Tees General Hospital, and 
the City Maternity Hospital, Carlisle (as well as two 
projects at mental hospitals). 
6.16 Letter from the Newcastle RHB to the Ministry of 
Health, 11.1.65 - copy held in RHB 145_/2/Q/10. 
6.17 Newcastle RHB - memorandum of evidence to the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Estimates: Sub-Committee 
B (the Hospital Building Programme) - copy held in 
RHB 145} 2/K/9. 
6.18 Report of a meeting between officers of RHBs and the 
Ministry of Health, 30.6.68 - copy held in RHB 145_/Z)II. 
6.19 Internal memorandum on the RHB's capital programmes 
14.12.67 - held in RHB 145}2/H. 
6.20 See note 6.14. 
6.21 
6.22 
6.23 
6.24 
6.25 
6.26 
6 0 27 
6.28 
6.29 
6.30 
6.31 
6.32 
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Newcastle RHB - memorandum of evidence to the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Estimates - held in RHB 
145/2/K/9. 
DHSS evidence to sub-committee B of the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Estimates inquiry into 
the Hospital Building Programme - copy held in RHB 
145/2/K/9. 
RHB (49) 132 and HM (58) 29 gave details of appropriate 
consultation procedures. 
HM (68) 31. 
Paper on closures and changes of use of hospitals, 
prepared for a meeting of RHB chairmen, October 1970 -
copy held in RHB 43. 
There is evidence from Richard Crossman's Diaries that 
a Cabinet decision to maintain subsidies for the Central 
Wales railway line (and so avoid its closure) was taken 
largely in anticipation of the possibility that Labour 
seats might be at risk in that area (see Crossman, 1976 
(volume III), 602-603). Such evidence is unlikely to 
be forthcoming at government level in the case of 
hospitals, given that decisions on the closure of 
individual facilities are usually taken at regional 
level. However, it is interesting to note a reference 
to such issues in Barbara Castle's Diaries (1980, 601). 
Defending the hospital building programme in Cabinet, 
she deliberately referred to the possibility of delays 
in the construction of new hospitals in the constituencies 
of certain Cabinet members. 
Paper on closures and changes of use of hospitals, 
prepared for a meeting of RHB chairmen, October 1970 -
copy held in RHB 43. 
Kenneth Robinson, H.C. Deb., 661, c.Sl, 4.6. 62. 
Letter from the RHB to Alderman Robson (of Prudhoe) 
concerning hospitals in rural areas, 22.4.63. -
copy held in RHB 145}2/H. 
Minutes of a meeting of the RHB's capital development 
sub-committee, 3.5.63 - extract held in RHB 145}2/H. 
RHB 145/44 - Functions of the District General Hospital: 
Report of the Senior Administrative Medical Officer 
(October 1969). 
RHB 145/44 contains correspondence from Northallerton 
RDC (10.2.70), Northallerton UDC (21.1.70), North 
Riding County Council (20.2.70), Northallerton HMC 
(17.2.70) and the Friends of Darlington Hospitals 
(6.2.10) 0 
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6o33 RHB 145}44 also contains press cuttings reporting 
opposition to this development from, variously, the 
Northern Echo (l4olo70, l6olo70, 24olo70), the 
Middlesbrough Evening Gazette (8olo70), the Darlington 
and Stockton Times (l7olo70) and the Yorkshire 
Post (l7olo70) 0 Such responses were by no means 
confined to the Newcastle RHB, as the experience of 
the Leeds RHB testifies (see Ham, 1981, 68) o 
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7. 1914-1982: Public exuenditure restraint 
and hospital planning. 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed some important issues in 
the implementation of the Hospital Plan, up to the 1974 NHS 
reorganisation (see Appendix I for details of NHS adminis-
trative structures). This chapter now considers events in 
the subsequent eight years. Though this might seem an arbitrary 
periodisation, important continuities exist between Labour and 
Conservative governments in term£ of their attitudes to 
public expenditure, and these are discussed in section 7.2; 
the implications of such policies for NHS planning are also 
examined. Because of limitations of space and the complexity 
of the issues to be discussed, a full account of developments 
in the Northern RHA is not presented. Rather, events in 
Newcastle AHA(T) are used to exemplify the implications of 
expenditure restraint for hospital development. Although 
closures of certain facilities had been foreshadowed in the 
1962 Hospital Plan, the timing of these closures and the manner 
of their making represented a response to various financial 
crises (section 7.3). The recent developments in hospital 
policy are then considered (section 7.4); their implications 
for the Northern RHA are noted, and current policy guidance 
is contrasted with the original intentions of the Hospital Plan. 
7.2 Public expenditure restraint and NHS 
planning, 1974-1982. 
This section discusses the important consistencies in 
attitudes to public expendiure between Labour (1974-1979) 
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and Conservative (1979 to. date) governments~ and outlines their 
implications £or NHS planning. In general~ this period has 
been characterised by a view that public expenditure represents 
a burden on private capital~ and should therefore be reduced 
or at least tightly controlled. The reasons for the emergence 
of such views are not analysed here (see~ inter alia~ CSE State 
Group, 19_79; Doyal, 1979; Gamble~ 1979; Gough~ 1979; Manson, 
1980; Taylor-Goohy, 1981; Walker, 1980). Rather, attention is 
directed to attempts to reduce or restrain public expenditure, 
and to policies designed to rationalise, restructure and gain 
firmer control of public expenditure. 
Attempts to reduce or restrain state expenditure during 
this period can be traced not simply to the demands of the IMF 
in late 1~76 but rather to the increased pace of inflation in 
19.74-1975. From early 1976 it was clear that the government 
intended to reduce the share of public expenditure in GNP and 
this was a.persistent feature of subsequent Labour budgets 
(Ormerod, 1980, 51). Several reductions in public expenditure 
(in February, April~ July and De.cember 1976) fol.lowed. That 
these posed serious problems for strategic planning is graphic-
ally revea.led by the following quote; discussing the Cabinet 
debates on the April 1976 cuts, Barbara Castle (7.1) complained 
that: 
:Ministers were never given the chance of discussing 
priorities or overall economic strategy. Instead we 
were faced with ad hoc demands from the Chancellor 
from time to time, pleading sudden crisis or necessity. 
How could I get m:y health authorities to plan the 
NHS properly when the capital allocations were abruptly 
changed?' 
(Castle, 1980, 359-360 ~emphases added) 
Under such circumstances, any attempt at long-term planning 
was doomed to failure. The NHS capital building programme was 
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particularly hard hit by such reductions, and new construction 
suffered most of all, since it was considered essential to 
maintain the on-going capital programme. Yet in the absence 
of new developments, additional expenditure was necessary to 
modernise existing facilities. Thus postponements of capital 
projects in the Gateshead and North Tyneside AHAs necessitated 
extending the lifespan of some old hospitals, at least one of 
which- the Preston hospital (North Shields)-had been recommend-
ed_for closure in the Hospital Survey (7.2). Such post-
ponements were seen as preferable to building a new hospital 
and being unable to open it due to lack of revenue funds. 
Moreover there may have been electoral pressures to cut new 
capital expenditure. Since such reductions applied to services 
that, by definition, had not been provided? their implementation 
was 'electorally slightly less disadvantageous than cutting 
on current expenditure' (House of Commons, 1977, 103, 105-107; 
Pliatzky, 1982, 147-161). 
Attempts to restrain and/or reduce public expenditure 
by the Labour government thus appear as ad hoc responses to 
crises rather than as a systematic pursuit of stated objectives. 
In contrast, the policy of the Conservative government was 
explicitly stated. Though in principle committed to maintain-
ing the level of resources available to the NHS, their 
attitude was that public expenditure was totally dependent on 
national economic performance: 
'Higher public expenditure cannot any longer be 
allowed to precede,and thus prevent, growth in 
the private sector'. 
(House of Commons, 1979, 2). 
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The implications for public expenditure are that: 
'it is simply a question o£ t~ilorirtg the ~hdle 
budget to ~hat ~e ·cafi afford and to what is consistent 
with the rest of the government's economic policy'. 
(House of Commons, 1980, 85- emphasis added) 
The implications of such policies will receive detailed 
discussion below, with reference to events in Newcastle AHA 
(T) . Thus the difference between the policies of Labour and 
Conservative governments is principally that the expenditure 
reductions imposed by the former represented ad boc responses 
to crises, whereas the latter have attempted more systemati-
cally to control the share o£ state expenditure in GNP. 
Secondly, several attempts were made to rationalise and 
restructure state expenditure. In the first major reform o£ 
public expenditure control since the introduction (in 1961) 
of the PESC system, cash limits on public expenditure were 
introduced in 1976. The NHS is an obvious candidate for such 
controls since several factors, including demographic pressure, 
the absence of financial barriers to use of services (Powell, 
1975) and the labour-intensive character of the service 
(Manson, 1980), all combine to produce persistent upward 
pressure on costs. Cash limits were initially intended to 
guarantee firmer control of expenditure without reducing the 
volume of services, but the attainment of cash limit targets 
has increasingly taken precedence over maintenance of planned 
volumes of service. In this respect, considerable continuity 
exists between Labour and Conservative governments (House of 
Commons, 1980, ix), though the latter have stressed more 
forcefully the need to achieve cash limit targets. Consider 
the following: 
'(cash limits)are paramount once the year starts ... 
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~hey take hrecedence over the volume~ 000 and that 
1s why we. ave. the phenomenon called squeeze ... 
once set~ it (a cash limit) must stay set~ and if 
anything has to give, it is the volu:rne' . 
(House of Commons~ 1980, 23 - eJUphasis added). 
It is worth noting that although local planning problems 
have resulted from such policies (see section 7.3.below), and 
although such problems can be traced directly to the effects 
of government fiscal policy, responsibility for these problems 
is devolved explicitly to the local tiers of NHS administra-
tion. Thus if service reductions were necessary a DHSS 
official claimed that: 
'we would not direct in detail where the cuts should 
fall since the management of the service can only 
be conducted at th~ front line where the troops and 
tanks are' 
(House of Commons, 1980, 33) 
This is consistent with the emphasis in government policy 
upon local autonomy and flexibility in planning (DHSS, 1979a; 
1980a; see also section 7.4). However~ it could be taken as 
a disturbing indication of an unwillingness, ~on the part of 
central government, to accept responsibility for the con-
sequences of its own fiscal policies. In exceptional cir-
curnstances indeed, the effect of resource redistribution and 
cash limit policies has provoked direct challenges from health 
authorities to central government, though this has not occurred 
within the Northern. RHA (7. 3) . 
Restructuring of NHS expenditure has also been attempted 
by the introduction of formal planning procedures (DHSS, 1976a) 
and more clearly defined criteria for resource allocation 
between sectors of the NHS (DHSS~ 19J6b; see also Rathwell~ 
1980) and. between geographical areas (DHSS, 1976c). The 
latter, in particular~ has had serious implications for 
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hospital planning, especially in the London area (Community 
Health Councils in London, 1980; NUPE, 1979; London Health 
Planning Consortium, 1979; 1980; Woods, 1982) 0 It ignores 
the problems of subregional resource allocation which result 
from wide intra-regional disparities in social conditions and 
in availability and quality of services (Buxton and Klein, 1978; 
DHSS, 1980b; Bevan and Spencer, 1982; Eyles, Smith and Woods, 
1982; Radical Statistics Health Group, 1977)o For example, 
in the Northern RHA, where variability in service availability 
between AHAs was - relatively speaking - not a serious problem, 
there remained health districts in which total renewal of the 
capital stock would be necessary (7o4) o Irrespective of the 
serious problems inherent in developing NHS resource allocation 
procedures, it is worth noting, finally,that one of the 
practical effects of the RAWP proposals has been to divide 
health authorities against one another. Debate on its proposals 
has therefore consisted less of attacks on their merits than 
of special pleading on behalf of particular areas (7oS). 
Thus the Labour government made various attempts to secure 
tighter control of resource allocation decisions within the 
NHS. lhese policies have, broadly speaking, been maintained 
since 1979, though there has been a shift in emphasis, evident 
not only in attitudes to cash limits but also in a questioning 
of the value of state expenditure. One policy response has 
been the latest NHS reorganisation (DHSS, 1979a); there has 
also been a search for clearer indicators of NHS 'performance', 
exemplified in the evidence of various Select Committees 
(House of Commons, 1980; 1981; 1982; see also Klein, 1982). 
Thus several important continuities existed between Labour 
and Conservative administrations, in terms of their attitudes 
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to state expenditure? though this is not to deny differences 
in emphasis in their policies. The two governments differ 
more fundamentally in their attitude to the appropriate balance 
between state and non-state provision of health care. Thus 
the development of private hospitals (documented by NHS 
Unlimited? 1982) follows logically from current policy emphases 
on the virtues of consumer choice and a market allocation of 
resources (see, inter alia, Adam Smith Institute, 1981; Seldon~ 
1981). It should not be forgotten, however, that the growth 
of independent hospitals was , at least initially, an unintended 
consequence of Labour's attempts to restrain private practice 
in the NHS (Knight, 1979; Politics of Health Group, 1981). 
Emphases on the importance of voluntary and community support 
for health services also represent a new departure in health 
policy since 1979; thus recent guidelines advocate a transfer 
of resources and patients out of long-stay NHS facilities and 
into the community (DHSS, 1981). 
In conclusion, this section has examined the changes in 
government policy towards public expenditure and the NHS in 
1974-1982, and has stressed the important continuities in 
policy between the Labour and Conservative governments. As 
explained above (section 7.1) a complete account is not 
presented of the implications of these policies for the whole 
of the Northern RHA. Instead, events in Newcastle AHA(T) are 
used to exemplify the implications of public expenditure 
restraint for hospital development. 
7.3 Hospital planning in Newcastle AHA(T), 1974-1982. 
Investigation of hospital planning in this area can be 
justified on three.counts. It is a large urban area with a 
variety of social and economic problems; acute hospital 
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services are spread between three sites~ posing serious planning 
problems; and the need to commission the new Freeman Road 
hospital has been a major constraint on the Authority's 
operations. The facilities taken over by Newcastle AHA (T) 
in 1974 are shown in figure 7.1. Two points should be borne 
in mind in considering subsequent events. Although the closure 
of several hospitals had been proposed in the Hospital Plan 
(Ministry of Health, 1962, 17-19), at issue here is the way 
in which some closures came about. Secondly,there exist 
some problems of evidence in that no clear statement of the 
Authority's intentions was available prior to the publication 
(in 1977) of their first Strategic Plan (Newcastle AHA (T), 
1977) though occasional references in the Authority's minutes 
partly close this gap. 
The AHA (T) inherited a situation in which certain on-going 
capital developments were likely severely to limit their scope 
for manoeuvre. Thus the commissioning of Freeman Road hospital 
was seen as a ' conditioning factor' (7.6) by the Authority. 
Other capital projects - a new Ward Block at the RVI, and the 
new Dental School - would also create intensive pressures on 
the AHA (T) 's resources,and the expansion of the University 
Medical School would necessitate rapid progress in the re-
development of the RVI (Newcastle AHA (T), 1977, 10). Against 
this background, the Authority sought to close certain periph-
eral hospital units, namely the Walker Park, Sanderson, Fleming 
and Babies' Hospitals (see figure 7.1). Thus the AHA(T) 
emphasised the difficulties of retaining the specialist 
facilities of the Fleming Children's Hospital; it was not worth 
upgrading or reproviding services on a constricted and - in 
relation to the rest of the city's hospitals - isolated site 
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(7.7). The initial impetus for the closure of the Walker Park 
and Babies' hospitals can be traced to the effects of 
financial stringency in late 1976. In attempting to avoid 
closures, the AHA(T) had considered overspending~ but came 
down in favour of balancing its books in the first year of the 
operation of cash limits (7.8). The Walker Park closure~ 
though initially temporary, was subsequently made permanent 
(7.9). Though the Fleming Hospital remains open~ its future 
is uncertain (see below). Apart from the service reductions 
imposed late 1n 1976, which also included ward closures at 
the RVI and the General Hospital (NGH), the Authority 
successfully contained expenditure within its cash limits 
in the late 1970s (7.10). 
However, the AHA(T) 's financial position deteriorated 
from mid-1979. An increase in VAT from 8% to 15%, combined 
with inflation running at 16% - 17%, was likely to cost the 
Authority some £0.5 million in 1979-1980; this burden was 
'the direct result of the government's fiscal policy' (7.11). 
Moreover, the cost of wage settlements greatly exceeded the 
assumptions on which DHSS planning had been based; the NHS 
was expected to bear the first £22 million of the excess cost. 
The sum involved_ in Newcastle AHA(T) - £279,500 -would pre-
empt the Authority's service development resources for the 
year (7 .12). It was possible for the AHA(T) to break even 
financially but its reserves would be eroded and maintenance 
work delayed (7.13). 
Against this background the Authority resolved to invest-
igate the possibility of reducing service levels to a 
position'commensurate with available resources in a way 
sensitive to the needs of the area' (7.14). Stringent cost-
saving measures were essential if savings totalling £1 million 
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over three years were to be achieved (see table 7.1 for a 
summary of the proposals for achieving this). Though there 
might be scope for manoeuvre regarding which of these proposals 
were implemented, it was emphasised that: 
'the financial situation itself and any decision 
ultimately reached by the AHA(T) concerning the levels 
of saving required, will not be subject to consultation 
and debate'. 
(7.15). 
At issue, therefore, was not the extent of the savings 
required, nor the necessity for them, but rather the way they 
were to be attained. Serious disruption of services would 
result unless these savings were achieved; they were also an 
essential prerequisite for implementation of the priority 
policies of the AHA(T) (7.16). The financial situation of the 
Authority worsened throughout late 1979, its severity being 
slightly understated as a result of significant underspendings 
at Freeman Road due to non-recruitment of staff (7.17). The 
AHA(T) therefore considered, at its meeting in December 1979, 
the implications of this situation for the development of the 
city's health services. Three major strategic issues were 
recognised: the commissioning of Freeman Road hospital; the 
problems of service organisation inherent in providing acute 
hospital services from three sites, and the priority areas 
of the service (in particular, geriatric facilities). Four 
major constraints bound the Authorityrs scope for manoeuvre: 
the grave internal financial situation; the limited prospects 
of increased allocations (whether from the government or the 
RHA); the pessimistic forecast for public expenditure (see 
section 7.2 above); and the importance of advancing the 
Authority's declared strategic objectives (7.18). Against this 
Table 7.1 
Year 
1980-81 
. 1980-::81 
1981-82 
1979-82 
Source: 
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Expendi tur.e control measures approved by 
Newcastle AHA(T). 
Measures 
(l}Good v housekeeping 1 - small 
scale economy measures. 
(!)Continuation of the above. 
(2)Closure of certain hospital 
units: 
Either 
Or 
(a)Walkergate 
- close all units and 
clear site 
(b) Close: 
- Ethel Watson 
Children 1 s home 
- West End Chest Clinic 
- Wellburn Hospital 
Estimated 
saving(£) 
50,000 
200,000 
50,000 
8,000 
50,000 
(3}Tran£fer area headquarters to 
Sanderson Hospital 50,000 
(4)Direct staffing controls 250-500,000 
(to be adjusted depending on 
progress with (1)-(3) above. 
Total 500,000 
Walkergate Hospital 
Area HQ transfer 
Continuation of (1)-(4) above 
Close remaining units from 
(2) above 
Further adjustment of direct 
staffing controls 
Introduction of further 
50,000 
15,000 
N.A. 
108,000 
250,000 
measures requiring changes in 
clinical management _procedures N .A. 
Total £1,000,000 
Newcastle AHA(T),Area Management Team 
Report to the September 1979 meeting 
of the Authority. 
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background the Authority's position was: 
'exceptionally serious ... (they) ought to take 
whatever action was necessary to keep within 
the financial limits ... the (proposed) reductions 
appeared to be very savage and would result in 
drastic cuts in services'. 
(7.19) 
Moreover~ such problems - involving, inter alia~ the 
closure of Walkergate Hospital (see table 7.1) -were emerging 
at a time when 'almost every acute service in Newcastle could 
put forward a case for extra beds' (7.20). The financial 
crisis facing the AHA(T) was therefore so grave that - despite 
the perceived necessity for service developments - the AHA(T) 
could not survive without further reductions in hospital 
services; consequently the proposed reductions in service 
provision (summarised in table 7.1) were approved (7.21). 
These reductions assumed still greater urgency early in 1980, 
when it became clear that the imposition of ad hoc and 
unplanned cuts in services might be essential: 
'(the Authority) could be forced, as part of its 
statutory duty (7.22}, to take short and medium 
term measures to combat the financial situation. 
The influence of such measures, because of their 
arbitrary nature, could well outweigh the effect 
of any measures contained in the Operational Plan 
packag~'. 
(7.23) 
Moreover, the proposed closure of Walkergate Hospital 
had become critical to the financial position of the AHA(T). 
It was argued that if this facility were retained on the 
grounds that its closure was against the interests of 
patients and public in Newcastle, this would have certain 
unintended consequences because: 
'if unplanned closures carne to pass in order to 
generate savings, (this) will be somewhat ironic 
... (because) effectively this will mean that it has 
been decid~d to support rn~intenance costs and fuel 
bills at th~ least effi~ient hospital in the area'. 
(7.24) 
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Put another way, if Walkergate was not closed? the 
service reductions that might then follow would have even more 
serious consequences for health care in Newcastle. The 
inefficiencies inherent in the retention of Walkergate were 
such that its closure would generate revenue savings on a 
scale which would materially assist the AHA(T) to stay within 
its cash limit. The vital importance of these savings was 
underlined at the May 1980 meeting of the Authority. In 
addition to an anticipated underfunding of £431,000 for 
1980-1981 (due to the likely effect of inflation), the AHA(T) 
would also have to recover overspending from the previous 
financial year totalling £520,000, as well as making the 
savings of £660,010 proposed in the Area Operational Plan; 
even without the effect of inflation, then, the required 
savings totalled £1,180,000 (7.25). In this situation, the 
more efficient use of resources would not, of itself, be 
sufficient to solve the Authority's financial problems, and: 
'apart from isolated pockets within the area, there was 
very little scope to make further savings' 
(7.26) 
Reductions in services would therefore be essential. 
Indeed these financial problems threatened to force the AHA(T) 
into direct conflict with higher levels of the NHS; it was 
argued that because of the threat to: 
'the whole financial foundation of the Authority ... 
the AHA(T) should revise its patient attitude towards 
the RHA' 
(7.27) 
As a result of a combination of persistent underfun.ding 
relative to the AHA(T) 's perceived needs and because of the 
alleged failure of the government to provide an adequate 
allowance for the effects of inflation, the AHA(T) had to 
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face the possibility of reducing services even though there 
appeared to be a clear case for their expansion. For example, 
although the improvement of geriatric care had been identified 
as a priority (7.28), the closure of Walkergate would delay 
this until services could be reprovided on the redeveloped 
Walkergate site. As the consultants in geriatric medicine 
argued: 
'the situation with regard to geriatric 
provision was already untenable ... the 
prospect of no additional beds within the 
next five years was totally unacceptable'. 
(7.29) 
This reinforces the point that irrespective of the 
proclaimed long-term benefits for the economy of the kind 
of expenditure restraint discussed here (see section 7.2), 
certain undesirable consequences were manifest locally as a 
result of the financial situation of Newcastle AHA(T). 
Indeed, if there is a common theme to the proposals for 
hospital closures in Newcastle in this period, it is the 
'inverse care' (Hart, 1971) aspect of the consequences of 
these proposals. Thus the Walker Park closure was strenuously 
9pposed on the grounds that its accident facilities were 
invaluable to those employed in the nearby riverside heavy 
industries (7.30); likewise, the Fleming Children's Hospital 
was said to be an essential specialist unit, the closure of 
which (with the concomitant dispersal of facilities and staff) 
would be against the interests of children's hospital services 
(7.31); and, as is evident from the above, the intended closure 
of Walkergate Hospital, for all its importance to the AHA(T) 's 
financial position, was seen as contradicting one of the 
Authority's main priorities. In such a situation, the AHA(T) 
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could do little other than reassure the consu:tants in 
geriatric medicine that this specialty remained an urgent 
priority (7o32) o Subsequently, however, this situation was 
eased by the RHA's agreement to provide assistance from 
regionally-held funds to facilitate the reprovision of the 
60 geriatric beds lost from Walkergate Hospital (7o3) o 
One further problem for the Authority in this period, 
related to both the themes touched upon elsewhere in this 
chapter- public expenditure restraint (section 7.2) and the 
revised hospital policy (section 7.4) -was rationalising the 
city's acute hospital facilities. These were split between 
three main sites (figure 7.1) and this problem could be re-
garded as an unintended consequence of the decision to develop 
a third hospital at Freeman Road (see chapter 10), a decision 
which, in addition to these operational problems, also had 
implications in terms of the difficulties of commissioning 
the new hospital (7.34). Indeed -as noted above- the 
Authority regarded the latter as a 'conditioning factor' on 
future hospital development (.7.35), but serious problems were 
experienced in providing the revenue funds to commission this 
facility (7. 36). The AHA(T) was placed in an extremely 
difficult position in this respect. Though it had long been 
recognised that the revenue for the new hospital could be 
provj_ded only if 'compensating reductions and closures' were 
made elsewhere in the area (Newcastle AHA(T), 19.77, 10) the 
necessity for such closures had become more urgent as a result 
of restraints orr the resources available to the AHA(T) (see 
above). Despite the fact that these problems were in part a 
result of goverrmentfiscal policy, the Minister of Health in-
sisted that a major capital development at the RVI - the new 
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440-bed ward block - could proceed only if, as a gui~ro quo, 
the AHA(T) gave assurances that Freeman Road would be commission-
ed as soon as possible. However, there was no indication from 
the Minister that additional revenue funds would be available 
to facilitate the commissioning process(7.37). In this 
situation, the RHA offered the AHA (T) a 'growth allocation' 
of an additional £2.5 million to cover the cost of bringing 
into use the 169 empty beds at Freeman Road (7.38). 
Even without the problems of obtaining agreement on the 
development of the RVI, there were still serious difficulties 
in developing a strategy for acute hospital provision. The 
final proposals of the committee investigating this problem 
are not yet ~ertain, but it is worth concluding this section 
with an outline of the constraints under which future hospital 
development in Newcastle will take place, and of the pre-
liminary ideas for this development. 
Irrespective of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the Freeman Road Hospital, there had been some measure of 
agreement within Newcastle AHA(T) that while - ideally - only 
two major general hospitals should continue to exist, this 
was an unattainable objective in anything but the very long-
term (7.39). Any attempt to rationalise acute services had, 
therefore, to be premised on the continued existence of three 
major facilities of approximately equal size; otherwise, there 
would be planning blight on any hospital with significantly 
fewer beds than the others (with consequent implications for 
staff morale) (7.40). Moreover~ plans were restrained by 
government policy limiting the size of hospitals (see section 
7.4) so that any solution involving facilities in excess of 
circa 800 beds would not be feasible. In addition, since 
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hospital services from three· sites~ and the fact that they 
arose could be taken as a vindication of the arguments of 
Freeman Road's opponents (see chapter 10 for further details). 
Irrespective of such an interpretation~ the evidence presented 
here supports the claims of chapter 3 concerning the character 
of state intervention and this will be examined in the con-
cluding section of this chapter~ following a discussion of 
recent developments in hospital policy. 
7.4 'The future pattern of hospital provision in England 
and Wales ': its rhetoric, .rationale and implementation. 
Though this chapter has stressed continuities in 
attitudes to p~blic expenditure between Labour and Conservative 
governments, one issue worthy of close investigation pertains 
to the Conservative government alone, namely their revision 
of policy on hospital size (DHSS~ 1980a). This section first 
of all outlines the rationale for reviewing policy on hospital 
size and summarises the proposals for doing so. The comments 
of NHS planners are then used to analyse this document in more 
depth, paying particular_attention to the policy's underlying 
logic, its selective character, and its implications for future 
hospital development. 
In its rhetoric, the docmnent (DHSS, 1980a) appealed to 
the advantages of small hospitals vis-a-vis DGHs, and to the 
need for greater flexibility and scope for local initiative in 
planning. Small hospitals were preferred because they 
facilitated staff recruitment and had better relationships 
with the local community; by contrast, DGHs were impersonal, 
relatively inaccessible and administratively complex. Moreover, 
the NH$ could not afford to lose physical assets; because 
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of pressure on acute serv~ces, patients 'not needing the full 
panoply of investigation and treatment' could be catered for 
in peripheral hospitals. Thus the document, at least in its 
rhet?ric, appealed to a 'small is beautiful' ideology 
(Schumacher,1973 ; Illich, 1976) and stressed the virtues of 
decentralisation and local initiative. Small hospitals were 
therefore to be retained 'wherever sensible and practicable', 
and the scale of future hospital provision would be limited. 
Thus the'major hospital' in each health district would possess 
450-600 beds, with up to 200 additional beds in regional or 
subregional specialties. To assist in this, psychiatric and 
geriatric provision in the major hospital would be limited, 
and indeed it was possible that acute services would be provided 
on more than one site. Hence more hospitals will be retained 
and, since this could lead to higher running costs (due to 
service duplication and staff movements), the DHSS urged that 
it is essential that: 
'the financial premium to be paid for more 
hospitals on more sites is properly assessed 
in advance ... it follows that the Department does 
not regard these proposals as a means to secure 
a reduction in planned capital expenditure'. 
(7.43) 
Thus the emphasis in policy has shifted from a concen-
tration of services in a small number of single-site DGHs, to 
a more spatially decentralised pattern of provision. 
However, RHAs and AHAs felt that an inadequate case had 
been made for a review of policy. The Northern RHA claimed 
that the case was 'thinly argued and unconvincing' (7.44), 
justifying its proposals by reference to 'non-specific 
observations and sweeping generalisations' (7.45). Support 
for small hospitals was 'emotional rather than rational' 
(7.48), being based on 'the instant judgement that small is 
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beautiful' (7o47) o Moreover~ several arguments favouring, for 
instance, a more decentralised pattern of services, had become 
part of the conventional wisdom; yet, on closer examination, 
'they have no real substance' (7.48). The case presented 
thus relied on generalisation and assertion~ rather than evidence 
and sound argument. 
There were also clear inconsistencies in the document's 
arguements. The maximum hospital size would be 600 beds if 
only district specialties were provided, but, if subregional 
and regional specialties were to be available, 200 additional 
beds would be permitted. This coula be taken to mean that: 
'the communications, management and other problems 
which should be used as a basis to restrict hospital 
size will not occur in a hospital of ove~ 600 ti~ds 
provided that any additional beds are in regional 
or subregional specialties'. · 
(7.49) 
The distinction between the two maxima is thus spurious 
and the Northern RHA felt that if the policy was really about 
hospital size, the DHSS would have done better to_specify 
a 600-800 bed size range, ~rrespective of the specialties of 
the beds' (7 o 50) . 
In addition, although the Minister of Health was wary of 
setting up a rigid or inflexible policy (7.51), it was still 
£elt that insufficient consideration had been given to the 
'immense variations in local circumstances' to which the policy 
would have to be applied (7.52). Indeed, flexible planning may 
not actually have been a priority. Before the document's 
publication, RHAs had been required to review major hospital 
planning schemes, 'on the assumption that the new initiatives 
will b~ accepted as a prescriptive policy; and are right' 
(7.53). How.ever, the document's weakness had created a 
'climate o£ suspicion' (7.54) for two reasons. Firstly, in 
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an area requiring over 600 beds~ the implied dispersal of 
services would increase both staff and patient travel and the 
complexities of service organisation (7.55). Secondly~ if 
hospital units fell below the minimum size specified by the 
Royal Colleges of Medicine for staff training purposes~ it 
would not be possible to provide all the facilities of a DGH 
on one site hence a poor 'mix' of facilities could result 
(7.56). Consequently the new policy could be detrimental to 
patient care. 
Moreover, the document was selective in the options 
included and excluded; it referred neither to providing 
hospitals in communities which do not currently possess them, 
nor to the possibility of redeveloping existing facilities. 
The latter could be seen as a 'manifest requirement' of future 
policy given the condition of much of the hospital stock, 
whereas the former was an 'inescapable consequence' 6f the 
document's logic (7.57). Since both options would involve 
heavy capital investment, it could be argued that, despite 
assertions to the contrary, the underlying intention was to 
justify the restraint of capital expenditure. 
Finally, the confusion created by the document is 
exemplified by the following: 
'the policy document is as remarkable for what it 
omits as what it actually says ... (it may have) 
little rational basis, deriving prim::tri.ly £rom 
considerations of political acceptability and 
popularity' . 
(J. 58) 
Indeed, the document's outcomes were likely to diverge 
from its aims. Thus multi-site DGHs were favoured in urban 
areas, yet these would be subject to all the disadvantages 
put .forward as reasons for moving away .from large-scale DGH 
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development (7.59). In rural areas, where accessibility is 
of prime importance, there is no guarantee that the new policy 
would improve this. Indeed, it could have precisely the 
opposite effect, since only a limited range of services could 
be provided in each of a dispersed set of facilities. 
As for the effect of this document on the policy of the 
Northern RHA, only six acute hospitals exceed the 600-bed 
maximum size; these are the three main hospitals in Newcastle, 
and the Sunderland General, North Tees General and Darlington 
Memorial Hospitals, and all possess regional or subregional 
specialties. The new policy was to prove an important 
constraining factor on the development of hospital strategy 
in Newcastl~ (s~e section 7.3), Sunderland (see Ch~pter 10) 
and Cleveland, where the South Cleveland DGH development was 
scaled down from 1200 to 832 beds (7.60). However, proposals 
for Gateshead and North Tyneside AHAs were approved only when 
the retention of a small hospital had been agreed in order to 
keep the size of the main_ facility to around 600 beds. Thus 
the original aim had been to develop the DGH in North Tyneside 
to 686 beds, but approval was given to this only after the 
retention of Moor Park Hospital was agreed,so as to keep the 
size of the DGH to 630 beds (7.61). Similarly, plans for 
development in Gateshead were endorsed on condition that Whinney 
House Hospital was retained as a community hospital, for 
similar reasons (7.62). This 'somewhat shallow' basis for a 
policy review supported the claims of local administrators 
that, despite its rhetoric about flexibility and decentral-
isation, the policy revision was essentially a thinly argued 
case for .restraining capital expenditure (7.63). The 
prescr-iptive application of the policy supported such a view 
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(7 .64) 0 
Finally? a comparison of this document with the 1962 
Hospital Plan illuminates the changing character of state 
intervention in health care provision. The Hospital Plan 
emphasised the scope for rationalising NHS current expen-
diture via the provision of a system of modern? -efficient and 
large-scale (600-800 beds and above) DGHs. This was based 
on several studies not only of NHS bed norms but also of the 
economics of hospital planning. By contrast, the substance of 
the comments of NHS planners on the 1980 document (summarised 
here) was that this policy guidance relied on relatively 
weak arguments and unsupported assertions. Taken in con-
junction with the application of the policy, it seems that the 
underlying rationale is the restriction of new capital expen-
diture, consistent with the broader macro-economic intentions 
of the current government. While the 1962 Plan advocated 
a minimum DGH size of 600-800 beds, this had become a maximum 
size range by 1980, with rather different implications in 
terms of the amount, quality and spatial pattern of hospital 
provision. Figure 7.3 shows that the likely outcome of 
current policies will be a rather more decentralised spatial 
pattern of services than that originally envisaged 
figure _7..4). Thus while both the documents referred to were, 
in a sense, concerned with public expenditure restraint, they 
attempted . to achieve this in different ways. Whereas the 
Hospital Plan sought to improve the efficiency of the hospital 
service by rationalisation and new construction, the 1980 
document attempts to deny claims for new capital developments 
and encourages retention of the existing capital stock, as far 
as is possible. These different policies are indicative of 
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broader changes in attitudes to public e.xpend.i ture during the 
1962-1980 period. At the time the Hospital Plan was announced, 
public expenditure was viewed as one of the most important 
mechanisms available for economic management; by contrast, 
current attitudes are such as to question the utility of public 
expenditure, leading to attempts to restrain it via the kind 
of policy discussed here. 
7.5 Concluding comments 
The foregoing discussion presented, firstly, a summary 
o.f important developments related to public expenditure and 
NHS planning, in order to provide an appropriate context 
against which to interpret the empirical evidence of sections 
7.3 and 7.4. The former of these demonstrated the problems 
posed for local planners by public expenditure reductions and/ 
or restraint; the latter analysed the most recent changes in 
policy on hospital size. The following points should be 
emphasised. 
Firstly, this period was essentially one of retrenchment 
and crisis in NHS planning. This was manifest from the 
level of central government, graphically exemplified by the 
quote from Barbara Castle (1980, 359~360- see section 7.2), 
down to the local scale (exemplified by events in Newcastle 
AHA(T)). Indeed, as the fiscal crisis of the state deepened 
in the late 1970s, as a result of a combination of rapid 
inflation and government fiscal policy, the limits to state 
intervention were increasingly evident. References in the 
minutes of the Newcastle AHA.(T) to the lack of scope for 
manoeuvre .of the Authority, to the impossibility of solving 
its problems simply by more _,·.efficient management, and to 
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the need for reductions in service provision despite the 
manifest requirements of the AHA(T) ~ all support such an 
interpretation. In Offe's (1975b~ 246) terminology, the 
necessary had indeed become impossible and the impossible 
necessary. 
It is evident~ furthermore, that notwithstanding the 
declared intentions of certain state policies, their objective 
impacts diverge from these aims. Cash limit policies 
exemplify this; initially introduced as a means of ensuring 
tighter control over public expenditure, they have increasing-
ly been employed to set definite targets outside which 
expenditure must not stray. This in turn - particularly in 
the last three years (due to increased VAT and inflation) - has 
led to volume cuts in services, contradicting the declared 
intentions of the Conservative government that NHS spending 
should be maintained in real terms. Moreover, when service 
reductions have resulted, responsibility for their implemen-
tation has been devolved to the local levels of NHS admin-
istration. Consistent though this is with the government's 
declared intention of increased decentralisation in adminis-
tration, it is disturbing that this occurs given that such 
reductions (as Newcastle AHA stressed- see quote 7.11 above) 
were the direct consequence of government fiscal policy. It 
is interesting to contrast this with the employment of the 
revised hospital policy in a prescriptive manner, to constrain 
capital development at the local level, despite the proclaimed 
intention of this policy to increase scope for local autonomy 
in planning. 
A further important point to emphasise here is the 
changing character of state intervention in the economy. This 
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is best exemplified by reference to the contrast between the 
Hospital Plan and most recent developments in policy. The 
increasingly technical character of NHS resource allocation 
and planning (see DHSS, 1976a, b, c) also falls into this 
category and this can best be seen as an attempt by the state 
to reduce political issues to technical problems, in the 
face both of expenditure restraint and increased demands on 
the service. Though their implications for provision of and 
access to health care have not been considered directly, 
the expansion of the independent hospitals, and the anti-
collectivist philosophy of the 'new right' (Taylor-Gooby, 1981) 
also exemplify the changing character of state intervention 
and its consequences for public sector provision. Clearly 
the implications of such policies require more detailed 
analysis. 
The final issue to be noted here concerns the selective 
character of state policy formulation. This is evident, at 
the most general level, in the rolling back of the boundaries 
of the state intervention since 1979. More specifically, 
the role of ideology has evidently been crucial in terms of 
its influence on attitudes to public expenditure and to 
public service provision which have increasingly been seen 
as a burden on capital accumulation and as an inefficient way 
of providing services. Consistent with such attitudes are 
policies which exclude certain options from consideration -
for instance, the revised hospital policy (7.4). 
Thus the evidence presented has illustrated the 
consequences of public expenditure restraint for health 
se.rvice and hospital planning in the 1974-1982 period, and has 
provided further evidence in support of the views advanced 
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above co~ccrning the capitalist stateo The characterisation 
of the state's interventions as being selective in nature, 
increasingly crisis-prone and changing in character over time, 
seems particularly apposite in this lighto 
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8. Issues in spatial policy and hospital planning 
in postwar North East England. 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, 
an account is presented of important issues in intra-regional 
spatial policy. This facilitates an understanding of why 
the issues discussed at greater length here (and in Chapters 
9 and 10) ar~ of particular interest. The~reasons for the 
designation of Washington and Peterlee new towns, and for 
the proposals for urban redevelopment in Newcastle, are 
therefbr~ discussed in section 8.2. The pjoblems posed for 
hospital planning by new town development are examined (section 
8.3), and the links between the urban redevelopment of New-
castle and hospital planning are analysed in section 8.4 
8.2 Intra-regional spatial policy in N6rth Ea~t 
England: a brief sketch. 
More comprehensive accounts of this topic are available 
(Carney and Hudson, 1974;1976;1978; Hudson,l976) and here 
only two issues are discussed. These are proposals for settle-
ment concentration policies and new town development and, 
secondly, the view of the Hailsham Report (Board of Trade, 
1963) that a spatial concentration of p1:1blic sector investment 
was a prerequisite for industrial regeneration in the North 
East. 
Proposals for settlement concentration within the North 
East cart be traced to a consensus view, established among 
the region's bourg~oisie_in the 1930s (Carney and Hudson, 1978), 
that the future of industry in the region depended on 
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guaranteeing a sufficie~t supply of male labour in certain 
locations. Likewise, the influential Pepler-MacFarlane 
Report (Pepler and MacFarlane, 1949) argued that future 
settlement patterns would have to be geared to the attraction 
of male-employing industry to replace jobs lost in the region'~ 
declining basic industries. Thus: 
'the framing of industrial policy is outside 
our provenance. All we can ~o is endeavour 
to fit that policy to the,£acts of the land 
in a rri'anner whic.h will serve· the needs of 
in:dust'ryand ... secure for the people art 
environment appropriate for good living'. 
(Pepler and MacFarlane, 1949, 22 - emp~asis added) 
Future industrial development would also require a 
'wholesale expansion of public services' and<! modernisation 
of the existing infrastructure (Pepler and MacFarlane, 1949, 
22). Populations of a certain minimum size were necessary to 
guarantee the provision of this infrastructure. This implied 
concentrating public investment and industrial development 
at selected locations. It was assumed that the requisite 
labour force would move to the areas specified, given suitable 
employment opportunity and a modern environment (Pepler and 
MacFarlane, 1949, 63, 267-268). Such views were translated -
in County Durham - into specific proposals in the County 
Development Plan (Durham CC, 1951). This advocated a fourfold 
categorisation of settlements, based on an assessment of their 
potential £or future industrial growth. Public sector invest-
ment would be concentrated in certain locations deemed to 
possess potential for future growth, while other settlements 
were denied such investment on the grounds that their 'viability' 
would be threatened by future socio-economic and demographic 
changes (Durham CC, 1951). 
The implementation of settlement concentration policies 
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is not discussed further here (see Blackman, 1981; Carney 
and Hudson, 1976; Snowdon, 1979). However, one way the more 
general objectives of settlement concentration could be 
achieved was via new town development. The designation as 
a new town of Peterlee (and, later, of Washington) has to 
be set against the background of the more general acceptance 
of new towns as a policy instrument. 
Proposals for new town development date back at least 
to the 19th century. They stemmed partly from enlightened 
self interest on the part of industrialists, and partly from 
idealistic visions of an alternative society (Shaffer, 1970; 
Robins~n, 1978). However, the potential value of new towns 
in spatial policy was not recognised until the Barlow Report 
(Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial 
Population, 1940). Subsequently the Greater Londm,Plan 
(Abercrombie, 1944) advocated such developments as part of a 
policy of metropolitan decentralisation, and the Reith Committee 
(New Towns Committee, 1946) put forward influential proposals. 
Thus n:ew towns were to be run by Development Corporations 
(NTDCs) which, though charged with a range of functions, were 
given no statutory power for health service provision. Nor 
was appropriate administrative machinery set up to guarantee 
cooperation between NTDCs and other statutory organisations. 
Joint planning between NTbCs and other organisations has 
therefore been ad hoc in character. Although new towns and 
the NHS were set up and developed together, the mutual benefits 
have been minimal. The relationship between the NHS and other 
statutory agencies will receive more detailed examination 
below. 
New.towns could be developed in two sets of 
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circumstances: to facilitate decentralisation (e.g. the London 
new towns) and to concentrate population in areas of dispersed 
settlement. Peterlee was ultimately to be chosen to fulfil 
the latter function. The recommended size of new towns 
(30-50~000) represented a compromise between being large enough 
to support social facilities and provide a sufficiently large 
labour force for industrial development~ and being small enough 
to provide a sense of community. As regards economic and 
social objectives the attraction of stable male employment was 
a key go~l, and was essential if new towns were not to become 
dormi: tory towns. Social goals, by contrast, were often vague 
'"" 
and idealistic; moreover~ given that no legislative action was 
taken to ensure the cooperation of other relevant planning 
agencies~ it is perhaps not surprising that there is a con-
siderable gap between the stated intentions and actual results 
of new town development (Robinson, 1978, 29). The above 
represents only asketch of the origins of new towns (see, 
inter a).ia Shaffer, 1970; Robinson, 1978; Wirz, 1975)" The 
specific factors underlying the development of Peterl.ee are 
now examined, drawing on the commentaries of Steele (1962), 
Leishman (1971) and Robinson (1978). 
Initial proposals for new town development in the 
Easington area emerged within the Easington RDC between the 
wars, not only as a means of avoidir1g 'sprawl' and 'Tibbon 
development', but also because several local villages lacked, 
or were likely to be deprived of, an economic base due to mine 
clo,sures. Initially, growth in mor.e than one centre was 
favoured., but it subsequently became clear that development 
wa.s to ta~e pla.ce on only one site. This was due, in large 
measure, to the influence of C.W. Clarke, the clerk to Eas~ngton 
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RDC. He had actively puTsUed the case for n~w town develop-
ment as a means of reformi:n,g social and eco.nomic conditions 
in the Easington area. Improved living conditions for miners 
were seen as essential if an adequate labour force was to be 
retained for coal .mining; the quality of the built environment 
had been perceived as a hindrance to recruitment (Clarke~ 1947). 
Backed by the RDC, Clarke pursued this matter with the 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning. The latter proved 
receptive, both because of the extent of local support and the 
perceived necessity to guarantee coal supplies. The new town 
of Peterlee was designated in March 1948; its target population 
was 30,000, and it was seen as a future urban focus for the 
Easington area, offering services which, it was felt, could 
not be provided economically in the surrounding pit villages. 
The extent to which this intention was realised, in the context 
of hospital planning, will be examined below. 
The next major issue for consideration here is the 
emergence·of the Hailsham Report in 1963, though this is not to 
imply that no developments took place in intra,-.regional spatial 
policy in the 1950s. New towns received slightly less direct 
support from the Conservative government (elected 1n 1951), who 
preferred financial backing for such developments to be 
provided jointly by local authorities and central government, 
undeT the terms of the 1952 Town .Development Act (Huds,on, 1976, 
101; Leishman, 1971, 66). Settlement concentration policies 
were still pursued, but there was no real attempt to steer 
industrial development toward-s specific locations within the 
region; the whole of the North-East coalfield was accorded 
.Development Area status (McCrone, 1969). 
How.ever, a rather different policy was pursued in the. early 
1960s. The potential for long-term planning of the economy, 
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involving explicit use of public sector investment as an 
instrument of economic management had been recognised in the 
late 1950s (Jessop, 1980). One aspect of this was the emergence 
of specific public sector investment pro·posals for North-East 
England. The appointment of Lord Hailsham as .. Minister with 
special responsibility for the North-East reflected government 
concern at the unemployment rate in the region (4% in January 
1963). The report which followed Hailsham's appointment 
advocated a rapid rise in public sector investment, in order 
to modernise the region's social and economic infrastructure, 
and thus facilitate industrial development. In particular, the 
urban environment was to receive special attention; within the 
overall 'growth zone' Jxrunded by the coast, the Al and the three 
industrial estuaries of the region) investment was to be con-
centrated on specific locations, (Board of Trade, 1963, 6-7). 
Thus Newcastle was seen as a regional capital which was to 
play a central role in assisting in - even leading - the 
modernisation of the North East. The following is illustrative 
of this view: 
'In a region in the midst of changing its economic 
base, the capital city must be· at th-e head of renewal 
and in the forefront of providingwhat modern man 
expects in a modern environment'. 
(Burns , 19 6 7 , 2) . 
The absorption and promulgation of this kind of view by 
parties to the dispute over hospital strategy for Newcastle, 
had significant effects on the type of policies advanced and 
upon the progress of negotiations in this dispute (see below; ~e 
also chapters 9,10). 
A second growth point (within the growth zone referred_ to) 
was to be Washington new town. This had been proposed as a 
potential new town site in the Pepler-Macfarlane Report, but 
· ..•.. ·· 
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definite support for such a development was not forthcoming 
until the late 1950s, when Durham CC propbs.ed that industrial 
development should take place in the vicinity of Washington, 
to cater for the growing population of north-east Durham. 
Leishman (1971, 65) argues that this reflected not so much 
the Council's desire to improve the built environment of that 
area, but rather its concern that it would los~ its large 
towns on the industrial estuaries in a future local government 
reorganisation. Industrial development at Washington would 
therefore partially compensate for the resultant loss of rates 
income. These initial proposals for new town development were 
not received favourably, on the grounds that Washington,being 
located in between Tyneside and Wearside, could not form a 
self-contained community (Leishman, 1971, 67). However, the 
Hailsham Report rejected such a view on the grounds that a new 
town at Washington would 'help to stimulate faster progress in 
raising the scale and quality of the region's u~ban dev~lopment 
generally' (Board of Trade, 1963, 27). Washington thus ex-
emplifies a policy of uneven intra-regional development which 
was justified in terms of the reduction of inter-regional 
differentials (Hudson, 1982, 667). Following the approval of 
the Hailsham Report, Washington was designated as a new town 
early in 1964. 
The foregoing brief sketch of issues in spatial policy 
within postwar north-east England has outlined points which 
relate directly to postwar hospital planning and to ehapters 
8-10 of this thesis in particular. Hence the implementation 
of (for example) the settlement concentration policy in County 
Durham, or the proposals in the Hailsham Report, have not been 
e.xamined in detail; rather this introduction is a background 
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which is necessary for a full understanding of the issues of 
local hospital policy to be discussed in the next section. 
8.3 Hospital planning and new town development: 
the cases of Peterlee and Washington 
In discussing the interrelationship between hospital 
planning and the development of new towns the policy intentions 
of NHS and other state agencies will be examined closely. 
Areas of divergence and convergence of intentions will be high-
lighted. This account is somewhat exploratory in character, 
due largely to the relative paucity of the evidence available. 
At the time of the Hospital Surveys, considerable in-
decision existed as to the future form and organisation of the 
postwar hospital services (see chapter 4). Consequently the 
surveyors could not commit themselves on what developments 
were most appropriate. However, their views on the problems 
of planning in North-East England show consistentcy with the 
proposals advanced at that time for settlement planning. 
Thus: 
'the future prospects of industry in the 
North-East are still uncert~in, and the 
possibility that there may be important 
changes in the size of the population must 
be taken into account in any reorganisation 
of the hospital service ... plans for ... 
(such a reorganisation) must not be too rigid'. 
Ministry of Health, 1946 (volui·ne 10) ,4). 
Note, in particular, the argument that changes in pop~ 
ulation distribution within the region were necessarily 
dependent upon the 'prospects of industry' - a view which 
closely parallels the rationale for the settlement concen-
tration proposals discussed above. Of the population changes 
at which this document hinted, the most important developments 
have been associated with the growth of new towns,in particular 
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at Peterlee and Washington. The reasons for the choice of 
these locations have been sketched in the previous section. 
Her ·e the response to the development of these towns is 
'-
examined. Figure 8.1 shows the location of Peterlee and 
Washington in relation to existing hospital facilities; though 
the two new towns were designated at different dates, only 
minor changes took place in the availability of hospital 
facilities and these are indicated on the map. 
The Hospital Surveyors proposed serving the Peterlee 
Easington area from hospitals at Sunderland and Hartlepool 
(Ministry of Health, 1946, 59, 90). This preceded the 
designation of Peterlee, but it soon became evident that the 
RHB were interested in providing a hospital there. For 
example, four possible sites had been identified in a pre-
liminary meeting on hospital development, though subsidence 
would delay the availability of two of these for at least 
15 years (8.1). Peterlee was actually regarded as the RHB's 
third highest priority for development, following the West 
Cumberland and Bedlington areas (8.2). The RHB argued that the 
population of the Peterlee and Easingtort area were not receiving 
an adequate service if they had to travel to Sunderland where, 
in any case, the hospitals were already under pressure (8.3). 
The RHB therefore agreed to provide a 300-bed general hospital, 
capable of expansion to 500 beds (8.4). 
However, the conflicting intentions of the RHB, the NCB 
and the NTDC were to hinder this proposal's implementation. At 
the time of Peterlee's designation, a substantial amount of 
coal remained to be extracted from seams beneath the site and, 
if subsidence was to be avoided in the new town, it was 
essential that this be recovered quickly. In conveying land to 
the NTDC, the NCB had insisted that their approval be sought 
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for future sutface developments. Clearly, construction of a 
large building such as a hospital would demand particular 
caution with regard to choice of site. The details of the 
negotiations between the NCB and the NTDC are not directly 
relevant here (on these, see Robinson, 1978; Steele, 1962, 
107-152) but by late 1953 the NCB was in arrears with its 
programme for coal extraction. This would delay the availa-
bility of the site previously offered to the RHB, but the same 
land could be used almost immediately for light structures, 
such as housing. It was likely that the RHB would not be able 
to provide a hospital for some time due to constraints on the 
resources available for capital development (see Chapter 5 ) . 
The NTDC were therefore anxious not to leave an 'undeveloped 
hold' in Peterlee (8.5). They were also keen to minimise 
disturbances to and restrictions on the extraction of coal; 
unless they achieved this, they 'could hardly expect much help 
from the NCB' (8.6). Thus while the NTDCs wished to devel9p 
social provision in Peterlee, this was subordinate to the 
requirements of the NCB to maximise coal production; the RHB 
were therefore offered an ~lternative site which they accepted 
(8.4). 
Thus, although Peterlee had been a high priority for hospital 
development in the early postwar years, this development had 
not occurred. due largely to constraints on capital investment in 
the NHS. Uncertainty also existed as to the site to be occupied 
by the proposed hospital. However, Peterlee evidently slipped 
down the list of the RHB's priorities in the late 1950s. The 
reasons for this are not clear; the slow growth of Peterlee 
may haye been a contributory factor, and there were also 
pressures to give a higher priority to other areas served by 
the RHB - such as Teesside (8.8). Changing attitudes to the 
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size of general hospitals (see Chapter 5) may also have 
swayed the RHB against Peterlee and~ as the RHB pointed out, 
there already existed four hospitals close to Peterlee (8.9) 
(see figure 8.1). In the NTDC's opinion, however? the 
continued existence of such facilities contradicted the aim o£ 
developing Peterlee as a service centre for the_Easington area 
and, indeed, was at variance with settlement concentration 
policies more generally (8.10). Though the RHB attempted to 
placate the NTDC by indicating their willingness to provide 
consultative outpatient facilities in a health centre (8.11), 
the NTDC objected to this on the grounds that they had reserved 
a site for a hospital for several years and this had influenced 
Peterlee's development (8.12). Subsequently~ indeed, the NTDC 
informed the RHB that the site they had reserved might no longer 
be available should it be required at a later date (8.13). The 
RHB's view, however, was that while population growth had 
taken place in the Easington/Peterlee area, it had been dis-
tributed evenly between HMCs (table 8.1), and so there was no 
case for additional development in any one HMC. Furthermore, 
the rundown of the coal industry from 1958 (see Krieger, 1979) 
and the 'uncertain' prospects for the attraction o£ other 
sources of local employment, combined to make it uncertain 
whether the anticipated population growth in the Easington 
area would materialise (8.14). Although the population of the 
Shotton/Peterlee area were the most~distant from a general 
hospital (in the area under consideration, 80% (109500) 
were between 5 and .7~ miles from a hospital, whereas appro_x-
imately 20% (24,620) were 8-10~ miles from their nearest general 
hospita.l), the RHB claimed that the apparent ~nequality in 
access was. compensated for by the position of Shotton/Peterlee 
in between HMCs. Hence greater choice was available. Thus the 
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Table 8.1 Summarised population estimates for HMC 
catchment areas in East Durham, 
1954-1959. 
HMC Registrar- Registrar- Change 
Area General's General's +I-
Estimated Estimated 
1954 1959 
Population Population 
Sunderland 359,400 371,380 +11,980 
Durham 133,740 136,480 + 2,740 
Hartlepools 133,620 138,625 + 5,005 
North Teesside 141,770 149,530 + 7,760 
768,530 796,015 +27,485 
Source: 
RHB Report on Hospital Provision £or Peterlee: 
Po ulation changes and local travel £acilities 
in the a~ea, 16.12.60 - held in RHB 47 A, 
volume 1. 
Per cent 
(%) 
Change I 
+/-
+3.3 
+2.0 
+3.7 
+5.4 
+3.6 
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RHB considered that the evidence did not justify developing 
a new hospital in the Peterlee area (8.15). Following the 
Hospital Plan (Ministry of Health~ 1962) it was evident that 
Peterlee could not be considered as a potential DGH, purely 
on the basis of the relatively small catchment population of 
such a facility. However, the RHB were still attempting to 
provide consultative outpatient services at a health centre 
in Peterlee; pressures for this had not only resulted from the 
RHB's desire to see some sort of hospital provision in Peterlee~ 
but also from local pressures (8.16), not least among which 
were those from GPs concerned at the necessity to employ over-
seas doctors in the Peterlee area, due to the difficulty of 
attracting British GPs (8.17). Subsequently, the RHB continued 
to consider schemes for outpatient provision (8.18) and the 
Peterlee health centre ultimately provided such services. 
However~ the question of hospital provision did not reappear 
on the political agenda until the late 1970s (see Chapters 9,10). 
Since the Peterlee case shares certain common features with 
developments at Washington, these developments are now discussed. 
Prior to Washington's designation, the Sunderland HMC 
did not regard Washington UDC as an area to be served by their 
hospitals; only 33 patients from that area had been treated in 
Sunderland HMC's hospitals during 1960 (8.19). As formally 
stated in the Hospital Plan, and confirmed by local NHS planning 
agencies (8.20), major DGH developments were to take place at 
Sunderland DGH and Ryhope (see figure 6.2). However~ following 
Washington's designation, a RHB document noted the possibility 
that a third DGH could be required~ depending on Washington's 
growth (8.21). The Ministry of Health endorsed this in suggest-
ing that Sunderland HMC's planning population be modified (8.22). 
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The RHB's initial reluctance to consider providing a hospital 
in Washington seems to have stemmed from their concern that 
there was no 'natural drainage' of population to Washington. A 
hospital in that town would therefore have only a limited 
catchment population and it would not relieve the pressure on 
the two other DGHs in Sunderland HMC (8.23). 
However, the RHB subsequently revised their opini6n, 
partly because of the anticipated population growth in 
Washington (8.24),and partly because of the lack of alternative 
sites within the HMC. The RHB still had reservations due to 
the relatively low population which such a hospital would 
serve (8.25) but perhaps a crucial factor in encouraging them 
to develop a hospital at Washington was the possibility that 
Washington's population might seek hospital facilities in 
Gateshead (the DGH there -(the Queen Elizabeth HospitaD-being 
only three miles from Washington - figure 8.1) if a hospital 
was not available in the new town. This would be a 'serious 
embarrassment' to the RHB, as it would greatly overload the 
capacity of Gateshead HMC's hospitals (8.26). Hence the RHB's 
provisional agreement to the development of a hospital in 
Washington (8.21). 
However, and as at Peterlee, the precis~ timing of such 
a development remained open to question; it could not be 
accorrillodated within the RHB's ten-year capital prograrr~c (8.28). 
For the NTDC this posed the problem of 'sterilising' 30 to 40 
acres of land; it was likely that there would be considerable 
pressure on the NTDC to release this, particularly if the proposed 
rapid growth of Washington actually took place. As a compromise 
the RHB,. expressed an interest in experimenting with alternative 
arrangements for health servi~e provision (see below). Two 
other issues also concerned the RHB, namely, the proposed 
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ultimate size of the town and the location of the site to be 
occupied by the hospital. 
The RHB were particularly concerned that Washington might 
never reach its projected size. Its target population 
- 80,000 - was seen as an tipper limit to growth, and the RHB 
were especially concerned about the following observation in the 
Master Plan for Washington: 
' it must be largely a matter· o·f sp·eculation 
how much of the migration to Washington ... 
will be made up of overspill' 
(Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks, and Co., 1966, 40 
emphasis added) 
For instance, some of the intended overspill from Wearside 
was unlikely to materialise because of a decision to build 
Silksworth township to cater for overspill from Sunderland 
(Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks and Co. 1966, 40). The RHB therefore 
feared that the viability of a hospital in Washington would 
be threatened, as the Master Plan envisaged that it was 
unlikely that much overspill would take place in the early 
years of Washington's development (Llewelyn.,-Davies, Weeks and 
Co., 1966, 40) and so voluntary 1Iligration to the town was o£ 
paramount importance. Such migration was, by definition, 
beyond the control of the NTDC, and so the RHB felt justified 
in delaying any proposals for hospital devel6pment at 
Washington (8.29). 
The RHB also had reservations on the location of the 
hospital, preferring a central location to the peripheral site 
allocated by the Master Plan (8.30), because a central site 
would facilitate integrating the services provided by the NHS, 
and would also integrate the hospital more fully into the 
community. In addition, it would facilitate attraction o£ the 
labour £orce necessary to run the hospital. The RHB argued 
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that one implication of a national labour shortage was an 
increasing dependence upon part-time staff and this would imply 
the employment of married women. Since the time-space budgets 
of married women are constrained by their domestic responsib~ 
ili ties, a central site for the hospital would permit such won1en 
to carry out those duties requiring the facilities of the new 
town (e.g. shopping) at the beginning or the end of their 
daily professional commitments (8.31). 
However, since - as has been mentioned above - the 
construction of a hospital for Washington was unlikely to take 
place for some years, the precise services to be provided 1n 
a health centre had to be agreed upon. Though the RHB 
indicated their willingness to provide consultative outpatient 
services from a health centre (8.32), the NTDC continued to 
press the RHB for additional facilities, arguing in particular 
that maternity and accident facilities were necessary, given 
the actual and projected nature and composition of the town's 
population (8. 33) . Th-e RHB therefore considered seriously the 
possibility of providing specialist services at a health 
centre in Washington (8.34). Though this appeared to contradict 
their earlier decision on services for Peterlee - where the 
RHB had decided to provide outpatient services only (8.35) --
the evidence suggests that the RHB were willing to consider 
more flexible approaches to health seYvice provision in new 
towns. Washington therefore offered an opportunity for ex-
periment (8.36), particularly in the l~ght of the experience of 
other new towns (on which, see inter aTia, Sichel, 1969a, b; 
1970; Draper et al ,1971; Dillane, 1966; Reid and Gooding. 1975; 
Parston, 19.80) . There developed local opposition to proposals 
for such development, how.ever; though senior officials of the 
RHB were undoubtedly aniious to provide some consultative 
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or specialist facilities through a health centre (8.37), local 
medical opinion was against such a proposal. This was because 
of shortages of medical staff (so that concentration of services 
and personnel was desirable); the nearness (under five miles) 
to Washington of hospitals in the Gateshead, Durham and South 
Shields HMCs; the fact that the RHB had not endorsed similar 
proposals for Peterlee; and the complica{ons that could develop 
with staffing arrangements if the pr9posed hospital were to 
be built locally (8.38). However, it would be too simplistic 
to regard this as the view of all local representatives of the 
medical profession. Both the Durham County Executive Council 
(8.39) and the County Medical Officer stressed the value of 
locally available consultative facilities in ~ttracting 
'high quality GPs to Washington (8.40), paralleling the view 
advanced in respect of Peterlee that a similar development was 
necessary to lessen the area's dependence on overseas doctors. 
Thus the possibility of experimental forms of health service 
provision continued to be explored and the importance of such 
facilities was persistently stressed by the NTDG(8.41). While 
the RHB reiterated that full-scale hospital development in 
Washington was out of the question for at least 15 years (8.42), 
therefore, they continued to im:restiga te al ternat.i ve ways of 
providing hospital services in Washington (8.43). However, with 
the proposals oi the Bonham-Carter Report (Central Health 
Services Gquncil, 1969; see Chapter 6) which advocated a spatial 
concentration of.hospital facilities into units of 1,000 or 
more beds, it became clear that Washington (and indeed Peterlee) 
would not be considered seriously as a site for development on 
such a scaJe. Moreover, given the uncertain climate in which 
NHS planning was taking place in the late 1960s, due to the 
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possibility of NHS reorganisation, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the form to be taken by health services in Peterlee and 
Washington was not an issue for extensive public debate. 
In concluding this section, themes common to hospital 
planning for the new towns of Peterlee and 1Vashington are drawn 
together; theoretical issues will ~e considered in the con-
clusion to this chapter. Firstly, NHS planners ·are dependent 
on the population of the new town reaching a certain level before 
services are provided. In both these cases a persistent problem 
for the RHB was uncertainty as to whether these towns would 
attain their target populations. There.exist no statutory 
mechanisms to ensure that health services are provided in advance 
of full demand in new towns. Moreover, the NTDCs are not in 
a position to guarantee that new towns will achieve specified 
population targets; though they can provide both the basic 
infrastructure for industrial development, as well as housing, 
ultimately they are dependent on the decisions of both entre-
preneurs (on industrial location) and individuals (migration 
to the town ) as to whether or not the anticipated development 
takes place. 
Furthermore, land-use allocation decisions have posed 
problems for health authorities. Thus, at Peterlee, site 
availability was delayed due to a prior agreement on coal 
extraction between the NCB and the NTDC (though in fact resource 
constraints seriously limited what the RHB could achieve in any 
case), while in Washington the central site requested by the 
RHB was not made available, though, again, the RHB were willing 
to develop an alternative site. In general, NTDCs cannot be 
seen to leave large areas of land undeveloped for considerable 
periods especially when the possibility of other development 
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(such as housing, in the Peterlee case) e_xists. Given the 
constraints on the RHB's capital investment programme, then, 
it is not surprising that references were made by the NTDCs 
to 'sterilising' land (Washington) or 1 leaving an undeveloped 
hole 1 (Peterlee) o 
Finally, whatever the good intentions of health authorities, 
they are constrained not only by the p~anning problems outlined 
here but also by the amount of resources available at any one 
time for capital development, and by medical opinion on what 
kind of facilities are appropriate; the discussions on the merits 
(or otherwise) of providing hospital facilities from a health 
centre in Washington clearly illustrate this. 
The foregoing evidence, then, has illustrated the problems 
posed for the Newcastle RHB by the decisions to locate new towns 
at Washington and Peterlee. The question of whether or not to 
develop hospital facilities in these locations resurfaced in 
the late 1970s and aspects of the ensuing discussions are pre-
sented in Ch~pters 9 and 10. A further major issue in intra-
regional spatial policy is that of the urban redevelopment of 
Newcastle as a 'regional capital' o The links between this and 
hospital planning are now examined. 
8. 4 . Urban redevelopment and. hospita·l planning 
in Newca5tle upon Tyne. 
As noted above (section 8.2) an important theme in intra-
regional spatial policy in North East England has been the 
assertion that development must necessarily proceed unevenly 
within the region. It is evident that Newcastle was seen as a 
regional capital by a number of prominent local politicians. 
This can be linked to hospital planning, for there existed a 
consensus view among a variety of local politicians, planners 
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and medical professiona:s that a centraliSed development of 
hospital facilities in Newcastle was ne.cessary. Here an 
attempt is made to elucidate the connections between hospital 
planning and the intended redevelopment of Newcastle. 
A persistent theme in hospital development in the Newcastle 
RHB area was the view that the future hospital services of 
North East England should be planned around a major medical 
complex in Newcastle. This theme can be traced at least to 
wartime negotiations between several voluntary hospitals in 
Newcastle (8.44). Following these discussions, the Hospital 
Surveys proposed the development of a Hospital Centre in the 
city, whick would be achieved by coordinating the facilities of 
the RVI and six specialist hospitals. If this could be co-
ordinated successfully with that of NGH, to preve~t overlapping 
and duplication of services, Newcastle's position as a medical 
centre would be greatly enhanced (Ministry of Health, 1946 
(volume 10), 10, 14, 51, 52). Implicit in this proposal was 
the view that the Centre would dominate the region's hospital 
services (Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 10},10, 14, 51). 
Indeed Newcastle's hospitals were intended to serve a population 
over three times as great as that of the next largest hospital 
district (table 8.2). However, the immediate effect of such 
proposals in the early postwar years was minimal. The resources 
available for development were so limited (see Chapter 5) that 
the Hospital Centre project had to be 'shelved indefinitely' 
(8.45). Under the 1946 NHS Act, responsibility for Newcastle's 
hospital services was divided between the RHB and BG. However, 
not until 1955 were formal steps taken to coordinate development 
plans for the Hospital Centre (8.46). 
The concept of Newcastle as a medical capital was reaffirmed 
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Table 8.2 Proposed populations of htispit~l distticts 
in N~tth E~~t England. 
I D" . 
. J.StTlCt 
Newcastle(Z) 
Sunderland 
Middlesbrough 
Darlington 
Durham 
Population (l) 
1,243,699 
35.7' 590 
359,536 
169,985 
288_2_211 
Source: 
Ministry of Health, 1946 (volume 10). 
Notes: 
1. ·Dates to which these refer were 
not given; nor were the criteria 
on which they were assessed. 
2. This district includes Tyneside 
with Tynemouth, South Shields and 
Gateshead, Northumberland, and that 
pirt o£ County~urham lying south-west 
of Newcastle, down to Consett and 
Chester-le-Street. 
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1n the Hospital Plan (Ministry of Health, 1962, 17) and ex-
tensive negotiations subsequently took place on future hospital 
developments in the city. While the RHB and the BG agreed on 
the necessity to accord these developments some priority over 
the rest of the region (8.47). differences df opinion emerged 
over the most appropriate way to achieve this. Briefly~ the 
RHB favoured developing three general hospitals - the RVI, 
NGH and Freeman Road - but considerable opposkion developed. 
According to a group of prominent doctors at NGH, such a scheme 
was wasteful, disruptive and duplicative of services. By 
contrast, their plans for developing the RVI, NGH and a new 
hospital in between these two sites, would provide: 
' a unified .medical precinct bringing together 
all the major regional units to give a complex 
warthy of the fine traditions of N~wcastle 
medicine'. 
(8. 48) 
Such a complex could become :'a model of hospital 
development in the country (8.49). Thus the image of Newcastle 
as a leading medical centre was invoked as a partial justif-
ication fo .r the consultant lobby '·s arguments, though their case 
stressed several other factors~ particularly the detrimental 
consequences for medical education of building Freeman Road 
Hospital. Their proposals were also favoured by the City 
Council, some prominent local politicians (especially T . .Dan 
Smith- 8.50) and representat.ives of Newcastle University. 
Crossman (8.51) argues that the Council required the Freeman 
Road site for housing (8.52) but it is evident that they shared 
some common ground with the consultant lobby in terms of their 
views on the redevelopment of Newcastle. Both parties saw the 
nece~sity fbr the city to be developed as a regional and medical 
capital. This ideology was actively propounded by key 
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individuals 1n the Freeman Road debate. T. Dan Sm::.th, in 
particular, was a keen supp.orter of proposals for a centralised 
development of services, and at a time (mid-1969) when the 
dispute seemed intractable, he exerted pressure for direct 
ministerial intervention. Thus Crossman,somewhat wryly, 
describes an exchange with: 
'T. Dan Smith ... the big b~~s of the N6rth 
East ... (who)was full of his concept that 
~hospitals must help in the export trade 
and must provide a bas·e for New'cas·tle' s 
industry'. 
(Crossman, 1976, 589- emphases added) 
Implicit in such a statement was Smith's acceptance of 
the view that modernisation of Newcastle's infrastructure was 
a necessary prerequisite for its role in industrial development. 
Crossman went on to argue that while such an objective would 
be facilitated by a large scale centralised development, locating 
a third general hospital on the edge of the city 'would not 
totally upset that' (Crossman, 1976, 589). 
In addition to Smith, the City Council supported the 
proposals for a centralised medical comple.x. The following 
quotes, from the Leader of the City Council, Alderman Arthur 
Grey, are indicative of their views: 
'as Newcastle was the regional capital, which 
already had an expanding university, the idea 
of a large hospital comple.x was a very 
attractive proposition' 
(8.53) 
'we already have in the centre of Newcastle a 
fine civic centre precinct and university 
precinct, and we could have a medical co·mple.x 
there as well'. 
(8.54) 
Given the aim of developing Newcastle as a regional 
capitaL (on which see Burns, 1967; and section 8.2 above), it 
is not surprising that the City Council favoured proposals to 
concentrate hospital services in the city centre. The.re are, 
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of course, economlc and medical reasons for centralisaton, 
but the factors stressed here refer not to such considerations 
but rather to a shared view that the city of Newcastle ought 
to be developed as a regio.nal and medical capital. This 
implied concentrating services on the RVI and an adjacent site. 
This argument_is supported by the emphasis in both the Hospital 
Survey (Ministry of Health, 1946, 14) and the Hospital Plan 
(Ministry of Health, 1962, 17) on the key role of Newcastle in 
devel9ping the region's hospital services. In addition, the 
consultant lobby had persistently stressed the potential for 
a medical complex which would be 'a model of hospital 
development in the country as a whole' (8.55). The view of 
Henry Miller (8.56) is perhaps the clearest indication of the 
convergence of the consultant lobby and the local planners and 
politicians: 
'if we built a third hospital near the RVI, 
we would be setting a pattern for the future. 
We would have potentially the finest medical 
centre in I::urope, with three closely integrated 
hospitals'. 
(8.57) 
In order to facilitate such a development, the City 
Council were willing to explore the potential availability 
of central sites, such as those at Barrack Road and Castle 
Leazes (8.58). 
Finally, a point which should not be overlooked is that 
the RHB favoured according the 'highest priority' to the 
development of Newcastle's hospital services (8.59), but they 
felt that this would best be achieved by developing the Freeman 
Road site. The major point at issue here, then, is the con-
veLgence of the interests of the City Council, the university, 
the cons.ul tant lobby at NGH, and certain prominent local 
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politicians? on a proposal for centralised development which 
held up the implementation of the RHB's plans for some 
considerable time. This proposal was motivated not simply by 
considerations of efficiency (whether medical or economic)? 
but also by a common wish to see Newcastle redeveloped as a 
regional and medical capital. The opposition to Freeman Road 
can thus partly be explained in ter.ms of the convergence of 
these intentions, and it is evident that the ideology then 
dominant in intra-regional spatial policy was crticial in 
ensuring the support of certain non-medical agencies and 
politicians. Clearly other considerations (such·as the claims 
advanced for centralisation on the grounds that it was in the 
interests of modern medical practice - Chapter 9) were important, 
but on the basis of the foregoing evidence it would be over-
simplistic to account for the opposition to rreeman Road in 
these terms. 
8.5 Concluding co:mnlents 
This chapter began by outlining impor.tan t themes in spa tia1 
policy in postwar North East England (section 8.2). Such 
policies led to problems for hbspital planning, particularly 
those posed by new town development (section 8.3) and a certain 
convergence of intentions was evident in proposals for hospital 
planning in Newcastle. Some conclusions are now drmm concern1ng 
state practice. 
Firstly, the scope for manoeuvre of state agencies is 
cons trained by s.everal factors, irrespective of the in tent ions 
of the agencies concerned. Although the RHB were in favour of 
h9spital development at Peterlee, their capital allocation was 
insufficient to permit this being implemented, due to restraint 
of NHS expenditure resulting from a variety of socio-political 
-256-
pressures on central gove:rnment (Chapter 5). By the 1960s~ 
with the shift in emphasis of hospital policy towards the DGH 
concept (Chapter 6), Peterlee and Washington could not seriously 
be considered as potential hospital sites due to their small 
populations. More flexible approaches to health care delivery 
were therefore attempted. 
Secondly~ though the foregoing evidence could be taken 
as lending only partial support for Offe's views on the 
s~lective nature of the capitalist state, it is important to 
note the role of ideology in the Newcastle dispute. The 
ideology of modernisation of the urban environment had a 
considerable influence on attitudes to hospital provision. 
While there was basically agreement that Newcastle's hospital 
facilities should be accorded priority over the rest of the 
region, a divergence of opinion on how best to achieve this held 
up planning for some seven years. This can partially be 
accounted for by the coincidence of interests of several 
politicians and medical personnel, all of whom favoured a 
major centralised development in the city. 
Thirdly, the divergent policy intentions of various state 
agencies forms a further important theJne. In both Peterlee and 
Washington, differences of opinion as to the most appropriate 
hospital site resulted from the divergent objectives being 
pursued by various agencies. 1hus the NCB 1 s requirement to 
maximise coal production delayed the availability of a proposed 
site at Peterlee. Likewise the resource constraints on the RHB, 
which led to further delays, exposed the RHB to the charge that 
their policy was at variance with the aim of developing Peterlee 
as a focus .. for service provision in the Easington area, because 
of the continued existence of other facilities in the locality. 
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References by NTDCs to 'sterilising' land and leaving 
'undeveloped holes' in the centre of their towns,. exemplify 
the problems of developing social facilities in such centres. 
NTDCs cannot be seen to leave land undeveloped, yet they are 
largely dependent on the decisions of various agencies concerning 
service provision. Moreover, in both cases the RHB was concerned 
that the anticipated population grow~h would not materialise. 
Yet NTDCs are not in a position to guarantee such growth since 
they are largely dependent on voluntary migration which, in 
turn, was dependent on the availability of employment 
opportunities and so on private sector investment decisions. 
To summarise, then, it is evident, that the problems 
of hospital p.lanning discussed here cannot be understood outside 
the broader context of developments in intra-regional spatial 
policy in North East England. New town development, and the 
proposals for modernising Newcastle's urban environment, both 
influenced the strategies put £orward and created problems for 
NHS planners. Attempts to resolve such problems new receive 
further consideration in Chapter 9. 
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9. The use of knowledge in hospital planning: 
examples from North East England. 
9.1 Introduction 
The intention here is to show how attempts have been made 
to resolve hospital planning disputes either in terms of allegedly 
neutral techniques or by presenting a 'model' of hospital 
provision as being 1n everyone's best interests. Thus section 
9.2 summarises studies produced on behalf of Durham AHA and by 
the Northern RHA to justify their respective proposals for 
hospital development in the Durham Health District. Discussion 
of the limited value of location-allocation methods in planning 
emphasises the limitations of certain approaches to public 
facility location problems (see Chapter 2). Section 9.3 
demonstrates how a group of prominent medical professionals in 
Newcastle sought to legitimate their intentions for the city's 
hospitals as being in the best interests of all concerned. 
Following this, section 9.4 considers studies of alternative 
strategies for hospital provision in Sunderland AHA. Finally, 
section 9.5 draws together the common themes and implications 
of these studies. 
9. 2 Hospital location in the .Durham Health District 
This section summarises a report prepared for Durham AHA 
during 1979. This had been commissioned on the understanding 
that it was to be employed in assessing alternative hospital 
strategies in the Durham Health District (see figure 9.1). 
Following a brief review of the historical background to this 
case (section 9.2.1) the report itself is summarised (section 
9.2.2), its technical limitations are pointed out (section 9.2.3) 
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and finally the use to which it was put is discussed (section 
9.2.4). 
9.2.1. Background 
It was shown above (Chapter 8) that the development 
of Peterlee New Town had posed problems for health service 
planning since its designation. The issue of hospital provision 
for this area reappeared on the political agenda in the late 
1970s, for three reasons. 
Firstly, the 1974 NHS reorganisation had created AHAs 
and RHAs (see Appendix 1) whose functions, it may be argued, 
were potentially conflicting. AHAs were charged with providing 
a service for .their resident population, while the RHA_' s 
responsibility was essentially to ensure efficient strategic 
planning; hence total self-sufficiency at AHA level was .. not 
seen as essential by the Northern RHA (Newcastle AHA(T), 1977,4). 
This is not to suggest that policy conflicts between RHAs and 
AHAs necessarily followed from the functions with which they 
were charged; rather, a situation had been created in which con-
flicting strategies within the NHS ~6uld come into opposition. 
Secondly, schemes had emerged for a rather smaller 
scale of hospital provision, prompted by the accessibility 
and public expenditure implications of DGH development (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). Whereas Peterlee could not be considered 
as a potential DGH site, these developments once again raised 
the possibility of providing a hospital in the Peterlee area. 
Thirdly, the Durham AHA w·as in the process of reviewing 
its hospital strategy. From the Hospital Plan onwards, it had 
been assumed that central Durham's acute hospital facilities 
would be concentrated in Durham City, either at Dryburn Hospital 
or on a new site (9.1). However, the formal allocation of the 
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population of Easington District to nurham AHA £ollowing the 
1974 NHS reorganisation (due to the requirement for coter-
minosity of AHA and local authority district boundaries) meant 
that the AKA was required to plan to serve an increased popu-
lation, of around 240,000. Furthermore,. the necessary beds 
could not all be accommodated at Dryburn, due to restrictions 
on both horizontal expansion (the site was a limited one) and 
vertical site development (9.2). Consequently the AHA consider-
ed several alternatives. 
The Authority were concerned at the lack of local 
hospital facilities for approximately 105,000 people resident 
in Easington local government district. The only locally-sited 
hospital was Thorpe Maternity, near Easington. However, this 
was administered by Sunderland AHA who, it was_thought, were 
unwilling to maintain it. If the hospital were therefore to 
close, the Easington area would be deprived of maternity 
facilities and new construction would be necessary to replace 
this, and this could not be accommodated at Dryburn (Durham 
AHA, 197t, 41). The Durham AHA's concern at the lack of local 
hospital facilities was also prompted by socio-economic con-
ditions in the Easington area. In particular~ a_high proportion 
of the district's population was in 'deprived' categories (table 
9.1), and projected population changes within the Durham AHA, 
especiall·y in the rLu1nbers of people a.ged over 65 and of pre-
school children, were likely to be greatest in the Easington 
district (table 9.2). After considering various strategic 
options, the AHA favoured developing a general hospital in 
Peterlee, to complement the DGH at Dryburn. This would provide 
local specialist and maternity Services in the Easington area, 
and would avoid the problems inherent in attempting to pack a 
Table 9.1 Distribution of 'deprived' populations by type of deprivation 
and by local government districts within Durham AHA 
.-----
Types of Deprivation Darl Tees Dur Ches Eas Der Wear Sedge ~ Totals 
(AHA's classification) ington dale ham ter- ing went Vall field 1 for 
le-St ton side ey Co.Dur 
ham 
Multiple deprivation 3045 - 7 245 1460 - - _9160 - 20920 
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poor council estates on 
the periphery of urban 
areas with similar I deprivation. I 
·----- ----
Concentration of po- 5675 - 1985 1435 15915 12625 8470 735 I 46840 
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persons in old mining 
villages .- ~ot as severe 
as above. 
--1--·----
Working class areas with - - 24535 12645 49590 25195 .11615 875 124455 
an aging population, low 
socio-economic status,but 
no extreme deprivation. 
Total population cate- 8720 - 33775 15540 65505 37820 29245 1610 192215 
gorised as deprived. 
Deprived population as 8.9% - 40.4% 31.2% 62.3% 41.4% 45.4%' 1. 7% 31.6% 
a percentage of total 
residential population 
in 1978. 
--· - -
Source: 
Durham AHA Strategic Plan 1979-1988, p.5. 
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Table 9.2 Projected population changes 1976-1988, by health district, 
local government district, and age group . 
.-
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large numbers of beds onto the Dryburn si.te (Durham AHA~ 1971~ 
41-42) 0 
These proposals were, however, rejected by the Northern 
RHA, because: 
'(this strategy) is not considered to be in 
the best interests of the people involved, and 
would result in an uneconomic arrangement involv~ 
ing three general hospitals (Durham, Peterlee 
and Hartlepool) close together but each so small 
as to call into question their viability and 
their recognition from the point of view of 
professional training ... accessibility by 
public or private transport would, overall, be 
worse to Peterlee and}or Durham than to 
Sunderland for those living in the North and to 
Hartlepool for those living in the South'. 
(Northern RHA, 1979, 36-37). 
The RHA's preference was for the redevelopment of 
Dryburn Hospital; services for the Easington District would 
then be provided by continuing reliance on .DGHs in Hartlepool 
and Sunderland. The conflicting objectives made explicit in 
the above document led the AHA to commission the work reported 
in the next section to aid their assessment of the options open 
to them. 
9. 2. 2 Loca·tion-alloca tion analysis of alternative 
hospital strategies for the .DU:rhani. Health District. 
Against the background of the dispute reported in the 
previous section, the AHA commissioned the work reported here. 
The project was relatively straightfbrward~.Given 
the AHA!s_ assumptions about the nature and distribution of 
demand for hospital services, what would be the optimum location 
of services to meet this demand? Research involved three stages. 
Firstly, the study area was defined, using data on the likely 
areas of origin of patients; secondly, an as.sessment was made 
of the adequacy of current hospital provision; and thirdly-
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an analysis was undertaken of the optimuJ11 location(s) of 
hospital services within the study area. 
The area under consideration was the Durham Health 
District of Durham AHA (see figure 9.1)~ However~ there was 
clear evidence of cross-boundary patient flows in both 
directions; discussions with AHA officials (9.3) supported by 
planning documentation (9.4) suggested that three cross-
boundary flows were of particular importance. Firstly~ the 
Browney Valley - up to and including Lanchester - was 
technically part of North West Durham Health District, but 
the AHA accepted that this fell within the catchment area of 
Durham's hospitals. Secondly, there was evidence of travel to 
hospitals in the Durham AHA from the area immediately north 
of Chester-le-Street. Finally, although Seahamwas included 
in the Durham Health District, it is so close to Sunderland 
that its population is almost entirely served by pospitals 
there. Building on these guidelines, the AHA's intention 
was to serve populations from various local authorities as 
shown 1n table 9.3. As indicated above, the Lanchester area 
would be served by nurham hospitals, while the Seaham area 
would be allocated to Sunderland. Secondly, certain small 
cross-boundary flows into the district - in particular, from 
Gateshead AHA and South West Durham Health District - were 
to be eliminated (9.5). Thirdly, it was felt that links 
between Durham hospitals and Peterlee were being strengthened 
(9.6), which, coupled with the expansion of Peterlee,would result 
1n 60% of the population of Easington District being served 
by Durham. 
Therefore, acute hospital facilities in the Durham 
Health District would serve the local government districts 
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Table 9.3 Populations to be served by hospitals 
in the Durham Health District. 
Local Target Government 
District Population 
Durham City 85,000 
Chester-le- 48,000 
Street 
Derwentside 7,000 
Easington 60,000 
. 
Total 200,000 
Source: 
Durham AHA,unpublished memorandum, 1979. 
Table 9.4 Total provision of general hospitals 
in the study area, and needs for 
additional capacity 
Facility Beds Population Shortfall Additional 
Served Beds 
Needed 
General 
medicine 126.0 148,000 64,048 54 
Paediatrics 52. 5 210,000 2,000 2 
General 
surgery 103.1 171,800 40,250 24 
Trauma/ 
orthopaedics 79.0 225,000 - -
1 Gy·n.aecology -::? n l?Q nnn 84,000 21 ...., ~ . ...., ,_.v,.....,....,._, I I I 
Obstetrics 54.2 112,400 100,000 48.2 
Total 149.2 
Source: 
Durham AHA Health Information System Basic Tables. 
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of Durham and Chester-le-Street~ and the Lanchester area of 
Derwentside. However, determining the precise location of 
demand within Easington District, was a less tractable problem. 
it was 
Whilelevident that the Seaham and Murton areas should be ex-
cluded from the study area, allocating demand between 
the Hartlepool and Durham Health Districts was more complex. 
In the absence of detailed information on patterns of patient 
flow in this area~ the population was simply allocated on the 
basis of relative proximity to existing services in Durham 
and Hartlepool. The problems inherent in such a simplistic 
assessment were compounded by the difficulty of judging the 
effect on patient flow patterns of a hospital in the Peterlee 
area (see section 9. 2. 3 below) . The area. employed in the 
analysis is shown in figure 9.2, while figure 9.3 gives the 
population density of this area by lkm grid squares. 
The second stage involved assessing the adequacy of 
existing hospital capacity and the requirement, if any, for 
additional facilities. The measure of 'demand' used was that 
of population in each lkm grid square; the total population 
to be served was 212,048 (9.7). This unsophisticated estimate 
of demand was justified on two grounds. Eirstly, a uniform 
areal unit was essential for the computer program employed in the 
analysis and, secondly, total population was consistent with the 
NHS guidelines, or norms~ for bed provision in relation to 
population. To assess the adequacy of the existing hospital 
capacity~ the existing bed provision is compared with what 
would be predicted by the norms. This is summarised in table 
9.4, which demonstrates a shortfall in capacity of approximately 
150 acute. beds and 22 geriatric beds. The final sta.ge in the 
analysis was an assessment of where best to locate an additional 
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facility to meet this shortfall. 
This involved the use of the TORNQUIST computer 
algorithm (Tornquist et al., 1971; Rushtbn, Goodchild and 
Ostresh, 1973), the value of which had been demonstrated in 
several analyses (e.g. Robertson, 1976; 19J7; 19_78). The 
technique involves minimising the aggregate travel function 
generated by providing m facilities to serve n demand points. 
Mathematically this 
minimise c = 
can be stated thus: 
m n 
~ ~ p.d.. where c·= total cost function 1 1] 
j=l ~i=l P· 1 
d .. 
1J 
= demand at point 
= distance between 
demand point i _and 
supply point J 
Several more extensive and detailed reviews (Beaumont 1980; 
Eilon et al, 1971; Hodgart, 1978) and bibliographies (Freestone, 
1977; Lea, 1973) are available on these methods, and so the 
mechanics of the procedure used are not discussed at greater 
length. The measures of demand and distance used were, 
respectively, total population in each lkrn grid square, and 
straight line distance; the limitations of these are discussed 
below (section 9.2.3). Analysis then proceeded through an 
assessment of the aggregate travel function for the existing 
hospital sites (table 9.5.1) to a consideration of where best 
to locate an additional facility. It was shown that locating 
an additional hospital in Peterlee would reduce the aggreg~te 
travel function for the nurham Health District from 1,570,021 km 
to 794,306 km a reduction of 49%(table 9.5.2). In these terms 
it could be argued convincingly that access to hospital services 
in the Durham Health District would be greatly improved if a 
hospital were to be provided at Peterlee. An ~lternative 
strategy was also considered involving closure of the facilities 
-276-
Table 9.5 Aggregate and average travel statistics for 
various combinations of hospital locations 
9.5.1 The existing sites at Dryburn and 
Chester-le-Street. 
Location Population Aggregate Average 
Served Distance Distance 
(km) (km) 
Dryburn 162,606 1,431,227 8.80 
Chester-le-
Street 49,442 138,794 2.80 
Total 212,048 1,570,021 7.40 
. 
9.5.2 Three facilities: the two existing 
hospitals plus a third facility optimally 
located. 
Location Population Aggregate Average 
Served Distance Distance 
(km) (km) 
Dry burn 98,194 457,905 4.76 
Chester-le-
Street 49,439 138,745 2.80 
Optimal site 
for. t~irh) 
fac1l1ty 66,415 197,656 2. 9 7 
Total 212,048 794,306 3. 7 4 
9.5.3 Two facilities: one at Dryburn, the 
second optimally located. 
I Location Population I Aggregate Average I Served Distance Distance I (km) (km) 
Dry burn 144,485 845,021 8.85 
Optimal site 
for second 
facility 67,363 209,295 3.09 
Total 212,048 1,053,316 4.97 
Note: 
~n both cases the 1optimal site' referred 
to was in Peterlee New Town. 
I 
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in Chester-le-Street and searching for the optimum location 
of a new facility~ assuming~ again, that _Dryburn remained the 
major facility for the Durham Health District. This would 
reduce the aggregate distance function by 32.7~ 7 from 15.70021 km 
to 1054316 km (table 9.5.3). In terms of average travelling 
distances to each facility (see tables 9.5.1, 9.5.2~ 9.5.3) 
the present arrangements give figures of 2.80 km to Chester-le-
Street and 8.80 km to Dryburn. An additional facility at 
Peterlee would incur average travelling distances ranging from 
4.76 km (Dryburn) to 2.97 km (Peterlee). Such a strategy there-
fore not only reduces the aggregate distance travelled to 
services, it also reduces the inequalities reve ale.d by the 
range of average distances travelled~ and therefore offers an 
improvement in terms of access to medical facilities. 
To summarise, it was recommended that any new hospital 
development in the Durham Health District be located at Peterlee 
New Town; this would improve access to health care for the 
people of the Easington Local Government District,and it was 
likely that the effect upon patient flow would be such as to 
render the Durham Health District self-sufficient in hospital 
provision, since it would reduce cross-boundary patient flows. 
However, the latter is no more than plausible conjecture, 
given the problems of predicting the consequences of such a 
hospital Jevelopment in terms of patient flows. Indeed this is 
indicative of some of the more general technical problems of 
such an exercise which are worthy of further discussion. 
9. 2. 3 Limitations of the techniques em:pl_oyed 
Technical problems of the research reported in the 
previous section relate to the measures of demand and distance 
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used~ and also to the accuracy and appropriateness of the 
modelling procedure. As well as considering these issuesy 
suggestions are put forward as to how the techniques employed 
could have been improved upon. 
Clearlyy a more accurate assessment could certainly 
have been made of demand for hospital facilities; total 
population is a very crude surrogate. Even though 1971 Census 
data permit disaggregation for particular social or age groups, 
this still involves some over generalisation for three reasons. 
Firstly, class variation exists both in e.xperience 
of ill-health and utilisation of health facilities; despite the 
existence of the NHS, these differentials have not been 
reduced (see DHSS, 1980b; Walters, 1980). Moreover, there 
exists convincing evidence that services are available in 
inverse relationship to need (expressed in terms of social 
conditions - see Hart, 1971; Knox, 1978; Phillips, 1979). 
Secondly, the spatial arrangement of services constrains the 
use that can be made of them (Haynes and Bentham, 1979); re~ 
strictions on the time and travel facilities available to 
individuals, whether as result of the public transport system 
or a consequence of domestic and employment duties, may inhibit 
service utilisation. Cla~s -related differentials in mobility 
and employment may exacerbate such problems (Moseley, 1979), and 
settlement concentl~ation policies mayT £·urthcr co.mpound them 
(Cloke, 1979). Finally, spatial and social variation in health 
status cannot be ignored, from the national and regional scale 
(Howe, 1963; 1912) and more locally (Young, 1972). Within the 
Northern RHA, the region's poor economic performance has been 
identified as 'detrimental' to the population's health (Northern 
RHA, 1979, 3), though unambiguous identification of the precise 
links between social conditions and ill-health is a complex 
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task (see DHSS~ 1980b). For all these reasons~ the use of 
simple population data as a basis for health service resource 
allocation must be treated with caution. 
Concerning the measure of distance used, straight-line 
distance is clearly only a rough approximation~ due to diver-
gencies between such figures and actual road distance (Timbers~ 
1967). This had little effect on the work reported here however: 
the spatial concentration of population in three main centres 
means that any distance - minimising technique would tend to 
predict facility location in one of these centres irrespective 
of the measure of distance used. But straight-line distance 
over generalises in two other respects: it ignores the differen-
tial meaning of accessibility to different social groups (Dear, 
1974), and it takes no account of variations in hospital 
utilisation behaviour (Hassan, 1974; RigbyJ 1978). 
Thus it is not disputed that this study could have been 
rather more sophisticated in terms of its data input, and that 
a more advanced modelling procedure could have been employed. 
For instance, Beaumont (1980) ,recommends the incorporation of 
spatial interaction concepts in order more realistically to 
represent facility user movement patterns. However, the crucial 
point to emphasise here concerns .not the technical limitations 
of the work but rather the reasons for its commissioning, and 
the use to which it was put. This is now illustrated by refer-
ence to a dispute between the Durham AHA and the Northern RHA; 
in particular, the use of this study is contrasted with the 
use of a similar study carried out by the RHA. 
9.2.4 The use of kno~ledge in planning: the dispute between 
the Northern RHA and Durham AHA. 
In discussing this matter it is necessary to consider 
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briefly the study of hospital location in this area by the 
Northern RHA, before analys.ing the claims made for their 
respective stud.¥es by the RHA and the AHA. 
The Northern RHA's evaluation of the spatial planning 
aspects of this issue had considered not only the Durham Health 
District, but also the presence of hospital facilities in 
adjacent districts which might be able to guarantee the 
necessary level of service provision for the Easington area 
(9.8). The RHA's study (9.9) commenced with a discussion of 
the implications of Durham AHA's proposals for hospital 
development in that area and in the adjoining Sunderland AHA 
and Hartlepool Health District. A new hospital at Peterlee 
could be expected to reduce patient flows into Sunderland AHA, 
thus reducing the population seeking services at Ryhope General 
Hospital. However the consequences for the Hartlepool Health 
District were more serious. The anticipated reduction in 
patient flow to Hartlepool could threaten the viability of some 
clinical units _to the extent that they would not obtain a 
sufficient volume of work to gain the recognition of the Royal 
Colleges of Medicine for staff training purposes (9.10). 
Although general hospital facilities would be brought within 
easy reach of the population of the Easington area as a con~ 
sequence of the AHA's proposals, the RHA felt that this point 
ought not to be over stressed 9 since the access problems imposed 
by existing arrangements were 'not exce~sive' (9.11). In 
support of this the RHA presented a study of distances from 
selected villages to hospitals (table 9.6) and of the avail-
ability of bus services in the Easington district (table 9.7). 
From the.s e it c.ould equally be claimed that providing a new 
hospital at Peterlee would, nevertheless, effect significant 
improvements in access to services. However the RHA remained 
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Table 9.6 NRHA analysis of distances to hospitals 
from selected centres in Easington Local 
Government district. 
From To 
Hartlepool Sunder- Sunder- Durham Peter-
General land land (Dryburn) lee 
(Ryhope) (General) 
Seaham 13.75 2.75 6.5 13.5 6. 5 
Murton 12.25 4.5 8 . 5 10.5 5.5 
Easington 8.75 5.75 10.5 ll. 5 2.0 
Easington 8.00 7.00 11.5 12.0 2.0 
Colliery 
Horden 6.00 9. 2 5 12.0 12.75 1.0 
Peterlee 6.75 7.0 12.0 12.5 -
Sho tton 9. 5 9.0 12.0 9. 5 2. 5 
Wingate 8.0 11.00 15.0 10.75 4.0 
. ! Blackhall 5.0 9. 5 14.0 14.0 2. 5 
(Dlstances ln mlles) 
Source: 
NRHA paper on Pattern of Hospital Provision 
for Easington District (n.d., probably mid-1979). 
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Table 9.7 Public transport in Easington district: 
travel time and frequency of service from 
selected centres to existing hospitals. 
From To 
Hartlepool Ryhope 
Fre- Time Fre-
lquency quency 
Seaham 
Harbour 1 15 4 
New Seaham 2 so 8 
Murt.on - - 3 
Easington 4 40 2 
Easington 
Colliery 2 30 -
Harden 3 25 -
Peterlee 5 35 2 
Shot ton 2 45 2 
Wingate 2 25 1 
Blackhall 7 18 -
Units Frequency - buses per hour 
----- Time- minutes 
Source: 
· Sunderland 
Time Fre- Time 
quency 
12 4 20 
6 8 15 
18 3 25 
15 4 30 
- 2 38 
- - -
30 3 . 35 i 
30 2 40 
35 1 45 
- - -
NRHA Paper on Pattern of Hospital Provision for 
Easington Local Government District (n.d.,probably 
mid-19 79) . 
Durham 
Fre- T :iir.e 
quency 
1 55 
1 40 
1 30 
1 70 
1 60 
3 60 
5 50 
4 35 
1 55 
2 55 
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convinced that the Easicgton district could still best be 
served by Hartlepool and Sunderland rather than by Durham AHA 
(9.12). 
In considering the consequences of the studies reported 
here~ the claims made for these studies by the RHA and AHA 
respectively are considered. The AHA felt that the work re-
ported above (section 9.2.2) had vindicated their arguments, by 
confirming the strategy previously referred to - acute hospital 
provision in Peterlee and Durham, plus a community hospital in 
Chester-le-Street - as the 'optimum arrangement' of services 
(9.13). By contrast the RHA claimed that they had looked 
closely at 'the geography o.f and lines of communication within' 
the Easington area, and had concluded that this area could best 
be served from Hartlepool and Sunderland~ rather than by Durham 
AHA (9.14). The crucial point here is not the objectivity and/ 
or precision of the two studies, or the competence of those who 
conducted them, but rather the use to which they were put. Though 
both were somewhat innocuous pieces of research, the interests 
they were to serve meant that the analyses carried out supported 
the goals of the agencies on whose behalf they were produced. 
This begs the question of the extent of the dispute between these 
authorities (see Chapter 10), and raises the issue of the use 
of knowledge in planning, which will be examined more fully 
below (section 9.5). 
9.3 Models of medical provision and hospital planning: 
the Freeman Road dispute. 
The term model is employed in this context not in the sense 
of a simplified representation of reality but rather in the 
sense of an ideal type, a standard which can be presented as 
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being universally acceptable .. In this sense it may be argued 
that a particular definition of the nature and scale of hospital 
provision was employed by a group of prominent medical staff at 
NGH, in order to present their views as being in the best 
interests of the future development of Newcastle 7 s hospital 
services. A fuller account of the resolution of the dispute on 
hospital strategy is given below (Chapter 10). Here it is 
merely noted that, in opposition to the RHB's plans to develop 
a third DGH in Newcastle at Freeman Road~ a group of medical 
staff at NGH proposed a major spatial concentration of services. 
This would be achieved by locating a new hospital in between 
the RVI and NGH; this proposal was actively supported by prom-
inent local politicians (see Chapter 8). This section examines 
how such a scheme came to be presented as the most appropriate, 
or ~.optimum 7 , solution for the development of Newcastle's 
hospitals. 
What follows has to be interpreted against the background 
of contemporary medical opinion on hospital size, which favoured 
a considerable spatial concentration of facilities in the 
interests of efficient medical practice. Such views received 
their clearest expression in the Bonham-Carter Report (Central 
Health Services.Council, 1969), which argued for considerably 
larger hospitals than even the 1962 Hospital Plan. Despite the 
accessibility implications of such proposals: their supporters 
claimed that the superior quality of care to be provided would 
be in everyone's best interests. 
Such views were evident in the proposals advocated by 
consultants at NGH in a submission to the Ministry of Health 
during 1966. They claimed that a third DGH in Newcastle would 
increase the difficulties of providing an adequate service for 
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three reasons. Providing ancillary services on three sites 
would be inefficient; the development of medical education and 
practice would be facilitated by the concentration o£ services 
on two hospitals only; and a three-hospital scheme would lead 
to an unsatisfactory development of services which would be 
impossible to correct in the near future (9.15). Moreover 9 and 
in part.icular ~ the RHB 's plans were considered to be in-
sufficiently flexible to allow for changes in medical opinion 
(9.16). It was argued that medical opinion now favoured the 
development of hospital complexes of '2,000, 3,000 or even 
5,000' beds, acco.rding to local circumstances (9.17). Finally, 
and perhaps most revealingly, it was claimed that if the 
Freeman Road scheme went ahead: 
'the clinical confusion and inefficiency that 
will ensue will be a monument to nur constricted 
vision that is now, and will continue to be, 
condemned by the whole concourse of informed 
medical and scientific opinion' 
(9 .18) 
Clearly, therefore a view of medical practice was pre-
sented which emphasised the necessity for spatial concentration 
of services in the interests of clinical efficiency. This, 
in turn, was equated with, and presented as being in, the best 
interests of the recipients of the service. It also appears 
that such views were instrumental in gaining the support of 
certain prominent local politicians for these proposals. Such 
views may be absorbed readily, since the politicians concerned 
are not necessarily aware of the advantages and disadvantages 
of high technology, hospital-based medicine. Thus~ Alderman 
A. Grey was quoted as follows: 
'he (Ald.Grey) did not ... 1+nderstand the complexities 
of running a hospital, but he felt th<;t t if all the 
se·rvices· could be together, it m:us't surely be a 
better hospital'. 
(9.19} 
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Likewise~ Cour.cillor B. Weeks as.s erted that: 
'it is madness to have a hospital isolated from 
all the 'Others in the way tha.t Freeman Road will 
be .•.. it Seems to b~ against all the r~les of 
moaern ~~di~in~ which call for c6ncentrated 
complexes'. 
(9. 20) 
Note~ in the above quotes~ the apparently unquestioned 
acceptance that 'big is beautiful' in terms of hospital 
provision, this being accorded the status of a 'rule' of 
modern medicine. Moreover, the access implications of ·such 
centralisation are presented as a necessary consequence of the 
provision of what is taken to be a superior hospital service. 
Thus Henry Miller (see note 8.56) claimed that 'Newcastle was 
a compact city which did not require suburban hospitals' and 
indeed~ in his view, a central hospital complex was more 
accessible (9. 21). In this he was supported by an editorial 
in the Newcastle Evening Chronicle which claimed that the over-
riding consideration was the establishment of: 
'a really modern hospital and medical centre ... 
the argument that Freeman Road hospital would 
be more convenient for patients and relatives 
in the eastern half of the city appeals, but not 
enough to sway the balance'. 
(9 0 2 2) 
Thus a view of hospital provision was presented which 
favoured centralisation of services in the interests of modern, 
efficient medical practice. This view appears to have carried 
some weight with local politicians and indeed with the press~ 
so that the social implications of such proposals were either 
ignored or dismissed as being of only minor importance. Though 
a local MP emphasised the desirability of Freeman Road on 
social grounds (9.23), and though the RHB claimed that on such 
crite~ia they 'would have taken a great deal of shifting' from 
their plans (9.24), detailed examination of papers pertaining 
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to this debate shows that the social conseq~ences pf alternative 
schemes rece.ived little attention. Instead~. dis.cussion focused 
primarily on the ar:rangement of facilities that would best meet 
the interests of those responsible for the service. Furthermore~ 
it will be argued below (Chapter 10) that perhaps the most 
importan.t consideration~ from the RHB 's viewpoint was the 
interruption to their capital programme which would result if 
Freeman Road were not developed. 
It seems, then, that in order to canvass support for 
proposals for a spatial concentration of Newcastle's hospital 
facilities,a group of prominent medical professionals justified 
their plans as being in the interests of efficient medical 
practice, this in turn being equated with the best interests 
of the people of Newcastle. From such a perspective, the access-
ibility implications of such developments and, more generally, 
the question of the appropriateness of the services being pro-
vided, received limited consideration. The theoretical 
implications of this evidence are taken up below; the next 
section discusses technical assessments~ of hospital location 
in Sunderland AHA. 
9.4 Technical solutions to politic~! problems: hospital 
strategy in Sunderland AHA. 
As in the case of !'eterlee, new town development at 
Washington posed some problems for NHS planners (Chapter 8) . 
Resolution of these problems was attempted on purely technical 
criteria, and this section assesses this evaluation and its use 
1n resolving the dispute. 
The point at issue was whether the second DGH in Sunder-
land AHA should he located at W~shington or Ryhope; the major 
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hospital in the area was to be Sunderland Ger:eral (see Chapter 
10) for ful.ler discussion and illustrations). The Washington 
and Ryhope sites were evaluated according to various criteria. 
On accessibility, Ryhope was claimed to be superior as it 
was only four miles from Sunderland General Hospital, whereas 
Washington was S! miles away. This assessment clearly ignored 
several criter-ia, such as the implications of accessibility 
for different social groups (Dear, 1974; Haynes and Bentham, 
1979; White, 1979) and the characteristics of patient flow (Hassan, 
19794; Rigby, 1978). Simply to base a comparison of the rela-
tive accessibility of the two sites on their distance from the 
major DGH in the AHA was to lay the RHA open to the charge of 
catering only for the needs o£ medical staff and administrators -
an accusation subsequently levelled at the RHA by Washington 
NTDC (9.25). 
On other criteria, Ryhope was considered superior because 
of the large site there (250 acres, compared to 60 acres at 
Washington) which was also already in NHS ownership. Staff 
recruitment was not seen as a problem in either case, though the 
employment consequences of reducing existing services at Ryhope 
were a possible cause for concern, since the NHS was one of the 
principal employers in that area. Summing up, :the RHA felt that 
a convincing case had been made for a co.mmuni ty hospital in 
Washington, but not for a general hospital. Ryhope was favoured 
because of land availability and ownership and because there al-
ready existed a labour force likely to include appropriately 
qualified staff, due to the tradition of employment in local 
hospitals (9. 26) • 
As in the case of Peterlee, however, these proposals were 
by no means universally acceptable. On technical grounds, 
opposition was forthcoming from Tyne and Wear CC, who had 
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carried out - independently of the RHA's investigation - an 
assessment of alternative strategies for hospital location 
(reported in Riley, 1982). Since the RHA had not made explicit 
their patient referral policies, two options were explored. 
These were, firstly~ allocation of patients to all general 
hospital beds in the AHA - including either Ryhope or Washington 
- and, secondly, allocation of patients to beds in Sunderland 
General Hospital and Washington or Ryhope. In neither situation 
was there a sizeable difference between the Washington and 
Ryhope locations (table 9.8). However, with the exploration of 
various options, such as capacity-constrained solutions with 
varying referral policies (either to the nearest hospital or to 
the nearest available bed), a location at Washington began to 
show clear advantages, of the order of 10% in aggregate terms 
(table 9.8). This was felt to be 'significant' in a land-use 
transport planning context, and indeed.an official of Tyne Wedr 
CC suggested that siting the hospital at Washington would save 
the Council some £5 million over 10 years. This would accrue 
from not having to repair and/or replace roads in the Ryhope 
area, and indeed in the Sunderland area more generally, as a 
result of Washington's superiority in terms of accessibility 
and traffic generation (9.27). Though there was little to 
choose between the sites in terms of space for car parking or 
access by public transport, the benefits of a hospital e~.t 
Washington would, it was felt, be more widely dispersed through-
out the western part of Sunderland AHA(9.28). Hence Tyne 
Wear CC favoured Washington on the grounds of what they saw 
as its superiority in locational terms. However, this report 
was rejected by the RHA on the grounds that its conclusions could 
be accounted for by the 1 margin of error attached to such 
calculations' (9.29) -though the RHA preferred not to indicate 
Table 9.8 Summary of location-allocation analysiscarried out by 
Tyne-Wear Council on alternative hospital strategies. 
Analysis 
RHA Policy 
(i) Allocation to all general 
hospital beds in the district 
ind.luding Washington or_I{yh()_p_e 
I" 
(ii) Allocation to general beds 
in Sunderland General and 
either Washington or Ryhope. 
Washing- Ryhope 
ton 
7532520 
(25.9) 
7698583 
(26.5) 
75 2 53 35 
(25.9) 
7688788 
(26.5) 
Differ-
ence 
(R-W) 
-7185 
(0) 
-9795 
(0) 
County Policy . 
(i)Uncapacitated allocation 4345473 50297641684291 
t~ the neares~ of all h?s- (14.9) (17.3) (2.4) 
Per-cent INotes 
Differ-
ence 
(R-W)/ C.l.l-W): 
-0.0% 
-0.0% 
-0.0% 
-0.0% 
+15.7% 
(+15.7%) 
Total travel 
(average time) 
Total travel 
(average time) 
Total travel 
(average time) ~ 
p 1 tals plus e1ther Wash1ngton *( 0 . 5 7) *(.0.66) 
or Ryhope·--------------------~--------~------1r-------t-----------t--------------, 
(ii)Uncapacitated alloca~ion 
to the nearest hospital-either 
Sunderland General and either 
of Washington and Ryhope. 
(iii)Capacitated allocation to 
the nearest of all hospital 
beds plus either Washington 
5509096 
(18.9) 
* (0. 72) 
4713318 
(16.2) 
*( 0.62) 
6123727,614631 
(21.0) (2.1) 
*( 0.81 
55873~8 1874020 
(19.2) (3) 
*( 0.73 
+11.1% 
(+11.1%) 
+18.5% 
(+18.5%) 
Total travel 
(average time) 
Total travel 
(average time) 
or Ry]lo~p~e~·~--------------------~---------4---------~------~------------+-------------~ 
(iv) Capacitated allocation 
to the nearest bed in Sunder-
land General and either 
Washington or Ryhope. 
Source: 
5764607 
(19.8) 
*(0.76) 
64698131705206 
(22.3) (2.5) 
*(0.85 
12.2% 
(12.2%) 
Total.travel 
(average time) 
Tyne and Wear County Council - Hospital Strategies for the Sunderland Area -
report to the Management Committee, 16.2.81. 
*Proportion of RHA policy time 
N 
'-D 
0 
j 
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the crite.ria (for instance referral policies) which they 
would have employed in such an analysis. Clearly, then, the 
RHA' s preferred policy option was o.pen to ~ri ticism on technical 
grounds. However, it is also evident that - on a political 
level - the strategy was still open to dispute. In this respect 
the Washington NTDC and the 1 Hospital for Washington 1 campaign 
were particularly vociferous in their criticism and the sub-
sequent debates are analysed more fully below (Chapter 10) . 
Despite the RHA 1 s detailed consideration of various options, 
then, their proposals were not considered acc~ptahle on technical 
grounds - witness the arguments of Tyne Wear CC - nor did they 
satisfactorily resolve the dispute from the point of view of 
a variety of interested parties. The way. in which the conflict-
ing points of view on this topic were resolved, is examined 
below; the concluding section of this chapter discusses the 
common issues arising from the evidence presented herein. 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated the use to which knowledge 
can be put in policy making, with reference to three disputes 
about hospital location. It should be emphasised, firstly, 
that the apparent inability of the procedures employed effective-
ly to resolve the issues to which they were addressed (par-
ticularly in the Washington and Peterlce examples) is in no 
sense an indication of incompetence on the part of those 
carrying out the studie~ nor is it attributable directly to the 
technical limitations of the procedures used. Rather, the 
evidence exemplifies the problems inherent in attempting to solve 
political disputes by technical methods, and demonstrates the 
difficulties inherent in certain approaches to public facility 
location. It also lends further weight to Offe's observations 
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concerning the logic of state policy formulation. These issues 
can perhaps best be exemplified by the case of hospital 
location in the Durham Health District~ hut they are also 
relevant to the other examples given here. 
Considerable shortcomings existed in the work carried 
out on behalf of Durham AHA~ While these could have been over-
come (which would have been desirable on purely technical 
grounds), this would not have affected the outcome of the 
dispute. For, irrespective of the technical merits (or other-
wise) of aJ.Jternati ve pieces of research, such knowledge can 
be used in support of the intentions of conflicting parties to 
planning disputes. Although the two studies of hospital 
location in the Durham Health District both claimed to be 
objective analyses of the same issues in,'the same area, they came 
to different conclusions and were used in support of competing 
views. This can partly be explained by the use of different 
techniques of analysis, but of more importance is the fact that 
the divergent intentions and perceptions of the RHA and AHA 
were influential in defining the way the problem was to be 
analysed. Similar problems were evident in the case of 
Sunderland AHA; indeed, at one point the Northern RHA were 
accused of defending a committed position. Finally, the New-
castle study illustrates the use of an image of an 'ideal type' 
of hospital provision to promote the interests of certain 
parties. Three implications seem worthy of comment. 
Firstly, such planning disputes ultimately cannot be 
resolved via application of the procedures discussed here. It 
is undoubtedly possible to evaluate alternative spatial arrange-
ments of public facilities, thereby indicating in what .direction 
resources should be channelled to achieve a particular obje~tive. 
However this presumes the existence of a consensus on the goals 
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to be achieved and the means whereby they are to be attained; 
without such a consensus the kind '.of situation described ab.ove -
in which parties to planning disputes produce knowledge to 
serve particular interests - may arise. However, such procedures 
may allow planning decisions or strategies to be justified by 
reference to allegedly 'scientific' or 'objective' allocation 
procedures. 
This in turn begs the question of what criteria are 
considered when such decisions are taken. Location-allocation 
methods, for example, are far from value-free; they present a 
view of society which implicitly accepts existing social con-
ditions and, by p~esuming the continued existence of such 
conditions, reasserts the existing social order as setting 
boundary conditions within which policy formulation must take 
place. Such arguments are not developed here (see Chapter 11; 
and also Lewis and Melville, 1978), but they can be linked to 
the evidence given above. For example, analysing a hospital 
planning issue in purely spatial terms seems to rule out 
discussion either of the appropriateness of the services provided 
or of such matters as the social needs of the population to be 
served. In seeking to resolve these disputes by reference to 
purely technical criteria, planning procedures limit the options 
to be discussed and, indeed, operate to the advantage of 
institutions that already exist. 
Finally, if academic research can be employed to serve 
particular interests in planning disputes, those involved in 
such work should, at the very least, point out why such conflicts 
arise and consider the us.e to which their work is put. This 
chapter has argued that allegedly nentral methods could not, of 
themselves, resolve the issues to which they were applied. To 
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understand more fully the emergence and resolution of such 
problems~ it is essential to consider public facility location 
in the context of theories of society and the state (Chapters 
2~ 3); this facilitates comprehension of the decision-making 
process. Chapter 10 therefore presents detailed discussions 
of the resolution of disputes on hospital location. 
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10. The politics of hospital planning; specific case 
studies. · 
10.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that the spatial planning 
of hospital facilities ultimately could not be reduced to, 
or resolved by, technical procedures. The focus here is there-
fore upon the resdlution of such disputes. Section 10.2 
considers the development of hospital services in Newcastle 
upon Tyne, paying particular attention to a dispute concerning 
whether or not to construct a new hospital at Freeman Road, 
in the north-east of the city. The debate between the Northern 
RHA and Durham AHA about hospital strategy for the Durham 
Health District is then discussed in section 10.3. Finally, 
the response by the Northern RHA and Sunderland AHA to the 
campaign for a hospital in Washington New Town is examined. 
10.2 Medical politics andhospital planning in Newcastle 
11pon T)f11e. 
The evidence is presented in three sections. Develop-
ments between the 1946 Hospital Survey and the 1962 Hospital 
Plan, and the emergence of proposals for a hospital at 
Freeman Road, are examined first (section 10.2.1) followed 
by a discussion of opposition to the latter proposals 
10.2.2); the resolution of the ensuing debate is then con-
sidered (section 10.2.3) and finally the major themes evident 
in this dispute are suM~arised. 
10.2.1 Postwar developments aP:d the emergence of plans 
for the Freeman Road Hospital. 
There existed 12 hospitals in Newcastle upon Tyne 
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before World Wa.r I I (figure 10 .. 1) . Though the City Council 
had proposed expanding NGH from 879 to 122& beds, no major chan-
ges in capacity took place in wartime (Ministry of Health, 
1946 (volume 10),36-38). The physical condition of the 
hospital stock was generally satisfactory, though some concern 
was expressed about parts of the RVI, as well as certain small 
specialist and/or isolation units (the Eye Hospital, the Ear, 
Nose and Throat Hospital, and theSmallpox Hospital) (Ministry 
of Health, 1946, 37, 40-41, 49). Primarily because of limited 
resources for capital development (see Chapter 5), virtually 
no progress was made with the proposals for a major regional 
Hospital Centre in Newcastle (Chapters 4 and 8). The 
possibility of having four general hospitals (the RVI, NGH, 
Walkergate and a_new hospital on the site of the Sanderson 
Orthopaedic Hospital, Gosforth) was discussed, but not pur-
sued; this seems to have resulted from a relaxation of Civil 
Defence regulations, whi.ch had restricted the maximum size 
of general hospitals to 800 beds (10.1). 
The Hospital Plan's point of departure was the 
facilities available in 1960 (figure 10.2) and its reference 
to Newcastle as a medical capital clearly had important 
implications in terms of the provision of regional and sub-
regional specialties. Several major developments were already 
in progress at NGH ancl~ with the completion of several schemes 
designed to modernise Newcastle's hospital facilities 
(Ministry of Health, 1962, 18-19), seven hospitals would close 
by 1975 (figure 10.3). Further schemes would concentrate 
development at NGH, the RVI and Walkergate, permitting the 
closure of two additional hospitils. 
In practice, however, there has been a major departure 
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from the Plan's intentions~ namely the deYelopment of a third 
DGH at Freeman Road (figure 10.4), rather than Walkergate. From 
mid=l962 it had become evident that there WDuld be problems in 
developing the Walkergate site. The City Council required 
extensive space there for a secondary school, while the County 
Council regarded the areas as a 'form of green belt' and, as 
such, felt that any development would have to be capable of being 
absorbed without detriment to local an1eni t.ies. Finally, the 
NCB had an interest in the site since they wished to extract 
coal from underneath it (10.2). Moreover, it was likely that 
complete rebuilding of the Walkergate Hospital would be 
necessary (10.3). The Freeman Road site - of some 52 acres -
had been suggested by the City Planning Officer as an appropriate 
alternative (10.4) and it was accepted by the RHB and Ministry 
of Health (10. 5) . Its main advantage lay in its being a virgin 
site - by contrast, Walkergate would have presented serious 
redevelopment problems - and it was also in a good location 
vis-a-vis present and anticipated population distribution..c(l0.6). 
However, considerable opposition mounted against such proposals 
and this is the subject of the next section. 
10.2.2 The development of opposition to the 
Freeman Road sc.heme. 
It vvould be over-simplistic to see this opposition 
as a consequence of objections to Freeman Road per se. Rather 
the opposition that emerged was directed at the proposition that 
three DGHs should be provided in Newcastle, and at the RHB's 
plans to locate certain regional specialties - in particular 
cardiothoracic medicine - at Freeman Road. Pressures were 
emerging for the development of cardiothoracic medicine (10.7), 
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but if it we.re to be loca.ted at NGH, comprehensive redevelop-
ment of that hospital would be required (10.8). The RHB 
were also faced with the p.ossibility of having to accommodate 
additional faciliti~s (in particular, some high technology 
equipment and a medical physics unit) at relatively short 
notice. Given the constraints on developing NGH they there-
fore proposed locating the cardiothoracic unit.at Freeman Road 
(10.9). This provoked strong opposition from a lobby of 
medical staff at NGH, who claimed that a third general hospital 
would increase the complexities of ho:3pital provision in New-
castle. They therefore advocated two hospitals - the RVI and 
NGH - of approximately 1500 beds each (10.10). This was 
rejected by the RHB because of the delays involved and also 
because of the extensive planning that had gone into the 
Freeman Road scheme (10.11), though a proposa1 to develop only 
two DGHs had a certain 'emotional appeal' (10.12). The RHB 
felt, moreover, that developing two DGHs would require ex-
pansion of the RHB facility to 1800 beds, because of the RHB!s 
obligation to provide certain region~l specialties. This 
would be logistically impossible at NGH and,if attempted at 
Freeman Road, would produce a disproportionately high-rise 
development, and would entail abandoning the RHB's substantial 
capital investment in NGH (10.13). Moreover, because re-
d~velopmertt of NGH depended on advance provision of new 
facilities on a third site (to allow 'decanting' of some de-
partments from NGH), a two-hospital scheme including NGH was 
not practicable without serious disruption of services; in this 
the RHB were supported by the Ministry of Health (10.14). The 
RHB's proposals, for three DGHs of approximately 1000 beds each, 
generated further debate in mid-1967. 
The consultant lobby at NGH insisted that to develop 
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three hospi ta.ls of approxima.tely equal size would be waste-
ful, duplicative of services, and lead to considerable dis-
ruption. Locating the cardiothoracic unit at Freeman Road 
would create delays (for example, by increasing staff travel!-
ing time) and separate the work pf that unit from that of 
other regional special ties. The la t.ter, in particular, should 
be avoided in view of the inter-dependence of the regional 
specialties; although these were highly disparate branches of 
medicine, such units shared highly specialised ancillary staff. 
Closer integration of the regional specialties was seen as 
essential (10.15). To achieve this, an in situ redevelopment 
of NGH, to an ultimate capacity of around 2000 beds, was pro~ 
posed, and it was claimed that this was feasible without build-
ing Freeman Road Hospital as a decanting unit (10.16). However, 
the RHB objected that this would take twice as long as their 
own proposals, incur additional costs (around £3.5 million at 
1967 prices), and deprive the residents of east Newcastle of 
a locally-accessible DGH (10.17). 
Subsequently, the consultant lobbj stressed the 
importance of developing Newcastle as a leading medical centre, 
though this should not be over-emphasised since similar views 
were held by several parties with ari interest in this dispute 
(Chapter 8.3). Contemporary medical opinion also lent support 
to the proposals for centr~li~ation (see Chapters 6 and 9); 
it was argued that developments in medical practice: 
'had so changed medical opinion that it was now 
generally agreed that in the larger centres there 
should be a concentration of all the essential 
services within a single hospital complex'. 
(10.18) 
This reinfor.ces the point made above (Chapters 6 and 
9) about changing medical practice, and emphasises further 
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the scale of proyision being considered. The RHB saw the 
advantages for medical practice of such proposals, but felt 
that the delays that would result were unacceptable. The 
RHB claimed initially that a third DGH was essential to 
facilitate decanting of facilities from NGH (10.19). However, 
it subsequently became clear that achieving a balanced, co-
ordinated development of Freeman Road and NGH would be difficult. 
Both hospitals were likely to have relatively small numbers of 
acute beds because of the RHB's obligation to accommodate a 
large number of geriatric and regional specialty beds. Du-
plication of services was also likely,Freeman Road would not 
provide an accident service, and several regional specialties 
would be separated (10.20). Taking these factors into account, 
and noting the recommendation of the Royal Commission on 
Medical Education (1969) that Newcastle's Medical School was 
to be doubled in size, the RHB proposed a 1500-bed hospital 
at Freeman Road. The RVI would contain around 1300 beds, but 
NGH would be reduced to 4SO beds - of which 370 would be in 
geriatric medicine (10.21). 
In parallel with these developments, a view emerged 
that a centralised medical complex might be feasible,either by 
increasing the size of the RVI,or by providing a new hospital 
on land adjacent to the RVI (figure 10.4). The RHB were un-
~Jilling to entertain this due to the problems they haJ. en-
countered in obtaining the Freeman Road site (10.22). However, 
opinion within the BG swung towards a centralised development 
from early 1969 (10.23), on the grounds that, if Freeman Road 
was built, hospital s.ervices would be 'dismembered and 
scattered'. The result would be: 
'a legacy of illogical hospital planning 
... the present proposals (including Freeman 
Road) have no logical justification'~ 
(10.24) 
-305-
Further support for such proposals was provided by 
Henry Miller, the Vice Chancellor of Newcastle University 
(see note 8o56), who claimed that the medical profession in 
Newcastle would prefer extensive delays in hospital development 
rather than the implementation of a 'disastrous' project, to 
which Newcastle University was: 
'categorically opposed 0 0 0 .(Freeman Road) is 
out o£ date, uneconomic, and oo• will militate 
against the efficient deployment of clinical 
resources' . 
(10o25) 
In Miller's opinion, the proposed Freeman Road scheme 
would merely be 'a truncated small_general hospital' - he 
had previously described it as a potential backwater {10.26). 
A third DGH was unnecessary 1n any case, since Newcastle was 
not large enough to necessitate suburban hospital provision 
(10.27). Miller claimed that it would be pbssible to transfer 
the Freeman Road plans en bloc to the potential·central site 
(10.28), and argued that centralised development would produce: 
'(not) a. single mammoth hospital complex, but 
interlinked hospitals virttially adjacent and 
furnishing an unsurpassed medical teaching 
potential'. 
(10.29) 
Finally, as discussed above (Chapter 8.4) the proposals 
for centralisation were also favoured by various prominent local 
politicians and the City Council. This can be understood in 
terms of the coincidence of interests of the medic~l lobby 
in promoting medical developments in Newcastle, with the 
interests of local politicians and planners in modernising 
Newcastle's environment. Indeed, the Council were prepared 
to seek parliamentary permission to release the required land; 
this would have been necessary since the land was owned by 
the Freemen of Newcastle (10.30). 
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However, the RHB we.re committed to proceeding with the 
Freeman Road scheme; it would be 'sheer lunacy' to revise their 
plans (10.31). The development of hospital facilities in 
Newcastle was said to be lagging behind the. rest of the region; 
on a per capita basis? investment in the RI-IB.'s hospitals in 
Newcastle had been consistently below the regional average in 
the mid-1960s (10.32)? and this situation would persist until 
and unless the new hospital was built (10.33). If further 
delays were necessary it was possible that alternative plans 
for £apital development in the city might not reappear in the 
RHB 's capital programm.e for at least f-ive years, which would 
expose the RHB to the criticism that they: 
'we.re trying to develop the hospital services 
of the region in a way which does not admit of 
logic' 
(10.34) 
Put another way? the problems o-f agreeing on a hospital 
strategy for Newcastle were such that developments in other 
HMCs were proceeding - relatively speaking -:- at a faster pace 
than in the city. This was evidently at variance with develop-
ing Newcastle as a 'medical capital' for the region. Finally, 
the RHB noted that it was important to provide a service for 
the population of the east end of Newcastle; on social grounds 
alone the RHB 'would have taken a great deal_ of shifting' 
from the Freeman Road scheme (10.35). However, the interests 
of the consultant lobby were clearly opposed to such a view; 
hence; 
'the ideal solution could not be forthcoming 
simultaneously from the opposing points of view 
of the de~irable development of medicine and 
of the necessary service to the public'. 
(10.36) 
__ , ____ - This quote serves to emphasise further the severe 
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problems confronting attempts to 'optimise' public decisions 
and in this respect reipforces arguments developed above 
(Chapter 2) . 
On the one hand~ the.refore~ the :RHB's intention was 
to develop Ereeman Road so as to avoid further delays and 
provide a new hospital for east Newcastle. Against this were 
ranged the City Council~ the BG~ the University~ and a group 
of senior consultants~ all of whom proposed a centralised 
development of the city's hospital services. So entrenched 
had the situation become that the apparent inability of 
politicians and planners to develop Newcastle's hospital 
services in a coordinated fashion - arising from their attempts 
to pursue difJerent (arguably irreconcilable ) goals - was 
perceived as having deleterious consequences in terms of 
improving access to health care: 
'hospital development in Newcastle is a long 
way behind the rest of the region as a res~lt 
of.persistent disagreements between the experts 
and of the difficulty in getting agreement on 
the plan to be followed' 
(10.37) 
Evidently, therefore, an almost intractable dispute 
had arisen. This was resolved only after the intervention of 
Richard Crossman (10.35) in September 1969; the next section 
therefore discusses the way in which the decision was reached. 
10.2.3 The resolution of the dispute; the decision 
to proceed with ~reeman Road. 
Crossman's intervention followed an interview with 
T. Dan Smith (Crossman, 1976, (volume III), 589) and rep-
resentations from Henry Miller. Crossman called a meeting of 
all interested parties in Newcastle in September 1969. Since 
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no detailed record of that meeting is available~ the following 
draws largely on Crossman's (1976 (volume III)~ 656-659) 
personal record of his role. Hence this account may seem some-
what one-sided in terms of the sources of evidence consulted. 
Firstly, Crossman's remarks on the various alternative 
proposals are of interest. Implicit in the various schemes 
was the proposal that NGH would ultimately be run down, 
irrespective of where the major development of Newcastle's 
hospital facilities took place. Crossman noted that this had 
had a serious effect on the Eorale of staff at NGH, and he 
felt that: 
'(this)seemed the most extraordinary solution ... 
it seemed that if ... (the) excellent buildings 
at NGH were to go it was for the sake of building 
a new hospital two and a half 1niles away, with 
some of their own specialties' 
(Crossman, 1976 (volume III) 657). 
' 
Crossman also emphasised the social benefits of build-
ing a hospital in east Newcastle, arguing that proposals for 
a large-scale centralisation of services represented a 'case 
of elephantiasis' (Crossman, 19.76 (volume III), 589). In 
seeking to resolve the dispute, he noted general agreement 
on five points. Firstly, there was no question of developing 
three general hospitals; in the long term at least, it was a 
question of either two ho.spitals or one central. medical complex. 
Secondly, and due in part to the complexities of development 
there,th~re would be no large-scale investment at NGH. Thirdly, 
it was intended to produce a central nucleus of 2,000 beds. 
The remaining beds in the city were to have a role in teaching 
all were to be part of a University hospital group - and 
finally, any delays in excess of 18 months were to be avoided 
(10.39). Discussion therefore focused on three issues. Firstly, 
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whether it would be best to abandon the :Fre·eman Road site 
altogether, concentrating all the beds in two general hospitals 
on the central site; secondly, the amoun.t o~ delay which would 
ensue from such an alteration of plans; and finally, the 
location of the cardiothoracic ·unit (10. 40) . 
On the first and second of these points, it was agreed 
that serious delays were totally ·unacceptable. In attempting 
to resolve such dis.putes, Crossman: argued that: 
'a point may well be reached where reopening 
the search for the ideal solution merely 
distracts attention,from what has. become the 
best Solut1on av~ilahlei 
(10.41) 
A centra)j,sed development of services, Cr-ossman arg11ed, 
might well represent the best possible solution, but it would 
involve considerable delays for two reasons. Since the Free-
men of the city owned the land required for this development, 
its acquisition would require a Private Member's .Bill (Crossman, 
1976 (volume III), 659). Secondly, a detailed geological 
investigation would be essential to determine the extent of 
mining subsidence, since this was thought likely to inhibit 
construction work on the site (10.42). The RHB's claim that 
seven years delay would be involved,created a 'great deal of 
incredulity' (Crossman, 1976 (volume III),659). Hence, the 
matter was settled by an architect's report - commissioned by 
Crossman - to the effect that even if the plans for Freeman 
Road could be transferred en bloc to the central site, there 
would be a minimum delay of two years; if these plans had to 
be revised at all (due to the different physical characteristics 
of the two sites) a minimum delay of four years was likely 
(10.43). Since such a delay was felt to be excessive the Free-
man Road scheme wa.s agreed upon. 
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There remained one last obstac~e to be overcome in 
the shape of the opposition of certain influential consultants 
to the proposal to locate cardiothoracic surgery at Freeman 
Road. Crossman emphasises the importance of this issue: 
'Richardsnn, the leading doctor (10;44) was 
himself a cardiothoracie surgeon and it was 
the putting of the' cardiothoracic un:it on the 
Freeman Road site which ~eally made him blow 
his top. He said that this unit must be on the 
central site because it had to link up with all 
sorts of other expertise and could not be sep-
arated off and put into a district hospital 
site. . . it was cTe·a:r that 'if he. could move the 
cardiothorac1~ Un1t tb the ~ent~~ 1t w6uld 
eliminate some of h1s ·ferocity 1 
(Crossman, 1976 (volume III) 658 - emphases added) 
The opposition to locating cardiothoracic surgery 
at Freeman Road had stemmed from the perceived inefficiencies 
in medical practice which would result from separating off what 
was an important regional specialty; this was a major reason 
for the initial opposition to Freeman Road (see above, section 
10.22). Crossman therefore suggested, in order to placate this 
opposition, that an attempt be made to accommodate the cardia-
thoracic unit in the central medical complex. 
Thus, the Freeman Road decision was upheld only 
after a dispute over hospital strategy which was prolonged 
for several years and, after apparently reaching deadlock in 
mid-1969, was resolved via Ministerial intervention. Yet some 
evidence suggests that Crossman could scarcely have made any 
other decision. Commenting on his preparations for the meeting 
referred to above, Crossman claimed that the brief he had 
received: 
'was just a series of ar~uments for the RHB's 
case. I had said I woul come up as an impartial 
investigator ... I had to say to my officials ... 
"this brief must not be left about because if it 
seems thaT I have been briefed with the RHB line, 
all the susp1cion:s about the De'partment will be 
confirmed" 1 
(Crossman, 1976 (volume III) ,657 - emphases added) 
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A later -reference emphasises t.hepoint: 
'my own people~ who vv'ere co:m:m:itted to t·he RHB~ 
were terrified by my proposal for an independent 
arbitrator' 
(Crossman,l976 (volume III), 659- emphasis added) 
The above would appear to justify the inference that 
the main consideration (as far as the DHSS was concerned) was 
to avoid the interruption to the capital building programme 
that would result if Freeman Road were not built, though it 
would be unwise to extrapolate from this to the effect that 
Crossman's mind was entirely made up prior to the meeting at 
Newcastle. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the major criteria 
to be tonsidered were the amount of delay that would ensue if 
hospital services in the city were to be centralised, and the 
consequent effect on the RHB's capital programme. Hence, 
despite the advantages claimed for the central site, the decision 
to devel9p at Ereeman Road was upheld. In the final section, 
major themes specific to this dispute are now restated. 
10.2.4 Concluding coJnrrients. 
Two themes are examined briefly, namely, the role of 
the medical profession in this debate, and the competing aims 
and objectives of various agencies of the sta.te. 
Medical opinion was of considerable importance ln this 
dispute, in terms of structuring views on and attitudes to the 
organisation and delivery of hospital care (cf. Chapter 9.3). 
Thus the consultant lobby based at NGH were able to put up 
influential opposition to the Freeman Road scheme; this arose 
not only because of their fears that NGH would be downgraded, 
but also because they claimed that an inefficient fragmentation 
of specialist facilities would result, whith, in turn, would 
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be against the best interests of the development of medical 
practice in Newcastle. The importance of this group's argu-
ments is perhaps most clearly revealed by the use of the 
location of the cardiothoracic unit as a 'lever' with which 
to buy off an important source of opposition to :Freeman Road. 
However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that this was 
a c1ass or professional interest; the group of consultants 
at NGH were certainly homogeneous in their own interests, but 
they cannot necessarily be shown to be representative of their 
profession. This situation is perhaps best seen as an interest 
group employing its position within the NHS - a relatively 
privileged position, given the class character of the 
organisation of the NHS - to exert influence to achieve specif-
ied goals. 
ln considering the competing goals of various agencies 
of the state, the first point to note is that all parties con-
cerned were in agreement with proposals that Newcastle should 
be developed as the region's 'medical capital'. Where they 
differed, however, was on the means whereby this would be 
achieved, in terms of the intra- urban de-velopment of services. 
Thus the RHB favoured a dispersed pattern, against which a 
vociferous lobby argued that concentrating facilities in the 
city centre was both possible and desirable, irrespective of 
the delays involved. Ultimately, it was seen as essential to 
proceed with :Freeman Road to avoid the disruption to the RHB's 
capital programme that would otherwise ensue, though an attempt 
was made to placate the consultant lobby by offering con-
cessions on the location of the cardiothoracic unit. Offe's 
(1976) characterisation of the state's activities as a process 
of crisis avoidance seems apposite here (see also section 10.5). 
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Moreover? th.e state must be seen to plan its services in a 
rational fashion. A dec is ion against ~Freeman. Road would have 
both seriously disrupted the RHB's capital,programme and left 
Newcastle lagging behind the rest of the region in terms of 
hospital development; this would have exposed the RHB to the 
charge that its proposals for service development were same-
what arbitrary and haphazard? perhaps generating a trisis in 
their perceived capacity for rational administration. Hence 
it seems that Crossman could hardly have made any other 
decision. 
The mare general theoretical issues arising from this 
evidence will receive more detailed consideration below. This 
chapter now discusses the resolution of a dispute between the 
Northern RHA and the D.urham AHA, concerning hospital strategy 
for the D.urham Health .District. This raises important issues 
concerning the divergent intentions of two levels of the NHS 
administration. 
10.3 Hospital planning £or the Durham Health District 
Chapter 8 . .3 e.xamined why the eastern part of County Durham 
had posed problems for hospital planners~ not only because it 
was located in between the catchments.of ho?pitals in Sunder-
land, .Durham and Hartlepool, but also because of the difficult-
ies involved in pl~nning for the growing population of Peterlee 
New Town. Chapter 9 illustrated that attempts to resolve this 
problem, on a purely technical level, had ultimately failed 
to produce an agreed strategy. Here, attention is directed 
to the arguments and counter-arguments put forward by the 
respective authorities - the Durham AHA and the Northern RHA-
and to the way their competing claims were reso.lved (see figures 
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9.1 and 9.2). 
The AHA had argued that hospital £acilities should be 
available in the Easington .District~ for s.e:veral reasons (see 
Chapter 9.2). Hospital development in the Peterlee}Easington 
area would be a corollary of the AHA's strategy since re-
organisation, which had involved the e.xpans ion of community 
services in that area (10.45). The AHA therefore proposed 
that two acute facilities would be developed in the Durham 
Health District; at .Dryburn (the scale of which would be 
restricted by constraints on expansion (10.46))and in the 
Easington area, possibly at Peterlee (.Durham AHA, 1979, 41). 
The research described in Chapter 9.2 had confirmed the AHA's 
view that this was the optimum s tra te.gy, though the AHA also 
proposed retaining a community hospital in Chester-le-Street 
(10.47). Though the AHA had never envisaged a totally 
independent hospital in the Easington area, they nevertheless 
wished to see a substantial hospital presence there. In this 
regard they appealed for support to the DHSS's changing 
attitude to the scale of DGH development, arguing that rigid 
definition of hospital services as either '.DGHs' or 'community 
hospitals' was unwise in the light of variable local circum-
stances. Hence greater flexibility was required; the AHA 
wished to see an ad hoc or 'hybrid' type of hospital p~ovision 
(10.48). Their proposed development would therefore include 
acute and maternity facilities, as well.as psychiatric services. 
The AHA's appeal to the DHSS's changing policy on hospital size 
is of particular interest. 
This policy (DHSS, 1980a) advocated a smaller scale of 
hospital provision (with a maximum of 600 beds) and greater 
flexibility in planning; as such it would appear to support 
-315-
t.he AHA's case. However~ one of the policy options excluded 
from this document was th.e provision of hospitals in communities 
which did not already possess them, such as new towns - yet 
this might be regarded as an inescapable consequence of 
the change in policy. The comments of var.ious health adminis-
tra tors suggest that the rh.etoric of this· policy document 
conceals a desire to restrain new NHS capital investment; it 
was therefore unlikely that the AHA would receive support for 
its plans (see Chapter 7.4). 
Thus the Durham AHA's proposals were based upon a 
recognition of local need and upon a desire to serve its resident 
population adequately. By contrast, the Northern RHA did not 
regard the provision of a fully comprehensive hospital service 
as one of the principal tasks of an AHA. Cross-boundary flows 
of patients were accept~ble, in the interests of regional 
strategy and efficient management (10.49). The RHA proposed 
that the Easington area would continue to be served by hos-
pitals in Sunderland, Hartlepool and .Durham (Northern RHA, 
1979, 36-37). Similar emphases were evident in the RHA}AHA 
discussions on hospital strategy in March 1980. While noting 
that the AHA's motivation was a desire to develop an adequate 
service for its resident population, the RHA ar.gued that the 
AHA had given only limited consideration to the strategic 
implications of their proposals: 
'perhaps not unnaturally the subject had 
been considered only in the context of the 
Durham area itself' 
_ _(_10. 50) 
By contrast, the RHA felt (on the basis of their own 
research - see Chapter 9) that the access problems arising from 
the existing arrangement of services were not excessive. More-
over, a new facility in Peterlee could not be viable. Its 
-316-
catchment population was unlikely to exceed 60~000 and so it 
might not be able to guarantee the Yolume .of work required for 
recognition for staff training purposes by the Royal Colleges 
of medicine (10.51). Hence staffing problems would develop. 
Such a development would also involve providing hospital 
facilities for the JJurham Health District from three hospitals 
(Dryburn (Durham) , Peterlee and Hartlepool) instead of two 
(Hartlepool, Durham). This did not appear to be a cost-
effective solution, and it logically contradicted the AHA's 
own identification of the vital importance of cost-effectiveness 
in planning. Finally, an acute general hospital at Peterlee 
(whatever its size) would necessitate a comprehensive re-
evaluation of schemes already in progress .for the development 
o.f hospital services in the Hartlepool health district (10.52). 
In exploring alternative strategies, the RHA rejected 
the possibility of a single DGH, on th.e grounds of accessibility, 
restrictions on the expansion o.f J)ryburn and the dif.ficulty 
of obtaining an alternative site. The RHA favoured locating 
a community hospital at Peterlee, linked to and supported by 
the .DGH at HartlepooL This wo.uld reduce the bed complement 
of Hartlepool DGH in certain specialties (long-stay geriatric 
and psycho$eriatric units) which could appropriately be located 
in a community hospital, but it would not provide acute 
services artd so it would not threaten the viability of the 
Hartlepool hospital. Such an option would also reduce the bed 
complement of Dryburn to around 600 beds - the maximum which 
could be accommodated there (10.53). 
The final discussions on this issue raised three issues 
worthy of closer investigation. One of these - the use made 
of the studies of the implicat·ions of the respective strategies -
has been examined above (Chapter 9). The remaining issues 
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concern the. extent to which the competing claims of the AHA 
and the RHA could be reconciled and the way the Northern RHA 
responded to local political pressure from wLthin the Easington 
District. 
On the first point, though there was apparently quite a 
deep-rooted conflict - broadly speaking, between interests of 
regional strategy and local need for and access to services -
a consensus was reached with surprising speed. A Northern RHA 
document considered that there was 'a substantial measure of 
basic agreement ... and acceptance of the regional strategy' 
(10.54). This agreement seems to have emerged following 
assurances from the Northern RHA that their approach to hospital 
provision for the Easington area would be flexible, and that -
in particular - outpatient facilities would be available in the 
new hospital. Nor were the .Durham AHA likely to object to the 
RHA's proposal to link the Peterlee facility to Hartlepool DGH, 
as long as they were convinced of the adequ~,cy of the facilities 
provided for their resident population (10. 55). It may be 
that the prime concern of the AHA was to establish at least some 
hospital provis.ion in the Easington area, and that as long as 
some steps were made. towards this g0al the AHA were prepared 
to give way on such issues as the control or content of such 
a facility. The Northern RHA and Durham AHA agreed, then, on 
a strate.gy which seemed to balance the R8}\is concern foT ef£ect-
ive management (since no new general hospital was to be built) 
and the AHA's wish to provide a locally-accessible hospital. 
Further matters to be considered concerned the potential 
political ramifications of developments in the Durham Health 
District. In particular, the potential closure of Thorpe 
Maternity Hospital generated some concern. This facility was 
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actually adminis.tered by Sunderland AHA~ but .that Authority 
had indicated that .they wished to relinquish resp9nsibility 
for it. Since this would remove the only local maternity 
service from the Easington area, the Durham AHA had been 
prompted to seek some way of making such a service avail~ble -
hence their wish to see maternity £acilities provided in 
Peterlee (10.56). Since there was likely to be a considerable 
public outcry if the Thorpe Hospital closed, (10.57) the RHA 
agreed to provide alternative local maternity services before 
this closure took place (10.58). 
More generally, there is evidence which suggests that 
the RHA were anxious to distance themse.lves from the 
negotiations on this issue. An internal memorandum written in 
July 1980, noted that given the imminent NHS reorganisation, 
some uncertainty could still arise over specific responsibilitftces 
for planning in this area. Hence: 
'(the RHA) must allow the priority £or the 
Easington (hospital) development to be 
det~rmined (and to be seen to be determined) 
locally (this issue) cotild ~e~dily attract 
a good deal of political' attention ... it might 
be better if the RHA were seen to have done 
nothing to delay or frustrate this development' 
(10 0 59) 
Put another way, had the RHA's involvement been seen 
publicly as having interfered with (or even taken precedence 
ove:r) local policy formulation, the policies of both 
authorities could have been questioned. In the case of the 
RHA, this was because they could be seen to be involved in 
local planning disputes . .By contrast the AHA could be seen 
as being unable to plan without interference from above. The 
authorities therefore reached a compromise solution which 
could be represented as being acceptable to all parties to the 
dispute. 
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To conclude~ this section has considered the emergence 
and reso.lution of a dispute over hospital strategy for the 
Durham Health District. At one level this exemplifies the 
'equity versus efficiency tradeoff 1 (a problem which~ it is 
held by many writers, is exemplified by public facility 
location - see Chapter 2). Thus the AHA's emphasis upon local 
need for and a.ccess to services contrasts with the RHA's concern 
for issues of stra te.gic management. At another level, however, 
it could be argued that the two authorities were attempting 
to reconcile what were (ultimately) imcompatible objectives. 
The responsibility of the AHA to provide adequate services for 
its resident popula.tion was ultimately at variance with the 
RHA's overall strategy for the region. While, therefore, the 
RHA could not go so far as to permit. a full-scale hospital 
development in the Easington area, they were in a position to 
offer a compromise solution whereby a community hospital was 
to be s;Lted in ~eterlee. The specific implications of this 
dispute will receive f.uller consideration in the conclusion to 
this chapter. Prior to that, consideration .is given to the 
resolution of another dispute over h9spital provision occasioned 
by rapid population change; this concerns hospital planning in 
Sunderland AHA. 
10.4 The 'Hospital for Wa~hirtgton' campaign and the 
response of the NRHA.and Sunderland AHA. 
The planning problems posed for the Newcastle RHB by the 
decision to develop Washington New Town were discussed above 
(Chapter 8.3). For several reasons, a hospital was not built 
in Washington, but two developments necessitated a re-
examination of hospital strategy for the Sunderland area from 
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mid-1979. These we.re .the eme:rgence of local political 
pressure for a general hospital in Washington, and a policy 
change on hospital size ( see Chapter J.4). 
The Sunderland AHA, who were formally responsible for 
providing health services for the Washington area, had 
proposed concentrating hospital development on Sunderland DGH, 
with a second general hospital at Ryhope (figure 10.5). In 
opposition to this strategy, however, the 'Hospital for 
Washington' campaign had started as a 'spontaneous movement' 
in early 1979; by July 1979, 22,000 people had signed a 
petition calling for the construction of a 500-bed general 
hospital in Washington (10.60). The campaigners appealed to 
various arguments in support of their case. 
Firstly, Washington's population had been expanding 
rapidly (to just under 50,000 by 1979- table 10.1), and the 
birth rate (22]1000) was almost twice that for Sunderland CB 
(11.7/1000). The AHA's intention to locate its second 
maternity unit at Ryhope would be 'disastrous' for Washington's 
residents, particularly for mothers with young children, who -
if required to attend clinics at Ryhope - would face serious 
problems combining that with meeting their children from school. 
Furthermore, psychiatric and mental illness services were 
relatively inaccessible; the 190 residents of Washington 
admitted to psychiatric hospitals in. 1978 had had to tTavel to 
a variety of units some distance away (table 10.2). As well 
as overloading hospitals which were already under pressure, 
this was a considerable inconvenience to patients' relatives. 
Finally, the campaign emphasised that a hospital would facilitate 
industrial development. Washington was 'the only growth point 
for industry in the Northern region' and it was claimed that 
0 
Kilometres 
Number of Beds 
0 100 
0 200 
0 300 
0 400 
0 500 
Type of Hospital 
A 
v 
@ 
0 
Acute · general 
Acute - specialist 
Psychiatric 
-321-
4 
A 
v 
Havelock 
(to close) 
Monkwearmouth 
0 
Sunderland General (expand 
to 1000 beds) 
0 
Eye Infirmary 
(to close) 
N 
t 
Thorpe Maternity 
0 (to close) 
Source: Sunderland AHA ( 1979) 
Figure 10.5: Proposals :for hospital development 
in SundeTland AliA· 
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Table 10.1 Population growth in Waslington New Town 
1972 - 1981. 
il Year Population I 
1972 31~000 
1973 32~690 
1974 35~900 
19]5 37,900 
1976 41,500 
19.77 46,565 
1978 47,733 
1979 49,619 
1980 53,231 
1981 55' 915 
Source: 
Washington New Town Development 
Corporation -Annual Reports. 
I 
I 
Table 10.2 Psychiatric hospitals to which pati~nts from 
Washingtoti were admitted, 1918. 
Source: 
Hospital 
Durham County 
Winterton 
St. Nicholas 
Cherry Knowle 
Darlington Memorial 
South Shields General 
·l\lol.rr-!1 c t1"' r::e.,..,o,.~ 1 ~ St·:~L~k;~S v avL~~ 
Letter from the 'Hospital for Washington' 
campaign to Dr. Gerald Vaughan, 1980 ·held 
in Northern RHA Planning Division files. 
Number of 
admissions 
102 
75 
5 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
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industrialists were 'disconcerted' to find there was no 
hospital available, though whether this had influenced firms 
against locating there cannot be. evaluated froJJl the available 
evidence. It was also claimed that more time was lost to 
industry as a result of people travelling 'unnecessary' 
distances to hospital, than was lost through strikes (10.61). 
Secondly, hospital strategy had to be reconsidered in 
the light of changing policy on hospital size, which sought to 
limit the maximum number of beds provided in DGHs (DHSS, 1980a). 
Hence the previous strategy for Sunderland AHA.- developing 
Sunderland DGH to 944. beds, supported by a second general 
hospital - was no longer acceptable (10 .. 62). For these 
reasons, hospital planning for Sunderland AHA was reconsidered. 
Two versions of the RHA's consultation paper on this matter 
are considered here; a draft version of this paper gives an 
interesting insight into their views. 
This paper argued that acceptance of Ryhope as a site 
for the second general ho?pital in Sunderland AHA had not only 
resulted from NHS ownership of some 250 acres of land there 
(liv'hich would greatly expedite development), but had also been 
influenced by recollection of 'local political pressure' 
following the closure of Seaham Hall Hospital in late 1977 
(10.63). This had provoked a considerable local reaction (10.64), 
and since the Ryhope Hospital was a major employer in an area 
of high unemployment, the RHA anticipated 'strenuous local 
political activity' if that hospital was to be run down (which 
would follow if Washington was chosen as the site for Sunder-
land AHA's second major hospitaL). The RHA were clearly un-
willing to risk a repetition of events at Seaham Hall and it 
would seem that this was an important - though not necessarily 
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decisive - factor in favour of Ryhope. However~ the final 
<version of the RHA's strategy made no mention of this point~ 
emphasising rather that Ryhope's advantages were the owner-
ship oflthe site, its potential for development~and the ready 
availability of trained personnel (10.65). The RHA's strategic 
proposals are shown in figure 10.6; the response to these is 
now discussed. 
Firstly, the Washington NTDC did not accept these 
proposals and claimed that the RHA were defending a pre-
determined conclusion (10.66). In their view, scant con-
sideration had been given to the views of the local community, 
and in particular to the 'vigorous, comprehensive and non-
political' case pursued by the 'Hospital for Washington' 
campaign. They claimed that the proposed strategy ignored the 
needs of the young and growing population of Washington, and 
was oriented more towards the convenience of administrators and 
staff than to the interests of patients and visitors. Moreover, 
the NTDC felt that the lack of a hospital i~'Washington could 
hinder the attraction of industry (10.67). However, the RHA 
felt that the attraction of industry was 'not relevant' 
(10.68) - a view which apparently ignored the NTDC's claim that 
there was substantial support for a hospital from industrial-
ists in Washington (10.69). Supporting the NTDC, Tyne and 
Wear CC claimed that, in locational terms, Washington was 
superior to Ryhope (see Riley~ 1982, and Chapter 9). Against 
this, Gateshead and South Tyneside AHAs were concerned at the 
potential threat to staff recruitment if a DGH were built in 
Washington. Moreover, such a development could threaten the 
viability of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital~ in Gateshead, by 
reducing patient flow to that hospital. Finally, as Durham CHC 
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~ource: Northern RHA (Unpublished PapPr, ·1960) 
Figure 10.6: Northern RIIA's proposed strategy for 
hospital development in Sunderland AHA 
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observed, not developing the Ryhope site would further penalise 
those residents of the Easington District who used hospitals 
in Sunderland AHA, since they would then haye to travel four 
miles further to receive treatment at hospitals in the centre 
of Sunderland (10o70) o 
Though the RHA's proposals had thus generated considerable 
dissatisfaction in certain quarters, the RHA were to insist 
that this strategy be carried through, although they reassured 
the campaigners that a community hospital would be provided 
in the western part of Sunderland AHA (l0o71) o It was 
logistically impracticable to provide the local facilities 
requested; in particular, it was unrealistic and uneconomic to 
provide a second accident and emergency unit in the AHA (10.72). 
The RHA also ar.gued that the delay caused by; this dispute was 
creating planning blight, because the progress of several other 
schemes (including the second stage of Sunderland DGH) de-
pended on agreement being reached on hospital strategy for the 
AHA as a whole. In addition, the delays were lowering staff 
morale at the Ryhope Hospital and hindering the disposal of 
surplus NHS land at Cherry Knowle Hospital (a psychiatric 
facility adjacent to Ryhope Hospital -figure 10.5) (10.73). 
Hence the Ryhope site was preferred. 
However, this strategy was reviewed in mid-1981, follow-
ing an indication of a more flexible attitude to hospital 
size on the part of the DHSS. Previous guidance (DHSS, 1980a) 
had emphasised that new hospitals should be restricted to 600 
beds, but this would not be imposed as a rigid size limit if 
'cogent and persuasive arguments' could be adduced in support 
of any proposals to exceed this limit. This once again 
opened up the possibility of a major concentration of hospital 
development in the centre of Sunderland~ particularly at 
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Sunderland DGH. If it proved essential to build a second 
major hospital? the preferred option was Ryhope? but the RH.A 
did not wish to take a final decision without re--examining the 
potential for town centre development. ':Fo.ur, strategies were 
considered (figure 10.7.1 - 4). 
The RHA argued that developing Sunderland DGH to 1200 
beds would be preferable since it offered the most accessible" 
pattern of hospital services for the catchment as a whole 
(figure 10.7 .1) o This would certainly have reduced the 
disparities in access to services within the AHA which would 
have resulted from siting a second general hospital at a 
peripheral location (either Ryhope or Washington), but in 
terms of aggregate distance travelled, two facilities would have 
reduced the overall 'system cost' 0 The attraction_ of such 
a strategy may have been that it compromised betwe.en. the 
Washington and Ryhope sites, rendering thetwo centres 
virtually equidistant from the DGH. However, safety con-
siderations ruled out this option; Sunderland DGH could not 
be developed to more than three storeys, and therefore the 
requisite number of beds could not be accommodated there. 
A further option would have split hospital development between 
Sunderland DGH and the Havelock Hospital (see figure 10.7.2); 
the latter would have accommodated 3_70 beds with the DGH 
taking the balance. However, the large concentration of 
specialist diagnostic facilities at the DGH, and the size 
difference between the two hospitals, made it likely that 
Havelock would be little more than a 'satellite' hospital. 
Moreover, this option would involve providing 9 hospitals 
rather than 8, since Havelock was not to be retained under any 
other option (figure 10.7). In addition. since there would be 
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financial benefits from selling the Havelock site if it was 
not to be developed~ there seemed to be sound arguments for 
r~jecting this option. 
The RHA was therefore drawn back to the question of 
whether to develop a second general hospital ~t Washington 
or Ryhope. Arguing that no 'conclusive' arguments had been 
advanced which would favour Washington, the RHA reaffirmed their 
earlier strategy of developing Ryhope. It was felt that pro-
vision of accident and emergency facilities (which had been 
requested by those campaigning for a hospital in Washington) 
at more than one hospital was impracticab.le; Ryhope would be 
considerably easier to develop (due .mainly to land availability); 
and though it was conceded that Washington .might have been more 
accessible than Ryhope, such considerations 'could not be the 
key determinant' between alternative strategic options (10.74). 
At their meeting in November 1981, the RHA therefore resolved 
that the future strategy for hospital development in Sunderland 
AHA would be based on development of the existing general 
hsopi tals on the Sund.erland General and Ryhope sites, complement-
ed by community hospitals in Washington, Houghton-le-Spring and 
Sunderland itself. 
To summarise, opposition to the proposal to develop 
Ryhope as a general hospital had originally st~mmed from the 
residents of Washington, from Washington NTDC, and fro~ Tyne 
and Wear CC. Their arguments highlighted the social needs of 
Washington, the need for locally-available medical services 
in order to facilitate the pursuit of Washington's role as an 
industrial growth point, and the accessibility implications 
of Ryhope and their attendant consequences for road provision. 
In the face of these demands; the RHA reviewed its strategy. 
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In purely spatial te-rms~ and on s.everal other criteria, the 
two locations were evenly balanced~ but Ryhope was favoured 
on the grounds of land owriership and also hecause of the 
potential political ramifications consequent upon a run-down 
of employment there. The objections of Tyne and Wear CC 
(that in terms of aggregate travel statistics~ Washington 
offered a superior location) were dismissed on the grounds that 
their results fell within the 'margin of error' attached to 
such calculations. Finally, the RHA had rejected as irrelevant 
the NTDC's claim that a hospital would fa,.cilitate the attrac-
tion of industry to Washington. 
Thus the attempts of various agencies of t_he state, and 
a social group located outside the state apparatus (the 
Hospital Campaign) to pursue their own goals, gave rise to 
a variety of claims, not all of which could be satisfied given 
constraints on what the RHA could achi.eve. Though attempts 
were made to examine al terna t.i ves to. Ryhope (for example, the 
possibilities for development in the centre of Sunderland were 
considered), considerable importance seems to have been attached 
to the likely political ramifications of any withdrawal of 
facilities from Ryhope. Coupled with the problems of develop-
ing other strategies, such considerations seem to have been of 
decisive importance in terms of leading to a decision to 
develop a general hospital at Ryhope. 
10.5 Concluding comments 
This section now draws together common themes from the 
foregoing. These concern the framework within which this 
evidence. should be interpreted, the const1;,aints on the state's 
ability to implement its declared intentions, and the nature 
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of the policy for.mulation process. It is also show:r;t,finally, 
that decisions taken by the state may themselves be a source 
of disfunction. 
Clearly, these issues cannot be explained solely in terms 
of the intentions, actions and statements of key individuals. 
to{ 
Such an account wouldlconsider the constraints on the ability 
of agencies of the state to realise their goals. For example, 
at one level, institutional arrangements limit the scope for 
manoeuvre of certain agencies. While the City Council could 
justifiably voice its 6pinions on the Freeman Road dispute, 
it had no direct authority to influence the outcome, other than 
by virtue of its control of land use planning. Likewise, 
NTDCs had no formal responsibility for health service pro~ 
vision, nor were appropriate institutional arrangements set 
up to facilitate. the planning of new town health services. 
However, at another level, various structural constraints on 
the activities of the state are of more decisive importance, 
and these are considered below. 
Moreover, it is also worth reiterating the points made 
above (Chapter 3) concerning the limitations of pluralist, 
managerialist, instrumentalist and structuralist accounts of 
state practice. Pluralist views would be unable to account 
for why certain demands were conceded and others denied in the 
planning process - and,indeed,such an.account would encounter 
difficulties in explaining why it was that specific demands 
were articulated by certain agencies or individuals in 
particular circumstances. Managerialist perspectives possess 
some merit in terms of directing attention to the actions of 
key decision-makers, but this would merely beg the questions 
of the criteria for identifying such individua1s, and of why 
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they were able to exert influence in the first place. On the 
former point? it is rarely possible to s.pecify who the key 
individuals are in cases such as those discussed here? in 
which much policy formulation is conduct.ed by committees or 
sub-committees of the relevant authorities. On the second 
point, it could be argued that Richard Crossman was perhaps 
the most decisive individual decision-maker in the Newcastle 
study; but this would simply beg the question of why his 
intervention was called for in the first place. 
If pluralist and managerialist views are therefore not 
sustainable, it must also be conceded that certain Marxist 
perspectives are oyer-simp lis tic. Thus, to yiew the state 
simply in .instrumentalist terms would overlook the diversity 
of the claims made on behalf of a variety of interest groups 
and the fact that several concessions were made in all the 
disputes referred to. In no sense, then, did these decisions 
represent unequivocal 'victories' for any one group. Nor is 
it justifiable to interpret these decisions in structur~list 
terms - that is, as having been made. in accordance with the 
requirements of 'reproduction' by a 'fact9r of cohesion' in 
society. Such an account would take little note of the limits 
to state intervention and of the constraints ori the state's 
activities. 
A more adequate understanding of state practice appears 
to be that provided by Offe (see Chapter .. 3). Via a com-
bination of the contradictory dem~nds placed upon it and the 
complexity of its internal organisation, the state is con-
strained in its ability to carry out its declared intentions. 
One consequence is that certain organised special interests 
may be able to make their claims heard and win substantial 
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concessions ta their demands (Habermas~ 19J6a, 60). Thus the 
privileged position available to members of the medical pro-
fession gave them considerable influence. on the outcome of 
decisions. This was clearly evident in the Newcastle case, 
where a group of prominent consultants was able to delay the 
development of the city's hospitals for some time. While the 
RHB ultimately obtained agreement to its original proposals, 
this was achieved only at the expense of concessions on the 
location of the cardiothoracic unit in the future development 
of Newcastle's ho·spi tals. Similar influences were evident in 
the Peterlee example, in terms of the emphasis on efficient 
medical practice and the most appropriate scale of hospital 
provision. These comments should not be seen as an attempt 
to introduce - for instance - the 'autonomy of the medical 
profession' .&St. some kind of independent variable whereby these 
disputes may be more satisfactorily explained. It is clear, 
however, that in certain historical circumstances, certain 
interest groups have been able to exercise a crucial role in 
decision-making. 
The state is further constrained by direct practical 
pressures from those it serves. Hence, in the Newcastle case, 
the RHB:'s concern to demonstrate that its. planning was pro-
ceeding in a rational and coordinated manner. The decision to 
locate a hospit:al at Ryhope was at least partly motivated by 
a consideration of the political rep~rcussions of transferring 
NHS facilities away from that site, and it could be argued that 
seeking a centralised development of hospi ta.ls in Sunderland 
offered an acceptable compromise between the Washington and 
Ryhope locations. Finally, the RHA clearly intended to 
minimise the apparent extent of their involvement in the Peterlee 
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case; witness the statement that priorities for hospital 
provision should be seen to be determined locally. 
It follows from the constraints on the state that only 
a limited number of demands placed upon it can be satisfied. 
This in turn has implications for the character of discussions 
on the spatial planning of health services. These can be 
shown to be selective in character to the extent that they 
tend to ignore the social implications of alternative proposals. 
Such issues were raised only by agencies or individuals comm-
itted to campaigning for a more accessible pattern of service 
provision. Thus in Newcastle the emphasis was upon the most 
appropriate way of developing a major medical complex in the 
city; from this point of view, the precise spatial con-
figuration of services was seen as irrelevant. While the RHB 
made some reference to service provision for the east end of 
Newcastle, their principal concern seems to have been the 
avoidance of disruption to their capital programme. Claims 
made on the basis of social need were more evident in the 
Peterlee and Washington cases, though in the former, the AHA 
came into direct conflict with the RHA over its strategic 
proposals, whereas in the latter, demands stemmed from local 
community organisations backed up by the NTDC. In both cases, 
however, the RHA were able to defuse potential problems, and 
this was attempted in two ways: either by attacking their 
claims on technical grounds (Chapter 9), or by emphasising 
considerations of strategic management and efficient planning 
at the expense of social needs. 
It also appears that the policy formulation process takes 
the form. of cr:is i.s management whereby the competing claims of 
a variety of interest groups may be defused - if never 
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entirely reconc:.:led. Thus the decision reached in the New-
castle case not only satisfied the RHB, by avoiding a major 
interruption to their capital programme~ but it a'lso placated 
the demands of those advocating hospital development in central 
Newcastle. In the Washington and Peterlee cases, proposals 
were advanced for community hospital development in each town, 
while in the Peterlee case the RHA gave as.surances as. to the 
local availability of maternity services. 
Furthermore, the policy formulation process cannot be 
likened to that of a private entrepreneur; the operational 
rationality of the state is fundamentally different, and is 
not easily specified. No explicit attempt has been made here 
to evaluate the policy .formulation process in a normative 
sense - for example., by comparing this process and its outcome 
with what might have been produced as the result of a cost-
benefit analysis of alternative proposals - bu.t this process 
evidently bears little relation to such a .framework,nor does 
it resemble the equity versus e.f.ficiency tradeoff, of which the 
problem of public facility location is often .assumed to re-
present an example par. excellence. A. variety of criteria must 
be taken into account, arising from_the necessity for the 
state to attempt to satisfy the competing claims on it; more-
over, the state's ability to do this is clearly constrained. 
Finally, the functions and decisions of the state may 
themselves be a source of dysfunction: the state cannot guarantee 
that its decisions will always produce results acceptable to 
all concerned without generating unintended consequences. Be-
cause decisions on the location of ho~pital ser~ices in the 
Sunderland and Durham health authorities were taken only 
recently, this point cannot be substantiated empirically with 
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reference to these issues. Howe~er, it is instructive to note 
developments following the decision to locate a hospital at 
Freeman Road. By the late 1970s, it had become clear that 
financing the new development was likely to precipitate re-
ductions in services elsewhere in the city; indeed, this was 
seen as the only way to achieve the full commissioning of the 
hospital (10.75). In early 1977, the AHA drew up plans to 
save approximately £2 million from closures, and the AHA's 
Strategic Plan, published later.that year foreshadowed the 
closure of certain peripheral hospital units to generate the 
revenue funds necssary to run the new development (Newcastle 
AHA, 19 7 7, 10) . A further - p.erh§ip£ , unintended - outcome of 
this decision has been the problem of managing acute hospital 
services split between three sites. A major policy rev1ew on 
this is currently in progress (see Chapter 1), and there remains 
resistance to Freeman Road among certain sectors of Newcastle's 
medical community. Consider the following: 
'(Fr~eman Road) was one of the most terrible 
administrative blunders ... one of the very bad 
planning :mistakes ... we· are not -pre·pare·d to 
dis~antle our service in other hospitals to 
ope·n Freeman Road'. ·· · 
(10,.76) 
Thus the decision to build a hospital at Freeman Road 
has had certain unintended consequences, in terms of its 
effect upon other hospital se.rvices in Newcastle, and 1n terms 
of the necessity £or subsequent policy reviews. This provides 
further evidence for the arguments of Chapter 3 concerning the 
state's capacity for rational administration, and also sub-
stantiates the arguments of Chapter 2, concerning the 
'optimisation' of public decisions. 
Footnotes 
10.1 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
10.5 
10.6 
10.7 
10.8 
10.9 
10.10 
10.11 
10.12 
10.13 
10.14 
-338-
Notes of a meeting of the Special Committee for 
the Planning of the Newcastle Medical Centre, 
25.11.57- held in RHB 195. 
RHB Capital Development Sub-Committee 
meeting, 2.11.62. 
Noted in reports to the RHB by its Senior 
Administrative Medical Officer, 12.6.62 and 
24.5.63 - held in RHB 195. 
RHB Capital Development Sub-Committee .meeting, 
1.3.63. 
Letter from the Ministry of Health to the RHB, 
18.11.64 - held in RHB 195. 
RHB Capital Development Sub-Committee meeting, 
1.3.63. 
-
Newcastle RHB.: meeting of the project committee to 
consider the development of hospital services in 
Newcastle, 2 7. 5 .. 6 5 - held in RHB 19.5 ~ 
Ibid. See also a Site Appreciation of Newcastle 
General Hospital (n.d.) - held in RHB 195. 
Senior Administrative Medical Officer's Report 
to the RHB ProJect Committee on the Newcastle 
Medical Centre, 27.9.65 -held in RHB 195. 
A petition - signed by many prominent consultants 
at NGH and by academic staff of the Newcastle 
Medical School - was sent to the RHB and Ministry 
of Health. 
RHB memorandum on the number of hospitals to be 
built in_Newcastle, Sunderland·and Middlesbrough 
(n.d. - probably late 1966). 
RHB File Note of a conversation between the RHB 
Chairman and the Senior Administrative Medical 
Officer, 24.1.67 -held in R.l-!B 195. 
Report of the Senior Adminis.tra ti ve Medical Officer 
to the RHB's Capital Development Sub-Committe, 
3.2.67. 
Letter from the Ministry of Health to Newcastle 
HMC, 7.3.67 - copy held in RHB 195. 
10.15 
10.16 
10.17 
10.18 
10.19 
10 0 20 
10.21 
10.22 
10.23 
10.24 
10.25 
10.26 
10 .. 2 7 
10.28 
10.29 
-339-
Memorandum by consultants at NGH on the 
development .of hospital services. in the 
Newcastle HMC area (n.d.-July 1967?) - held 
in RHB 195. 
Ibid. 
RHB document entitled App·reciatioti of the 
Cotisult~nt's Plan (n.d. - July 1961?) 
- held in RHB 195. 
Report of the meeting between the RHB and the 
consultants at NGH~ 28.7.67 -held in RHB 195. 
Ibid. 
Memorandum on the development 6£ hospital 
services in the Newcastle area~ 1.5.68 -
held in RHB 195. 
Ibid. 
RHB internal memorandum, 2.12.68 - held in 
RHB 195. 
Meeting of the Combined Medical Advisory 
Committee of the Newcastle :i-IMC and the 
BG, 14.1.69; see also minutes of the BG 
meeting, 1.5.69. 
Group Medical Liaison Committee: Advice concerning 
the .dis•tribution of beds and special ties in 
future· Newcastle hospitals~ April 1969, hel<i 
in RHB 195 - emphases added. 
Letter from Henry Miller to the RHB Chairman, 
13.5.69 - held in RHB 195. 
Reported in the Newca·stle Journal~ 28.7. 69. 
This paragraph draws on representations made 
by Miller to the DHSS. The actual text of these 
was unavailable but a summary of his views was 
given in a letter from the DHSS to the RHB, 
11.9.69 - held in RHB 195. 
Notes of a meeting ... regarding the possible 
development of a University Hospital Complex, 
6.5.69 - held in RHB 195. 
See note 10.27. 
10.30 
10.31 
10.32 
10.33 
10.34 
10.35 
10.36 
10.37 
10.38 
10.39 
10.40 
10.41 
10.42 
10 0 43. 
10.44 
10.45 
10.46 
10.47 
-340-
Notes of a meeting between the RHB and Newcastle 
City Council Planning Committee, 25.7.69 
- h~ld in RHB 195. 
Newcastle RHB, Board Meeting, 6.6.69. 
See figure 5.6, noting, however, that the data 
does ~ot include the BG~s Capit~l Ac~6titits, 
which-could not be traced. 
Notes of a meeting between the RHB and the 
Planning Committee of Newcastle City Council, 
25.7.69 -held in RHB 195. 
RHB document entitled 'Visit of the Secretary 
of State - brief for the Chairman of the Board', 
16.9.69 -held in RHB 195 (emphasis added). 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Letter from G. Rhodes (MP for Newcastle East) 
to the Ne~castle Jou~nal, 20.9.69. 
See note 8.51. 
Newcastle RHB File note on the meeting with 
the Secretary of State, 26.9.69 - held in RHB 195. 
Letter from Crossman.to the RHB, 22.10.69-
held in RHB 195 (this letter gave full details 
of Crossman's decision). 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Report by C.B. Pearson and Partners - held in 
RHB 195. 
Various papers held in RHB 195 show that Dr. 
G.O. Richardson had been heavily involved in this 
dispute and had consistently opposed Freeman Road. 
Notes of a meeting between representatives of 
the Northern RHA and Durham AHA, 11.3.80. 
Due largely to building height restrictions 
(see Chapter 9) . 
Notes of a meeting between representatives of 
the Northern RHA and Durham AHA, 11.3.80. 
10.48 
10.49 
10.50 
10.51 
10.52 
10.53 
10.54 
10.55 
10.56 
10.57 
10.58 
10.59 
10.60 
10.61 
10.62 
10.63 
10.64 
-341-
!hid. 
Northern RHA ~ Populations for planning purposes 
(unpublished paper, 1976). · · 
Minutes of a meeting between representatives of 
the Northern RHA and Durham AHA~ 1L3.80. 
Northern RHA - Report on the pattern of hospital 
provision for Easington District (n.d. - probably 
mid-1979). 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Minutes of a meeting between :;representatives of the 
Northern RHA and the Durham AHA, 11.3.80. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Notes of a meeting between representatives of 
Durham CHC and the Northern RHA, 11.3.80. 
Northern RHA/Durham AHA meeting, 11.3.80. 
Northern RHA internal memorandum, 4.7.80 
- square brackets in original~ other brackets 
and emphases added by the author. 
Letter from the'Hospital for Washington' campaign 
to the Minister of Health, 1980. This is held 
in the Northern RHA Planning nivision files, as 
are all papers referred to subsequently, with 
the exception of the press cuttings noted in 
footnotes 10.64, 10.75 and 10.76. 
This paragraph has summarised the arguments of 
the 'Hospital for Washington' campaign (outlined 
fully in Ibid.). 
Sunderland AHA, Review of Hospital Strategy: Report 
to the Regional Team of Officers, 8.7.80. 
Draft report on long-term development in Sunderland 
(n.d., probably September/October 1980}. 
Reported regularly in the local press - see, for 
instance, the Newcastle Journal, 17.9.77, 7.10.77, 
17.1.78, 24.1.78. 
10o66 
l0o67 
10o68 
l0o69 
10 0 70 
10o71 
l0o72 
10.73 
10o74 
10 0 75 
10 0 76 
-342-
NRHA document on long-term hospital strategy for 
the Sunderland area, November 1980o 
Letter from R. Tilmouth (Managing Director, 
Washington NTDC) to the RHA, l0o2o8lo 
Washington NTDC - Hos~ital Str~tegy fo~ the 
Sunderland area: detailed response to the RHA, 
30 0 1 0 81. 
NRHA notes of a meeting to discuss the location 
of a second general hospital within Sunderland 
AHA, 2 o 3 . 81 . 
·1Washington NTDC, Hospital ·strate·gy for the 
Sunderl~n:d area - deta1led respons_e 'to the 
NRHA, 30 o 1 . 81 . 
NRHA - Hospital Services in Sunderland AHA: results 
of consultation, 17o3.81 -comments of Gateshead 
AHA, South Tyneside AHA, and Durham CHC. 
NRHA notes of a meeting on Hospital Strategy for 
the Sunderland area, 20.3o8l. 
NRHA notes of a meeting with Sunderland AHA on 
Hospital Strategy for the Sunderland area, 9o6o8l. 
Ibid. 
This account has drawn heavily on Northern RHA 
documents, in particular that on Sunderland 
Hospitals Strategy, 16.11.81. 
Reported in the Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 
3o3.77 - see also Chapter 7.3. 
Professor I. Johnston- quoted in the Newcastle 
Evening Chronicle, 5.10.79 - emphasis added. 
-344-
11. Concluding comments 
In summarising the conclusions of .this thesis~ the 
four objectives stated in Chapter 1 are reiterated. These 
were: 
- to evaluate geographical work on public facility 
location problems; 
to assess the utility of certain theoretical 
propositions on the state, with reference to their 
utility in accounting for the spatial outcomes 
of social processes; 
- to provide a broad overview Df major issues 1n 
the deve}opment of the acute hospital services of 
the Newcastle RHB (Northern RHA) area; 
- to reconstruct in detail the decision-making 
processes whereby hospitals are located. 
The extent to which these have been fulfilled is 
now assessed. 
11.1 The lo~al planning issues. 
Viewed retrospectively, it is clear that a wholly 
satisfactory and comprehensive account of these issues would 
have been an unrealistic project, due to the complexity of 
the issues discussed, the number of agencies involved, and the 
protracted nature of the disputes. Any attempt at re-
construction can at best only be a summary, which is further 
constrained by such issues as survival of evidence. However, 
the following matters are of importance. 
Firstly, it is clear that an investigation of spatial 
changes in service provision within this region cannot be 
conducted without reference to the economic, social and political 
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changes within it (Chap..ter 8). In particular~ the development 
of Peferlee and Washington? and the proposals for modernising 
central Newcastle, both had important implications for dis-
cussions on hospital planning. The interaction of various 
agencies of the state is a key theme here. For e_xample, the 
ability of NTDCs to guarantee the attainment of their population 
targets was a matter of some importance in discussing hospital 
provision for Washington and Peterlee. An understanding of 
the inter-relationships between population change, spatial 
policy and health service planning is essential if these 
planning problems are to be adequately understood. 
Secondly?Chapter 9 demonstrated that these planning issues 
could not be resolved either by the application of the kind of 
spatial analytic methods reviewed in Chapter 2? or by appeals 
to what was taken to be an 'ideal type' of medical provision. 
Since the obj ect.i ves to be achieved we.re o.pen to discuss ion, so 
too were the means whereby alternative strategies were to be 
assessed. This touches on more fundamental points to be made 
later, and is therefore not discussed at this stage. 
Thirdly, Chapter 10 summarised major themes in the 
negotiations on these three planning issues. Attention was 
directed particularly to the constraints under which planners 
were operating? to the claims o£ various parties and the extent 
to which these were granted, and to the factors which were 
decisive in these disputes. however, these were. ultimately 
not explicable simply in terms of the actions and intentions 
of key agencies or individuals. By contrast, constraints on 
state intervention proved decisive and these are considered 
below (section 11.3). 
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11.2 HospitaT planning .,1948-1982 (Chapters 4-7). 
A comprehensive chro.nology of all events in the study 
area was beyond the scope of this thesis. Discussion focused 
instead on specific themes selected in relation to theoretical 
propositions concerning the state. Where poss.ible, these 
themes were related to particular planning issues. Thus Chapter 
4 discussed the historical development of hospitals in Britain, 
considered the wartime negotiations on future hospital planning, 
and presented evidence about the problems to be solved by 
postwar planning. However, given severe restrictions on the 
availability of resources in the immediate postwar years, 
progress in hospital development was minimal (Chapter 5) . The 
Hospital Plan's announcement in 1962 followed an important 
change in the character of state intervention in the British 
economy, namely the introduction of economic planning, but the 
specific form taken by the Plan was a result of a variety of 
technical developments in hospital planning. 
However, the optimism evident at the time of the Plan's 
announcement has proved to be misplaced and ~xaggerated. 
The Plan's implementation has been subject to a variety of 
constraints (Chapters 6 and 7). Thus public expenditure 
policies have disrupted its timing,. from the revision of the 
Plan announced in 1966 (Ministry of Health, 1966) to the ad hoc 
cuts imposed at various times in the 1970s. Partly in response, 
attempts have been made to rationalise the Plan; the Con-
servative government's (DHSS, 1980a) policy is the most recent 
in this respect. In addition, the scale of DGH provision has 
been reduced considerably from that envisaged by, for example, 
the Bonham-Carter Report (Central Health Services Council, 
1969). Planning problems have also been posed both by rapid 
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localised population changes and by the social implications 
of service concentration. The problems of imp.lementing the 
Plan have been exacerbated by re.cent .publ.ic expenditure policies 
and this was exemplified by reference to developments in New-
castle AHA(T), where a combination of the effects of inflation 
and strictly enforced cash limits has necessitated proposals 
for dramatic reductions in services. 
Chapters 4-7, then, have shown how broad changes in 
the British state in the postwar period in turn influenced 
events in the hospital service, and thus af.fected what could be 
achieved by local planners. In this sense these chapters serve 
as a context within which the material on local-scale planning 
should be interpreted. No attempt was made to provide a 
complete chronology of al1 events in the study are~;rather, 
the evidence was employed selectively, to illustrate the 
constraints under which planning agencies operate. A more 
detailed examination.of the Hospital Plan's implementation 
is clearly an important task. Furthermore, this research h~s 
concentrated totally upon spatial aspects of acute hospital 
provision. However, a comprehensive account of the hospital 
services of postwar Britain would have to consider the dis-
tribution of resources between sectors of the state hospital 
service, and also the balance between state and private 
hospital provision. These are important priorities for future 
work. 
11.3 Theoretical implications: the role of the state 
The arguments presented in Chapter 3 are now re-
evaluated in the light of the evidence presented. 
Firstly, it should be clear that this material cannot 
• c 
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adequately be understood in terms of managerialist or pluralist 
accounts of the state. Even if key 'managers' can be 
identified - and this was rarely possible in the disputes 
examined here - there is only limited value in discussing their 
actions without reference to the structurally-located constraints 
within which they operate. Likewise? the local planning 
disputes are characterised by a diversity of interest groups~ 
and thus might be open to a pluralist interpretation. However, 
on closer examination it becomes clear that there are considerable 
differentials in the ability of these groups to guarantee the 
attainment of their objectives; certain ]11terests and intentions 
consistently prevail. The limited consideration given, in the 
local case studies, to claims made on the basis of social need, 
exemplifies this. Interpretations which deny any connection 
between power and class - such as pluralist and managerialist 
views - give at best a partial understanding of state policy 
formulation. 
The claims of several Marxist accounts of the state 
were also rejected as being over-simplistic. lt is patently 
not the case that the state has acted as an instrument of the 
capitalist class. For instance, provision of state health 
services certainly benefits capital but it also represents an 
important concession to demands for social reform. More 
specifically, in the context of this work, it is not always 
clear that a direct link exists between capitalist class 
interests and the development of strategies for hospital pro-
vision. Structuralist accounts, such as those of Poulantzas, 
are functionalist in character and, as Giddens (1982) and 
Saunders (1979) observe, pose severe pr_oblems for empirical 
research since the concept of relative aut.onomy may be used 
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in an account of almost any conceivable historical situationo 
Finally, neither instrumentalist accounts explicitly consider 
the problem of the limits to state interventiono 
In view of the limitations of such work~ an assessment 
was made of the recent German debates on the stateo Capital-
logic views were rejected~ for they tend to reduce events in 
capitalist society to being a result of the needs of capital. 
I ~ As Mos iey (1982, 28) points out, they therefore replace an 
l 'v 
economic determinism with economic functionalismo However,the 
views of Habermas and, in particular, Offe, provided a more 
convincing interpretation of the empirical material, on 
three counts. 
Firstly, Offe provides important insights into the 
policy formulation process, demonstrating that its complexity 
arises neither from the incompetence of planners nor from the 
incompatibility of the subjective intentions of various agencies, 
but rather from the structural characteristics of the capital-
ist state and the changing character of the accumulation 
processo Policy formulation consequently follows a somewhat 
tortuous path, illuminated by what may be ill-specified criteria, 
and it can best be characterised as a form of crisis manage-
ment. This is supported, for example, by the studies of local 
planning issues; the decisions reached could be characterised 
as strategies likely to minimise disturbances to the systemo 
Many of the political solutions developed for hospital plann-
ing - from the 'Limit and Control of Expenditure' circular of 
1950 (Chapter 5) to the ad hoc public expenditure reductions 
of the late 1970s - can be seen as short-term responses aimed 
at avoiding major system crises. Precisely because of the com-
plex and c~isis-prone nature. of state policy-making, decisions 
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cannot be reduced simply to technical evaluations of alter-
native strategies~ for there will be no guarantee that such 
solutions will be generally acceptable (see Chapter 9) . 
Secondly~ Offe~s concept of selection procedures~ where-
by the state (in general) seeks to secure capitalist interests 
while simultaneously excluding anti-capitalist interests~ 
appears to have considerable validity in terms of elucidating 
the class character of the state. These procedures operate 
on four leveis, namely structure, ideology, process~ and 
repression. The latter was not directly relevant here but the 
others are considered in turn. However, such procedures do 
not operate mechanistically, nor are they necessarily as 
hierarchical as the above terminology might imply. 
Structural selection procedures refer to the limits on 
those matters that can become the subject of state policy. 
One example is the evident re~istance to full state control of 
the hospital service (Chapter 4). A rather better illustration, 
though perha~beyond the scope of this thesis, is provided 
by the fact that the NHS was organised on a curative, rather 
than a p.reventive, basis. In this sense the NHS represented 
not so much a socialist transition in health service provision 
but rather a rationalisation of existing arrangements. However, 
it should be emphasised that the operation of this selection 
procedure varies historically, as illustrated by the current 
attempts to facilitate the expansion of private medical care. 
Ideological procedures, operating within broad limits 
/' on theextent of state intervention, influence what the state >;\ 
l 
actually does. A clear illustration would be the recent trends 
in hospital policy (Chapter 7) which can plausibly be linked 
to the currently-dominant 'new right' ideology. Likewise, 
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the ideology of modernisation evident in the Newcastle d~spute 
(Chapter 8) was of some importance in terms of influencing the 
policy options put forward. However, Offe pays relatively 
little attention to the production of ideologies and the pro-
cesses whereby they become accepted. In this sense his views 
require development, and the class-theoretic arguments of such 
writers as Gramsci (1971), with their emphasis on ideology and 
consciousness, may be important in this connection. 
Offe also argues that the policy formulation process 
itself acts as a £clection procedure on state policy. Navarro 
(1978) seems to deploy this procedure in a simplistic and, 
arguably, instrumentalist fashion; he proposes that social and 
spatial inequalities in the NHS are related to the class origins 
of the senior personnel of the service and of the membership 
of its planning committees. Such. an interpretation 
reminiscent of Miliband's (1969) views - can only be justified 
if it can be shown exactly how such groups are in a position to 
use their influence. The local planning issues exemplify this; 
in particular the .Freeman Road dispute was precipitated, in 
large measure, by divisions within medical opinion regarding 
the spatial arrangement of services. 
Finally, Offe stresses the historically-changing 
character of the capitalist state. Thus the extension of state 
control of health services, which involved providing services 
for use rather than exchange, posed serious problems for 
policy formulation. Subsequent developments have included 
various attempts to rationalise, reduce or restructure state 
expenditure in response to crises in the accumulation process. 
Thus the introduction of economic planning represented a 
response to the perceived limitations of Keynesian techniques 
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(Chapter 5). More recent public expenditure policies reflect 
a widely-held view of the unproductive nature of such ex-
penditure. Perhaps the best single example of the consequences 
for hospital planning of the changing character of the British 
state is provided by a comparison of the 1962 Hospital Plan 
with the most recent policy guidance. The former document 
envisaged employing an expanding NHS capital building pro-
gramme not only to equalise the distribution of NHS resources 
(on a per capita basis), but also to attempt to rationalise 
(or at least gain more effective control of) hospital running 
costs. By contrast the 1980 Consultation Paper, for all its 
rhetoric about a more spatially decentralised hospital service, 
seems concerned largely with restraining claims for new 
capital development. 
Thus Offe's propositions about the capitalist state both 
facilitate an interpretation of the foregoing evidence and 
.represent theoretical advances upon earlier Marxist views. Two 
pbints which perhaps require development concern his treatment 
of ideology and the question of the boundaries between the four 
levels of selection procedure discussed by Offe. Finally, a 
theme not developed 1n this thesis concerns the differential 
influence of sub-class interest groups on state policy. For 
instance, the medical profession cannot be seen as an un-
differentiated entity; within it, there exist a 
groups with varying degrees of influence on NHS resource 
allocation. An examination of sectoral aspects bf hospital 
planning would have clarified this matter; evidently it is 
necessary for theories of the state to confront sub-class 
divisions, though this is not to be interpreted as a justific-
ation for a rapprochement with pluralist views. 
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Finally~ three poss.ible avenues for future research on 
the state are identified. These concern the local state, the 
language in which state policies are expressed, and some un-
resolved epistemological problems. 
Despite the superficially radical rhetoric o£ analyses 
of the local state (e.g. Cockburn, 1977; Saunders, 1919), no 
conclusive demonstration has yet been provided that this concept 
is anything other than a label denoting a local dimension of 
state action rather than an abstraction of social relations 
(Duncan and Goodwin, 1982). Debates have thus focused largely 
on consumption issues without considering production relations, 
though it is true that it may not be easy to link such 
apparently local issues with struggles between labour and 
capital. (Cooke, 1982, 199). Yet the existence of this problem 
is no justification for separating of£ the analysis of con-
sumption issues. Perhaps a crucial issue here is the.extent 
to which national and local state formations are interlinked. 
Clearly the extent of autonomy allowed to.the latter, and the 
tasks allocated to it, have varied over time and it is 
important to understand why and under what circumstan.ces this 
variation takes place. 
Secondly, a crucial theme in the empirical sections of 
this thesis (Chapters 4-10) concerns the language in which 
public debate on state policy formulation is conducted. Control 
over what. issues are, or are not, addressed by public policy 
is crucial, and it is clear that not all interested parties 
necessarily have an equal opportunity to voice their demands. 
Kemp (1980) demonstrates this for the Windscale Inquiry and 
it is exemplified here by the local case studies. Moreover, 
the images presented in planning deba t.es are of some importance 
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1n terms of gair.ing acceptance for particular views; Carney and 
Hudson (1974) illustrate this in relation to spatial policy 
within North East England, while Chapters 8 and 10. reveal the 
influence of certain groups within the medical profession in 
terms of putting forward certain views on the most effective 
organisation of health care delivery. Furthermore, control 
of information pertaining to planning matters (Roweis, 1981, 
168) may be a key element in the selectivity of the state (Offe, 
1974), since potentially unacceptable policy options may be 
excluded from debate. Hence the actual minutes of the meetings 
of planning agencies often contained only a partial account 
of important issues, and so reliance on background papers was 
essential. These remarks are not intended as an ex post 
rationalisation of the manner in which this work was con-
ducted. Rather, they serve to emphasise the point that without 
a detailed reconstruction of the decision-making process~ one 
is limited to inferring decision-making from its outcome, In 
summary, therefore, the links between state policy formulation, 
the interest groups involved in it, and the language in which 
public debates are conducted and policies put forward, all 
require much more detailed investigation. 
The final issue pertaining to the state concerns two 
epistemological problems raised by Giddens (1982) and Harris 
(1980) . These will not be resolved here but their status can 
perhaps be clarified. Harris (1980) objects to what he sees 
as the teleological character of historical accounts of the 
welfare state, whereby all events are simply attributed to the 
'balance of class forces'. But the point is surely that this 
balance is essentially a contingent matter; it is incumbent 
upon the researcher to demonstrate how it was that particular 
-355-
policies came to be adopted in specific circumstances. Giddens' 
(1982) distaste for the functionalist character of some 
Marxist approaches is easy to sympathise with, but this problem 
would be difficult to overcome if taken to its logical con-
clusion. For this would beg the question 'what would happen 
if the state did not act the way it does?' - a question 
which would be (almost) unanswerable empirically. 
11.4 Implications for geography and public 
facility location. 
It was argued above (Chapter 2) that much previous 
work on this topic had either considered only a limited range 
of issues relevant to its object of study, or had suffered 
from several technical and theoretical problems. In seeking a 
reconstruction of facility location theory as a theory of 
society, Dear's (1978a, 1979) views were endorsed in general 
terms but_certain specific proposals were disputed. Here the 
arguments of Chapter 2 are reconsidered. 
There seems to be only limited scope for constructing 
a location theory for public facilities along the same lines 
as that dev~loped for the private sector. The complexity 
of public decisions is a matter of commonplace observation; 
in turn this can be related to the nature of the capitalist 
state (Chapter 3) and the empiricn.l material (Chapters 4-10) 
supports such a view. Moreover, it has been shown that there 
are limits to the extent to which political problems may be 
resolved by, or reduced to, technical procedures (Chapter 9). 
If this is accepted, it follows that the approaches reviewed 
and evaluated above can be defended only on instrumentalist 
grounds (Batty, 1979). 
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Furthermore~ it is felt that the fragmentation 
evident in research on public facility location can be over-
come. By interpreting location decisions in their wider 
social context, it is possible to link the distributive 
outcomes of public decisions back to the structure of the 
social formation under consideration. This does not simply 
involve linking social policy to its social and spatial out~ 
comes (Kirby and Jones, 1982); such an approach takes for 
granted the determinants of social policy. Technical problems 
remain in assessing the distributive impacts of public facil-
ities, but it is surely of more fundamental importance to 
develop an adequate framework within which decision-making 
m~y be interpreted. 
In this regard, Dear's views were endorsed as a point 
of departure for a public facility location theory, but certain 
refinements were proposed and the foregoing has sought to 
demonstrate their relevance. Thus an account has been given 
of hospital planning in the study area which seeks to avoid the 
pitfalls of structuralism (simplistically reading off public 
service provision from the 'material base' of society) and 
voluntarism (pitching explanatory accounts solely in terms of 
the intentions of individuals or agencies) . This is perhaps 
best ex~mplified by the local case studies. These could have 
been discussed in terms of the subjective intentions of key 
decision-makers, but this would have ignored the constraints 
under which planners operate. In the Newcastle case for instance, 
constraints existed both on land availability and on the pro-
gramming of the RHB's capital schemes. These proved decisive 
in the final analysis, but not before a powerful lobby of 
consultants and politicians had exerted sufficient pressure to 
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require persistent negotiations and evaluations of alternative 
sites. To say, therefore, that this decision was the result 
either of the constraints referred to, or of the intervention 
of the Secretary of State at the DHSS (and both would be valid 
on one level) , would ignore this complex interplay of agents 
and structures. 
Moreover, it is .important to present a class analysis 
of these planning disputes and of the NHS as a whole. It is 
patently not the case that all classes or interest groups have 
an equal opportunity to press their claims and pluralist or 
managerialist views were rejected on this basis. More con-
vincing analyses can be presented via an understanding of 
theories of the capitalist state (section 11.3, above). 
Finally, the materialist perspective developed here 
permits the explanation of spatial changes in hospital pro-
vision in terms of the changing character of the state since 
1945. Attempts have been made to demonstrate how certain 
solu~ions to planning problems came to be adopted in specific 
historical circumstances; these have then been linked to 
developments in the hospital service. Such an approach is 
more fruitful in accounting for spatial patterns of public 
facilities than the methods reviewed above (Chapter 2) , which 
typically abstract facility location from its wider social 
context and thus reveal little - if anything - about why 
pu@:lic facilities exist and hence about spatial patterns of 
these facilities. 
To summarise, the foregoing has argued that Dear's 
(1978a, 1979) proposals provided a basis for a reformulation 
of facility location theory, but some refinements were deemed 
necessary. These arguments were substantiated via an empirical 
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investigation of state policies and hospital planning which 
stressed the importance of theorising the role of the state 
and the class character of state policy formulation. The 
~pproach adopted was claimed to be progressive insofar as it 
avoided the pitfalls of approaches identified within a 
tradition of regional science and~ at the same tim~, sought to 
elucidate the relationships between society, social change 
and state policy formulation in relation to the hospital 
services of North-East England. To the extent that these have 
been linked together, the aims of the thesis may be said to have 
been realised. Thus an account has been given of hospital 
planning (Chapters 4-10) which (with some reservations) has 
been interpreted in the context of certain theoretical pro-
positions about the state (Chapter 3). These propositions 
in turn follow from the reformulation of facility location 
theory advanced in Chapter 2. 
One final implication of this research follows from 
the critiques of both certain forms of knowledge in human 
geography (Chapter 2) and approaches to theorising the state 
(Chapter 3)~ a11d also from the empirical evidence on state 
policy formulation (Chapters 4-10); at issue here is the use 
to which knowledge can be put. In attempting to elucidate 
the class character of the state and to demonstrate the limited 
and ideological character of certain approaches to geographical 
problems, this research shares certain common features with 
the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt School (H0rkmeimer, 
1972; Habermas, 1972; 1974; 1976a). Broadly speaking this 
implies producing knowledge constituted by an emancipatory 
cognitive interest - that is, an interest in transcending 
existing social relationships to achieve a society characterised 
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by communication free from domination. Within h1..m1an 
geography, critical theory has been deployed by Gregory (1980) 
and Lewis and Melville (1978) to illustrate the ideological 
character of systems theory and regional science respectively. 
It is argued that, by adopting a particular form of ex-
planation -'traditional theory' (Horkheimer, 1972) - regional 
science produces accounts of social phenomena which conceal 
the possibility of social change but allow for partial 
modification of social processes. Both these arise because 
a symmetry between explanation and prediction is central to 
traditional theory; hence control of social processes is 
possible because the meaning of a prediction is in_its 
technical application. Since successful explanations can only 
be produced if it is assumed that existing social relation-
ships continue to exist, it follows that the use of such 
explanations in social engineering will have the practical 
effect of reproducing the existing social order. Moreover, 
these practical consequences are not dependent an the sub-
jective intentions of individual_social scientists (Habermas, 
1972). The foregoing has only summarised briefly the elements 
of Lewis and Melville's critique (see Fay, 1975; Bernstein, 
1976; Gregory, 1978) but it should be evident that this 
critique offers further grounds for rejecting the approaches 
discussed above (Chapter 2). As applied to public facility 
location, this would allow a demonstration that not only is 
the production of a facility location theory within the 
epistemological confines of regional science a technically 
difficult and theoretically problematic task, but it also 
implies adopting a covert political stance. Though apparently 
offering neutral techniques for planning, such an epistemology 
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offers a technology whereby piecemeal social engineering may 
take place~ and provides little more than a means of reducing 
political problems to technical issues. 
Such an argument undeniably provides an incisive 
critique of certain §!.pproaches within human geography, but 
there remains the problem of demonstrating that analyses of the 
class character of the state which - implicitly - seek to 
reconstruct social science as critical theory (e.g. Hudson, 1981; 
Krieger~ 1979) necessarily follow from such a critique. Further-
more, the extent to which critical theory can be advocated as 
a model for social theory is still open to question (see 
Giddens~ 1979). But it does seem that the metatheoretical 
critique offered by critical theory facilitates an under-
standing of the respective social functions of traditional 
and critical theory~ though whether those working within 
traditional theory would accept such an analysis remains to 
be seen. ~owever, this can only become a possibility if the 
ideological character of certain forms of knowledge and 
the class nature of existing social relationships can be 
demonstrated by the kind of analysis of which this work 
represents a preliminary formulation. 
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Appendix 1: NHS organisation 
This appendix briefly sets out details of (a) the 
organisation of the NHS and of the Newcastle RHB from 1948-1974 
and (b) the post-1974 reorganised NHS. Since the subsequent 
(1982) reorganisation is not relevant to the foregoing evidence~ 
it is not considered here. 
(a) The organisation of the NHS~ 1948-1974. 
The structure of the NHS, as it affected the hospital 
services in this period~is set out in figure A.l (overleaf). 
Three points should be noted. First, for reasons discussed, 
inter alia, in Eckstein (1959), Navarro (1978), Foot(l973) 
and Crossman (1972), the Teaching Hospitals were organised under 
separate Boards of Governors who were responsible direct to 
the Minister of Health. Hence responsibility for the planning 
of Newcastle's hospital services was split between the Board 
of Governors and the RHB, and this clearly posed some problems 
of coordination (see Chapters 8-10). However, the Board of 
Governors merged with the Newcastle HMC from 1971, to create 
the Newcastle University HMC. The second point is that 
psychiatric hospitals were administered under separate HMCs 
prior to 1974. This posed certain problems with respect to the 
financial statistics employed in Chapters 5 and 6 (see appendix 
2). Thirdly, in view of its ren1oteness from the rest of the 
RHB, a committee was set up to carry out the RHB's duties in 
Cumberland and in the part of Westmorland which fell within the 
Newcastle RHB. This was known as the Special Area Committee. 
However, its activities were not examined in detail above. A 
fuller account of the activities of the Newcastle RHB would 
clearly have to consider the reasons why this Committee was 
set up, its activities, and its relationship to the RHB. Such 
M i n is t e r of He a It h 
Regional Hospital Boards Boards of Governors 
Hospita I Management Committees Teaching· hospitals 
Non - teaching hospitals 
Figure A.l: Organisation of hospital Source: adapted from Eckstein (1959, 177) 
services in the pre-1974 NHS 
VJ 
co 
VJ 
[ 
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a task was outside the terms of reference of this thesis. The 
functions of the various authorities are now described. 
According to RHB(47)1, the 1946 NHS Act envisaged strong 
regional control of the service: 
1 the Minister of Health will discharge most of 
his statutory duty through RHBs ... RHBs will act 
as the Minister's agents ... on who~ h~ wishes to 
confer the larg~st possible me~s~re ~f discretion 
... (btit) the Minister wants the Board to feel 
... a lively sense of independent respon_sibi1ity'. 
(RHB(47)1- emphases added). 
However, no formal schemes or regional plans were 
necessarily required, though Boards were expected to agree with 
the Minister on the general lines of future developments. Below 
the RHB level, HMCs were to perform the actual day-to-day 
running of the services, 'reserving power to RH~s to decide 
questions of wider policy' (RHB ( 4 7) 1) . 
These functions were clarified by RHB (48)2. Three of 
the six functions prescribed for RHBs should be noted; these 
were: 
'(a)the general organisation and supervision of the 
hospital and specialist services 
(b)provision of the necessary premises ... 
for the prDvision of services for patients from 
the Board's area ... (and) 
(q)avthorisation of all building, civil engineer-
ing and maintenance work by HMCs costing over 
£1,000 I o 
(RHB(48)2). 
RHBs were to be responsible for: 
'the strategy .of the services in their area~ 
for reviewing and assessing the resources of the 
service 7 planning the best use of them ... 
and giving general oversight to the operation 
of the HMCs ... ' 
( RH B ( 4 8) 2) . 
Given that RHBs had to authorise any building work costing 
over £1,000 and since RHBs were responsible for strategic 
planning, the HMC's role was limited; indeed HMCs were simply 
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responsible for secur1ng: 
'the efficient management and administration 
(of the hospitals under their control} within 
the limits of ... (their) approved budget ... 
subject to any guidance given bythe Board or 
by the Minister~ each HMC ~ill be able to organise 
the day-to-day operation of its services as it 
thinks fit'. 
(RHB(48)2- emphases added). 
Boards of Governors, in general, had similar responsibi-
lities to RHBs; as might be inferred from their separation from 
the rest of the NHS, their particular responsibility was to 
facilitate the development of medical education. 
In the Newcastle RHB area, non-psychiatric hospital 
services were administered by the HMCs shown in figure 5.1; 
developments in the psychiatric services were not considered. 
Two changes were made to the ~on-psychiatric HMCs; the first 
of these - the merger (in 1971) of the Newcastle HMC and the 
Board of Governors of the Teaching Hospitals - has already 
been noted. The second was the reorganisation (in 1958) of 
the Sedgefield HMC and Teesside and Cleveland HMC into HMCs 
for North and South Teesside respectively. This in turn was 
linked to proposals for major hospital~development on Teesside 
(see Chapter 5). 
(b) The reorganised NHS, 1974-1982. 
The intention of the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS was 
to achieve closer integration of services provided by hospitals, 
local health authorities and GPs. To do this it set up Area 
Health Authorities at the sub-regional level. These were, 
generally~ speaking, coterminous with local authority areas to 
facilitate integration of the health and personal social 
services. AHAs were responsible: 
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'.for achieving national health care ob ject.i ves 
through the provision. o£ comprehens·i ve health 
services designed to ~eet the need~ o£ the 
communi ties within ·its disTricts ... (and)· for 
planning and.developlng services in consultation 
with its matching local authority and with 
the regional health authority'. 
(House of Connnons ~ 19.72 - emphases added). 
Below the AHA level, the day-to-day running o£ the 
service was based on health districts. These were not 
necessarily coterminous with local government districts, since 
the health district's boundaries would be related to health 
care heeds. Many AHAs were responsible .for only one or two 
health districts whereas others had up to .five. Thus the 
Newcastle AHA(T) (see Chapter 7) was a single district health 
authority, whereas Durham AHA was responsible .for .four health 
districts. The bounda.ries between health authorities were in 
no sense regarded as barriers to the use o£ health services; 
cross-boundary .flows would be appropriate according to the 
dictates of availability of services and patient choice and 
convenience. How.ever, some conflicts have developed regarding 
the necessity .for.such .flows and, more generally, over the 
nature and extent of services to be provided by an AHA in 
pursuit of its objectives (see Chapter 9). 
Above the AHA, Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) were 
essentially charged with strategic planning.· The RHA was to: 
'develop strategic plans and priorities based on 
a review of the needs identified by AHAs and on 
the judgement of the right balance between.·the 
individual areas' claims on resources ... (and to) 
review the plans of each o£ its areas to satisfy 
itself that they contain programmes to achieve 
necessary improvements in services, that they are 
attainable within available regional resources, 
that they are consistent with national and regional 
policies, and that they have been coordinated with 
the plans and activities of local authorities'. 
(House of Commons, 1972) 
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RHAs are responsible for all major cap:;.tal investment 
projects? and hence the planning of the future pattern of 
services in? for example? Sunderland AHA? was carried out 
largely at RHA level (see Chapters 9 and 10) . 
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Appendix 2: Sources of evidence 
Though the documents which were cited in the text have 
been referenced individually in footnotes, the sources from 
which these were obtained are summarised here for referenceo 
Published reports and accounts have beenreferenced in the 
bibliography; this appendix notes those sources not readily 
accessible, and is divided into four sections, concerned with 
(1) state papers and Public Record Office material; 
(2) minutes and papers of health authorities within the 
area studied; 
(3) miscellaneous sources; 
(4) sources of information on hospital locationo 
1. State papers and Public Record Offi~e material 
Public Record Office (PRO) material is arranged according 
to the ministry to which it refers. Papers_are then grouped 
in files on broad topics; within these, individual pi~ces contain 
material on specific issues. Thus MH 80/34 refers to piece 34 
of Ministry of Health file 80. ~abinet p~p~rs are arranged in 
two series; CAB 128, minutes of Cabinet meetings, and CAB 129, 
memoranda prepared for the Cabinet. In addition to the Cabinet 
papers for 1945-1951, the principal sources were the following: 
File Piece Subject 
MH 77 18 Survey of hospital .c . 1 ••• J..aCJ.J..lt:les. 
MH ]7 25-27 Hospital and medical services. 
MH 80 24 National Health Service: preliminary 
papers, 1939-1942. 
MH 80 25-30 National Health Service:Secretary's 
bill papers, 1943-1946. 
MH 80 34 Hospital services. 
MH 88 49 Newcastle RHB: hospital land, 
buildings and development. 
MH 90 54 Meetings of RHB Chairmen. 
In addition, various references to parliamentary 
debates reported in Hansard are given in individual footnotes, 
as are references to circulars issued by the Ministry of 
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Heal th}DHSS. 
2. Papers relating to activities of Health Authorities 
within the Newcastle RHB/Northern RHA. 
2.1 Papers of the Newcastle RHB 
Data on the location of hospitals are described below. 
Financial statistics were obtained from the RHB's Annual Accounts. 
These gave totals of capital expenditure in each hospital for 
each year from 1949-1950 to 1973-1974, with the exception of 
1972-1973, for which the accounts could not be traced. This 
information allowed analysis of the intra-regional distribution 
of investment in non-psychiatric hospitals (figures 5.6 a-d). 
Capital expenditure in the RHB was also disaggregated by the use 
to which it was put (e.g. new construction etc.), but the 
accounts did not consider separately psychiatric and non-
psychiatric hospitals. Hence discussion of the use of capital 
by Newcastle RHB (Chapters 5, 6) refers to capital expenditure 
for all hospital services in the region. The RHB's Annual 
Reports were also used but these appear to have been dis-
continued after 195]. 
Evidenrewas also drawn from the minutes of the RHB's 
Planning Committee (1948-1962) and Capital Development Sub-
Committee (1961-1974). According to the Newcastle RHB's First 
Report (1950, 20), the Planning Committee was intended to: 
'organise and keep under review the hospital 
and specialist service, formulate extensions 
and developments thereof, and consider 
recommendations from its various sub-committees'. 
The Capital Development Sub-Committee was responsible 
for administering the expanding capital building programme 
RHB .File 
Number 
195E 
195F 
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Subject 
Medical planning of hospital services -
Sunderland (2 vols.). 
Medical planning of hospital services -
Durham (3 vols.). 
It is important to note that various files and/or 
important individual papers either have not survived, or they 
could not be traced. Thus files RHB 145/F/1 (meetings between 
the RHB and the Ministry of Health) and 14~/2}G (Survey of Long 
Term Development in the Region) could not be found. Individual 
volum~s of certain files were also not traced, a case in point 
being volume 1 of RHB 194 (Hospital Services on Teesside). 
Finally, the RHB's submission to the 1962 Hospital Plan was 
not found. 
2.2 Papers of the Board of Governors of the United Newcastle 
upon Tyne teaching hospitals. 
Under the administrative arrangements set up at the 
establishment of the NHS, teaching hospitals were run by Boards 
of Governors responsible direct to the Ministry of Health 
(see Appendix 1). In the context of this research, this meant 
that the RHB and the BG were responsible for hospital services 
in Newcastle (until 1971, when the BG and its hospitals merged 
with the Newcastle HMC). Two particular problems arose. Firstly, 
the financial statistics employed in Chapters 5 and 6 are 
incomplete, as it proved impossible to locate the BG's capital 
accounts. Secondly, it was necessary to corroborate the evidence 
held in RHB files on hospital development in Newcastle (see 
Chapters 8-10); the Minutes of the Board of Governors (1948-1971) 
were therefore checked for this purpose. 
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from the late 1950s onwards. However the first volume of its 
minutes, which included the period up to May 1961 (when the 
RHB made its submission to the Hospital Plan) could not be 
found. 
The following files covering specific issues of 
relevance to this work were also examined: 
RHB File 
Number 
43 
47 
47_/ A 
4.7 /B 
55/ A 
58 
58/A 
58/C 
58/D 
58/E 
64 
65]1] 
144 
145/.D 
145/ 2jH 
145}2_/I 
145_/ 2/K/9 
145/2/P/1-6 
14 5 J 2_/ QJ 1-19 
194 
195 
Subject 
Meetings of RHB Chairmen at the Ministry 
of Health. 
Correspondence with Aycliffe NTDC 
(2 vols.) . 
Correspondence with Peterlee NTDC 
(2 vols.) . 
Correspondence with Washington NTDC 
(2 vols.). 
Hospital accommodation. 
Transfer of hospitals to the Minister 
of Health. 
Unoccupied hospitals. 
Closures and change of use of hospitals. 
Location of hospitals. 
Age distribution of hospitals 
Age of hospitals. 
Ge.ria tric accommodation. 
Planning of District General Hospitals 
(3 vols.) . 
Major capital schemes. 
Capital developments 1961-1971 (3 vols.). 
Capital developments: priorities from HMCs. 
Evidence to the Select Committee on Estimates. 
Investigation into hospital building in 
Great Britain (see also House of Commons, 
1970). 
Capital Building Programme,l949-1950 to 
1954-1955. 
Capital .i3uilding Progra.mme~l955-1956 to 
1974-1975. 
Development of hospital services on Teesside 
( 4 vols.). 
Medical planning of hospital services -
Newcastle (7 vols.). 
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2.3 Papers relating to h6spital planning sirt~e ~g74. 
2. 3.1 Files of Newcastle AHA (T) . 
The examination of hospital developments in Newcastle 
upon Tyne (see Chapter .7) drew upon the Minutes and Meeting 
Papers of Newcastle AHA(T) for 19.74-1982~ and upon miscellaneous 
unpublished doouments referenced separately. 
2.3.2 _Papers held by the Northern RHA. 
The following files were consulted: 
RHA File 
A3/ 422 
. A9/422 
86/51 
529 
Subject 
Durham AHA-Planning. 
Sunderland AHA-Planning. 
Capital Development Programme. 
Resource Allocation. 
In addition, the account of hospital planning in the 
Sunderland area (Chapters 9, 10) drew heavily on papers held 
in a file entitled Sunderland AHA-Major JJevelopment, held in 
the Planning Department, Northern RHA.. Documents pertaining 
to the study of hospital planning in the Durham AHA (Chapter 
10), and to recent developments in hospital policy (Chapter 7) 
were also consulted in the RHA's Planning Department. 
2.3.3 Other sources. 
Papers and minutes of the Newcastle and Durham CHCs 
were consulted on specific issues (e.g. on hospital closures 
in Newcastle- see Chapter 7). 
3. Miscellaneous sources 
The Newcastle Central Library's collection of press 
cuttings on hospitals and health services (nine volumes, 1969 
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to date) was valuable in supplementing the account of hospital 
development in Newcastle. Tyne Wear Archives _.Depart_ment holds 
records of the Board of Governors of the RVI; those con-
cerning proposals for post-World War II hospital development 
in Newcastle were consulted. 
4. Data on the loca.ti.on and size of hospitals. 
These were obtained, first, from the Hospital Surveys 
(Ministry of Health, 1946, volumes 9 and 10). These gave 
descriptions of the location, size, former ownership, and 
staffing of all hospitals in the Newcastle RHB area. Details 
of the location of individual hospitals were checked against 
the OS 1" (Sixth Series) maps and against more detailed maps 
as and where appropriate; street atlases we.re used to check 
hospital sites on Tyneside, Wearside and Teesside. Sub-
sequently, information on hospital size was obtained from the 
Annual Accounts of Newcastle RHB, and the location of hospitals 
was checked against the addresses given in the Newcastle RHB's 
handbook on Grouping of Hospitals, published in 1962. This 
was necessary because a number of hospitals either changed their 
name, merged with other facilities, or were taken over by the 
Ministry of Health some time after 1948. Thus the St. Mary 
Magdalene Home for Incurables, Newcastle, became the Hunter's 
Moor Hospital; the Sheriff Hill Hospital (Gateshead) merged with 
the adjacent Queen Elizabeth Hospital as development proceeded 
at the latter; and the former Dunston Hill War Pensioners' 
Hospital (in Gateshead HMC) was taken over by the NHS in 
1957. 
